

RECORD OF '68 DISCUSSION

The CIA Has "Cover" Problems, Too

By JAMES DOYLE
Star Staff Writer

Early in 1968 a group including former officials of the Central Intelligence Agency and the State Department settled down after dinner at the Harold Pratt House, on New York's Avenue, to discuss some of the CIA's problems.

A record of their conversation shows that the particular concern of the group that night was how to provide a deeper cover for Americans gathering information by using non-governmental organizations as fronts.

The participants were members and guests of the prestigious Council on Foreign Relations, men who seem to direct foreign policy from within and without the government on a permanent basis, and publishers of "Foreign Affairs," the quarterly bible of American diplomacy.

A record of the discussion at the council's headquarters on that evening, Jan. 8, 1968, has been circulated to some newspapers by a group of self-styled radical scholars based in Cambridge.

It portrays with some new details the structure and the style of the American intelligence community. The document is timely in the wake of events last week in London, where 105 members of the Soviet community there, including employees from the Soviet embassy, trade delegation, tourist agency, Moscow Narodny Bank and Aeroflot Airline were uncovered as espionage agents, and banned from the country without replacements.

It was a fear of just such an incident, apparently, that dominated the conversation at Pratt House that night.

The U.S. "employees" whose cover constantly is endangered, the participants felt, are those who work in the American Embassies, trade delegations, and other U.S. agencies in countries around the world.

Richard Bissell, a former deputy director of the CIA who left the agency after the Bay of Pigs debacle, led the discussion. According to the record made available to The Star, he told his council colleagues that CIA

agents "need to operate under deeper cover."

Bissell recounted ruefully the uproar over the CIA's exposed funding of the National Student Association's overseas activities and said, "The CIA interface with various private groups, including business and student groups, must be remedied."

He noted that the problems of American spies overseas "is frequently a problem of the State Department."

"It tends to be true that local allies find themselves dealing always with an American and an official American—since the cover is almost invariably as a U.S. government employee," Bissell is reported to have said.

"There are powerful reasons for this practice, and it will always be desirable to have some CIA personnel housed in the embassy compound, if only for local 'command post' and communications requirements.

"Nonetheless, it is possible and desirable, although difficult and time-consuming, to build overseas an apparatus of unofficial cover," Bissell is quoted as saying.

"This would require the use or creation of private organizations, many of the personnel of which would be non-U.S. nationals, with freer entry into the local society and less implication for the official U.S. posture."

Use Non-Americans

Bissell said that the United States needed to increase its use of non-Americans for espionage "with an effort at indoctrination and training: they should be encouraged to develop a second loyalty, more or less comparable to that of the American staff."

He added that as intelligence efforts shifted more toward Latin America, Asia and Africa, "the conduct of U.S. nationals is likely to be increasingly circumscribed. The primary change recommended would be to build up a system of unofficial cover. . . . The CIA might be able to make use of non-nationals as 'career agents', that is with a status midway between that for the classical agent used in a single compartment operation

and that of a staff member involved through his career in many operations, and well informed of the agency's capabilities."

An unidentified former State Department official responded to Bissell that he agreed with the need to change covers, noting that "the initial agreement between the agency and State was intended to be 'temporary', but nothing endures like the ephemeral."

Another participant noted that very little attention was paid to revelations of the CIA's use of supposedly independent operations such as "Radio Free Europe," he added, "One might conclude that the public is not likely to be concerned by the penetration of overseas institutions, at least not nearly so much as by the penetration of U.S. institutions."

This participant was quoted as saying, "The public doesn't think it's right; they don't know where it ends; they take a look at their neighbors." Then he asked whether "this suggested expansion in use of private institutions should include those in the United States, or U.S. institutions operating overseas?"

In response, clear distinctions were reportedly made between operating in the United States and abroad, and the suggestion was made by Bissell, "One might want CIA to expand its use of private U.S. corporations, but for objectives outside the United States."

Fund Demands Rise

The record of the discussion did not link comment and author, but did give a general identification of the men present. There also was a diligent removal from the authorized reporter's transcript of all specific references of agents, incidents and the like, with one noticeable lapse.

In a discussion of the effect of revelations that the CIA was financing U.S. labor union activities abroad, it was noted that these disclosures had simply increased the demand for such funds from overseas labor groups.

"For example," the text says, "British and French labor unions

"were supported through CIA conduits, but now they ask for more assistance than before. So, our expectations to the contrary, there has been no damage."

Those present and taking part in the discussion included men who have journeyed back and forth between government and corporate work, most of whom have remained near the center of the foreign policy establishment.

They included Bissell, now an executive with United Aircraft Corp. in Hartford, Conn.; former Treasury Secretary Douglas Dillon; former CIA director Allen Dulles; Robert Amory Jr., a former deputy director of the CIA; Meyer Bernstein, director of international affairs for the United Steelworkers of America; columnist Joseph Kraft; former White House aide Theodore Sorensen of Kennedy and Johnson days; and Philip Quigg, recently resigned as managing editor of Foreign Affairs.

Facsimile copies of the discussion summary have been circulated by "The Africa Research Group," a dozen young scholars in Cambridge who take a radical dissenting view of U.S. foreign policy.

Reached at his home, Bissell confirmed the authenticity of the document.

He noted that in the discussion that night in New York, he had begun by saying that agent espionage was the least valuable of three main CIA missions, behind reconnaissance and electronic intelligence, the two areas where most CIA money is spent.

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20 SEPTEMBER 1971

After 1967 expose CIA sought new ties with campus, labor

By Crocker Snow Jr.
Globe Staff

The written report of a confidential discussion about Central Intelligence Agency operations held in 1968, a year after the public controversy over agency involvement with the National Student Assn., shows the CIA was anxious to establish new contacts with other student groups, foundations, universities, labor organizations and corporations for its overseas work.

The discussion was held in January 1968 among ranking government officials and former officials, including several former CIA officers, under the auspices of the Council on Foreign Relations in New York.

Though no direct quotes are attributed in the report, the opinion was stated by the discussion leader, Richard M. Bissell Jr., formerly a deputy director of the CIA, that: "If the agency is to be effective, it will have to make use of private institutions on an expanding scale, though these relations which have 'blown' cannot be resurrected."

The discussion also referred to the continued utility of labor groups and American corporations to CIA operations. No such groups or corporations are named.

The written report, like others sponsored by the council, is considered by the participants as "confidential" and "completely off the record."

The document is being circulated by the Africa Research Group, a small, radically oriented organization headquartered in Cambridge, because "it offers a still-relevant primer on the theory and practice of CIA manipulations."

Portions of the document are scheduled to appear today in the "University Review," a New York-based monthly.

The document reflects individual assessments of the CIA by those present. The report includes a number of general statements:

—The two elements of CIA activity, "intelligence collection" and "covert action" (or "intervention") are not separated within the agency but are considered to "overlap and interact."

—The focus of classical espionage in Europe and other developed parts of the world had shifted "toward targets in the underdeveloped world."

—Due to the clear jurisdictional boundary between the CIA and FBI, the intelligence agency was "adverse to surveillance of US citizens overseas (even when specifically requested) and adverse to operating against targets in the United States, except foreigners here as transients."

—The acquisition of a secret speech by Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev in February 1956 was a classic example of the political use of secretly acquired intelligence. The State Department released the text which, according to one participant, prompted "the beginning of the split in the Communist movement." Since this speech had been specifically targeted before acquired, the results meant to this participant that "if you get a precise target and go after it, you can change history."

—"Penetration," by establishing personal relationships with individuals rather than simply hiring them, was regarded as especially useful in the underdeveloped world. The statement is made that "covert intervention (in the underdeveloped world) is usually designed to operate on the internal power balance, often with a fairly short-term objective."

—The reconnaissance of

during the '50s provided "limited but dramatic results. flights were late of the cancell scheduled sumr between Presid hower and 1 after Francis G was shot down sia.)

"After five d flights were from the Ru these operation highly secret in States, and with son," reads the these overflight 'leaked' to the press, the US have been forced action."

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The chairma meeting was Dillon, an inv banker who had served in Washington as undersecretary of State and Secretary of the Treasury in the Kennedy Administration.

Twenty persons were listed as attending including prominent former officials and educators like Harry Howe Ransom of Vanderbilt University and David B. Truman, president of Mt. Holyoke College.

The list included Allen W. Dulles, former director of the CIA, and Robert Amory Jr., who had been deputy director, as well as Bissell, who had been deputy director until shortly after the Bay of Pigs invasion, in which the CIA was involved.

The discussion took place just a year after revelations by Ramparts Magazine concerning CIA-funded training of agents for South Vietnam at

The document includes the statement that "it is notably true of the subsidies to student, labor and cultural groups that have recently been publicized that the agency's objective was never to control their activities, only occasionally to point them in a particular direction, but primarily to enlarge them and render them more effective."

In an article in the Saturday Evening Post in May 1967, Thomas Braden, who had helped set up the subsidies with Dulles, defended the concept as a way to combat the seven major front organizations of the Communist world in which "the Russians through the use of their international fronts had stolen the great words such as peace, justice and freedom."

The report shows that the publicity had not been as damaging to CIA activi-

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SEP 12 1974

Angela Davis idolized

Cuban TV promotes fierce anti-American propaganda

By MARTIN SCHRAM
LA Times-Washington Post Service

HAVANA — Mighty Mouse has liberated his fellow rodents and departed. Humphrey Bogart is waiting in the wings. But now the blue-gray tube is beaming still another North American folk hero into living rooms of Havana.

"Angela-a-Davis . . ."
The popular song all Cuba is singing sounds from the innards of the Soviet model television set. The striking face and Afro hairdo of the young American radical lingers on the screen. Abrupt cutaway to fierce looking American police in riot helmets and gas masks charging forward with clubs swinging. Back to Angela Davis. Then to American police.

Slowly, dramatically, through still photos and motion picture film, the television tells the story of Angela Davis — how she was hunted by the police, how she was found in that non-Afro wig, how she was jailed. Again the headshot of the beautiful black revolutionary lingers on Cuban television screens. And all the while, the song's refrain is heard: "Angela-a-Davis, Cuba wants your liberty!"

Just like the American kiddie cartoons in the early evenings and the old American movies at night, the Angela Davis story is presented courtesy of the government's Liberation Television Network. It is one of the ways Fidel Castro's regime helps Cubans keep tabs on life in the United States.

Propaganda dominates

When Cubans are not at home watching television, often they are in theaters watching movies. And among the visual fare in many of Cuba's leading theaters are a number of "documentaries" that are like the Angela Davis story, cinematically beautiful and propagandistically powerful.

There is, for instance, the one that opens with a shot of a naked lady holding her hands over her breasts. It is, of course, an attack on the United States Central Intelligence Agency. The film cites the CIA involvement in the 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion and then charges that the CIA was also responsible for the murder last year of Chile's army commander, Gen. Rene Schneider. In another serio segment, the CIA is also depicted as the center of a mysterious spider web.

Then there is the documentary that opens with the photos of President Nixon and Gen. Creighton Abrams, U.S. commander in Vietnam. It features a creative musical score in the background; the basic theme is an American folk singer warbling (to the tune of Muskrat Ramble) "and it's one, two, three join that happy way . . . ain't no time to wonder why, whoopee we're gonna die." For counterpoint, there is a discordant Star Spangled Banner.

The film is telling the story of the U.S.-South Vietnamese troops fleeing in apparent panic. Slipped into the midst of the documentary is a cartoon of Nixon fleeing in apparent panic. Here, the theater audience, which has been watching the documentaries in silence, begins to snicker and chortle. A few applaud.

Another chunk of Americana that the Castro government enthusiastically passed along to Cubans was the episodic saga of the Pentagon papers. "The secret documents," as the Cubans call it.

The official government newspaper, "Granma" published 32 issues between June 15 and July 21. A visitor to the "Granma's" offices counted 23 issues published during this period containing articles dealing with the Pentagon papers. Some were quite long.

Moon shot played down

The stories told of the initial revelations by the New York Times, the efforts of the U.S. government to halt publication of the papers, the final U.S. Supreme Court decision, and the legal proceedings against Daniel Ellsberg (the man who leaked the documents) and his friends.

In contrast to the coverage given the Pentagon papers, the most recent moon landing mission of the U.S. astronauts received just scant attention in Granma. Small articles tucked on the inside international page. And President Nixon's planned trip to mainland China was announced in one news story. There was no editorial comment. In fact, the Cuban press did not bother to carry the later news of the Soviet Union's mild reaction to the planned trip.

Cubans see the U.S. participation in the war in Vietnam from the perspective of the North Vietnamese. Recently, for example, Granma published an editorial from Nhan Dan, the North Vietnamese daily, under the headline: "The Nixon doctrine is headed for complete defeat." The editorial warned that "The Nixon doctrine is very wicked and perfidious."

Throughout the headline and editorial, as in every issue of Granma, the name of President Nixon is sort of misspelled. Granma's style omits the "x" in "Nixon." In place of the "x", Granma inserts a Nazi-style swastika.

Epilogue: In Comagucy a

couple of weeks ago, four Cuban youths in their early 20s stopped to talk with an American reporter along the narrow downtown main street Calle Avellaneda. Two were students, one a mechanic, and one on leave from a three-year hitch in the Army.

Viet war discussed

All four were intensely proud of their country and its accomplishments — the opportunity for every Cuban youth to attend a university free of charge, the opportunity for all Cubans to receive free medical care. And at the same time, all four were intensely interested in how people can endure life today in the United States. They were concerned, they said, because they like the American people, but not the American government.

"It must be very bad in the United States now," said one of the students. What did he mean? One by one, the four started ticking off a list of bad things: "Police brutality . . . the secret documents that showed that your government does not tell you the truth . . . racial discrimination 'I hear Negroes have to ride in a special section of the buses,' said one youth who was black . . . assassinations . . . gangsters . . ."



CIA: CONGRESS IN DARK ABOUT ACTIVITIES, SPENDING

STATINTL

Since the Central Intelligence Agency was given authority in 1949 to operate without normal legislative oversight, an uneasy tension has existed between an uninformed Congress and an uninformative CIA.

In the last two decades nearly 200 bills aimed at making the CIA more accountable to the legislative branch have been introduced. Two such bills have been reported from committee. None has been adopted.

The push is on again. Some members of Congress are insisting they should know more about the CIA and about what the CIA knows. The clandestine military operations in Laos run by the CIA appear to be this year's impetus.

Sen. Stuart Symington (D Mo.), a member of the Armed Services Intelligence Operations Subcommittee and chairman of the Foreign Relations subcommittee dealing with U.S. commitments abroad, briefed the Senate June 7 behind closed doors on how deeply the CIA was involved in the Laotian turmoil. He based his briefing on a staff report. (*Weekly Report* p. 1709, 1660, 1268)

He told the Senate in that closed session: "In all my committees there is no real knowledge of what is going on in Laos. We do not know the cost of the bombing. We do not know about the people we maintain there. It is a secret war."

As a member of two key subcommittees dealing with the activities of the CIA, Symington should be privy to more classified information about the agency than most other members of Congress. But Symington told the Senate he had to dispatch two committee staff members to Laos in order to find out what the CIA was doing.

If Symington does not know what the CIA has been doing, then what kind of oversight function does Congress exercise over the super-secret organization? (*Secrecy fact sheet, Weekly Report* p. 1785)

A Congressional Quarterly examination of the oversight system exercised by the legislative branch, a study of sanitized secret documents relating to the CIA and interviews with key staff members and members of Congress indicated that the real power to gain knowledge about CIA activities and expenditures rests in the hands of four powerful committee chairmen and several key members of their committees—Senate and House Armed Services and Appropriations Committees.

The extent to which these men exercise their power in ferreting out the details of what the CIA does with its secret appropriation determines the quality of legislative oversight on this executive agency that Congress voted into existence 24 years ago.

The CIA Answers to...

As established by the National Security Act of 1947 (PL 80-253), the Central Intelligence Agency was accountable to the President and the National Security

Council. In the original Act there was no language which excluded the agency from scrutiny by Congress, but also no provision which required such examination.

To clear up any confusion as to the legislative intent of the 1947 law, Congress passed the 1949 Central Intelligence Act (PL 81-110) which exempted the CIA from all federal laws requiring disclosure of the "functions, names, official titles, salaries or numbers of personnel" employed by the agency. The law gave the CIA director power to spend money "without regard to the provisions of law and regulations relating to the expenditure of government funds." Since the CIA became a functioning organization in 1949, its budgeted funds have been submerged into the general accounts of other government agencies, hidden from the scrutiny of the public and all but a select group of ranking members of Congress. (*Congress and the Nation* Vol. I, p. 306, 249)

THE SENATE

In the Senate, the system by which committees check on CIA activities and budget requests is straightforward. Nine men—on two committees—hold positions of seniority which allow them to participate in the regular annual legislative oversight function. Other committees are briefed by the CIA, but only on topical matters and not on a regular basis.

Appropriations. William W. Woodruff, counsel for the Senate Appropriations Committee and the only staff man for the oversight subcommittee, explained that when the CIA comes before the five-man subcommittee, more is discussed than just the CIA's budget.

"We look to the CIA for the best intelligence on the Defense Department budget that you can get," Woodruff told Congressional Quarterly. He said that CIA Director Richard Helms provided the subcommittee with his estimate of budget needs for all government intelligence operations.

Woodruff explained that although the oversight subcommittee was responsible for reviewing the CIA budget, any substantive legislation dealing with the agency would originate in the Armed Services Committee, not Appropriations.

No transcripts are kept when the CIA representative (usually Helms) testifies before the subcommittee. Woodruff said the material covered in the hearings was so highly classified that any transcripts would have to be kept under armed guard 24 hours a day. Woodruff does take detailed notes on the sessions, however, which are held for him by the CIA. "All I have to do is call," he said, "and they're on my desk in an hour."

Armed Services. "The CIA budget itself does not legally require any review by Congress," said T. Edward Braswell, chief counsel for the Senate Armed Services Committee and the only staff man used by the Intelligence Operations Subcommittee.

U.S. Brezhnev Doctrine?

STATINTL

By C. L. SULZBERGER

ATHENS—Premier Papadopoulos, Greece's strong man, likes to say he can't understand why the West, which so strongly dislikes the Brezhnev Doctrine used to impose Moscow's ideology elsewhere, should try to emulate what it abhors by contemplating its own Brezhnev Doctrine here.

No matter how much we dislike his governing methods, Papadopoulos has a point. Why, if since the Bay of Pigs Washington has carefully avoided intervention in Cuba; why, if it scrupulously keeps hands off Chile; why, if it refuses to make South Vietnam produce a peace-making regime, should American opinion feel the need to intervene in Greece?

The answer is partly that Americans have felt a sort of responsibility here since the Truman Doctrine, partly because of the childish legend that this is an inherently democratic nation (which it isn't) and partly because of the persuasive powers of opposition

"Although this is a disagreeable and leaden Government, its oppressiveness—above all by Greece's own standards—is often exaggerated."

propagandists abroad. All Greeks tend to be brilliant on politics and weave inspired tapestries.

Athens endorses France's approach on this issue enunciated last Bastille Day by its Ambassador: "Noninterference in the domestic affairs of other countries which, in this part of the world is, like elsewhere, the golden rule of French diplomacy."

The United States is broadly convinced by now that intervention is not our kind of game. After all, despite our obvious desire to keep NATO bases available in tiny but strategically vital Malta and Iceland, we eschewed any effort to influence their recent elections. One result is that our base tenure is seriously threatened.

Many of those elements in U.S. opinion that most savagely attack the thought of American intervention elsewhere want to lean hard on Greece. At the very least they would jeopardize Greece's military posture in NATO—so important to American commitments in the Mediterranean and the Middle East—by withholding promised

aid. Maybe the Brezhnev Doctrine but, as Talleyrand used to say, intervention and nonintervention can amount to the same thing.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

This is unquestionably a repressive and unsatisfactory form of government but such is also true about many governments in this world. We have learned to our painful distaste that we can't go around imposing democracy à l'Américaine.

Secretary of State Rogers advised Athens that U.S. public opinion demands "developments" in Greece. He was told: "We cannot shape your internal policies and you are wrong if you think you can shape ours. And remember that Greeks react in a negative way if they feel there is pressure on them."

We can't make the colonels disappear by tough talk. There is a current rumor that Washington may be contemplating an attempt to install General Anghelis, armed forces head, to replace Papadopoulos but this would be a lunatic type of intervention even if it worked. It would simply substitute one military boss for another.

Papadopoulos has been loyal to NATO, even before heavy weapons shipments were resumed, and to his duties as host to three thousand American servicemen stationed at bases near Athens and in Crete. Although he appreciates French policy on nonintervention, he doesn't fancy French ideas on trying to ease the superpower fleets (Soviet and U.S.) out of the Mediterranean.

Although this is a disagreeable and leaden Government, its oppressiveness—above all by Greece's own standards—is often exaggerated. Less than one hundred political figures are today in forced residence in villages or on islands. Perhaps four hundred are in prison (after martial law convictions), many in connection with violent acts like bombings.

Freedom of expression is muffled and political freedom is stifled. The Constitution is not yet being applied and it seems ridiculous that martial law should prevail after four and a half years.

The people certainly aren't happy but the great majority accommodates itself in a resigned way to what's going on. They would enthusiastically welcome a change but they want it handed to them by someone else. Still remembering their own bloody civil war a generation ago, they don't seem in a mood to embark on a serious urban guerrilla campaign.

Churchill described the Greeks as well as anyone: "They have survived in spite of all that the world could do against them and all they could do against themselves. . . quarrelling among themselves in a vacuum."

Is it wise for the United States to do more than stand back and despair?

22 AUGUST 1971

STATINTL

The Private Wars of William Pawley

Declaring communism his mortal enemy, Miami millionaire-industrialist Bill Pawley channeled his energy and resources against it, helping to organize the Bay of Pigs invasion and the Guatemalan insurrection. But now the former ambassador feels that the biggest battle of them all will be lost, unless . . .

By Nixon Smiley

William D. Pawley was a kid of 11 when he went into business for himself. This isn't too surprising, considering that his father, Edward Pawley, who swashbuckled his way around the world in his teens, began in business at age nine.

It isn't that the Pawleys were prodigies; they just had boundless energy and drive, and Bill Pawley, now approaching 75, is still engaged in an extraordinary number of activities, including the operation of a multimillion dollar sugar-producing plant in the Everglades.

But then, Pawley is rather an incredible individual. His outstanding achievement was organizing the legendary Flying Tigers, an American volunteer air force, to help Chiang Kai-shek stay in the war against Japan until the U.S. could fight its way across the Pacific in World War II. Pawley, however, has lived the kind of life that would make a

fascinating book. He was, for several years, on *The New York Times'* list of the 10 highest salaried persons in America.

Born in Florence, S.C., Pawley was reared in Caimanera, Cuba, where his father had a contract

NIXON SMILEY is a Herald staff writer and columnist. He spent several days with William Pawley for this article.

with the Navy to supply food for the fleet at Guantanamo Bay. Bill was just 11 when he rented a boat, filled it with goodies and hawked them to the sailors. Skinny, darkly tanned and able to speak Spanish like a native, young Pawley passed easily as a Cuban.

Pawley made his first million dollars by the time he was 29, during the 1925 land boom in Miami. Although he was to see Miami very little for the next 30 years, he has always considered it his home, and in 1941 built a 10-room home, where he now lives, on Sunset Island No. Two, Miami Beach.

Primarily a businessman, Pawley has been an airlines develop-

er, aircraft manufacturer, urban transportation owner, ambassador to Peru and Brazil, and special assistant to the secretaries of state and defense with the title of ambassador. He is still addressed by that title.

As a friend of several U.S. presidents, Pawley has been called upon to do jobs that required bold decision, finesse and intrigue, as well as the resources of a businessman, diplomat and soldier-of-fortune. Among his special tasks was helping to organize the intrigue that resulted in the overthrow of the communist government of Guatemala in 1954, and he was an organizer of the Cuban exile army which met disaster at the Bay of Pigs in 1961.

A slender man just under six feet, Pawley packs more energy than most men of 40. He can go all day and through the evening, conferring, buttonholing, cajoling, yakking endlessly on the phone, mixing the pleasure of lunch or dinner with the business of whether a business deal, raising

STATINTL

CAMDEN, N.J.

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Not Too Much to Ask

When the Central Intelligence Agency was established, in the late 1940s the explanation was that we needed a specially trained and equipped organization to gather information on political, economic, and military situations all over the world. We needed an organization that could give the President reports on these situations every day. The CIA was to be a well-camouflaged if not a secret agency — so that it could go about its data-gathering assignment with a minimum of trouble.

The CIA has, indeed, gathered information and prepared the confidential evaluations for the presidents. Some of these evaluations, like those that forecast the problems in Vietnam, turned out to be good and prescient judgments, even if they were ignored. The CIA would look a lot better today if it had stayed with information gathering — instead of getting into the business of designing and executing adventures like the Bay of Pigs.

It has been rumored for a long time and now is finally confirmed that the CIA has been running the "secret war" in Laos. This is the operation in which an irregular army of more than 30,000 Meo tribesmen, Thai volunteers, and men from the Royal Laotian forces has been waging nine years of relatively unavailing war for the Plain of Jars and the hamlets of the eastern half of the country. Our attempt to keep the operation secret has made our motives look too much like the motives of the Communists.

To the extent that the United States must carry on military programs in South Asia — and elsewhere — it would seem more reasonable and satisfactory to have them carried on openly and by the Department of Defense. We may not accomplish what we set out to do in every case. But at least we'll know what the United States is doing. That isn't too much to ask of the government.

13 AUG 1971

President Orders New Declassifications

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Aug. 12 — President Nixon has ordered early declassification of secret Government documents on the Korean war, the 1953 intervention by American troops in Lebanon, the abortive invasion of Cuba in 1961 and the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, the White House announced today.

John D. Ehrlichman, assistant to the President for Domestic Affairs, said that Mr. Nixon felt that the four military actions were "of such historical importance" that scholars should not have to wait the customary 25 years before the bulk of the documents were made public.

Mr. Ehrlichman said that the decision to speed the removal of the "secret" classification from the documents had grown out of an interagency study of the Government's security system. The study was ordered in January by the President.

'Classifying Them Better'

In what he termed a "progress report" on the study, Mr. Ehrlichman said that it was aimed at devising a method for "classifying fewer documents in the future, but classifying them better."


The President feels strongly, Mr. Ehrlichman said, that "Government has a duty to make disclosure of what is going on in the Government." But he asserted that Mr. Nixon's attempt to initiate an "era of negotiation" between the United States and other world powers required that the Government be able to demonstrate its ability to maintain confidentiality.

For that reason, Mr. Ehrlichman said in response to questions at a White House briefing, the Administration sought to block publication of the Pentagon's secret history of the Vietnam war in June. Parts of the study were published by The New York Times, The Washington Post and other newspapers.

He said it was unquestionable that "probably the large majority" of the Pentagon papers were "needlessly" held under restriction at the time of their disclosure in the newspapers.

Effect on Negotiations

But, he went on, the "massive compromise" of the Vietnam documents by the newspapers "demonstrably has raised questions in the minds of Americans



The New York Times
John D. Ehrlichman

whom we will be negotiating or have been in the past" as to whether the United States security system is effective.

Mr. Ehrlichman declined to relate the Administration's concern about the disclosure of the Pentagon papers to President Nixon's diplomatic initiative toward China.

The White House asked Congress last week to authorize a \$636,000 expenditure this year to begin a five-year process of declassifying some 160 million pages of documents on World War II that are still secret. The entire effort is expected to cost \$6-million.

Declassification of the documents on the Korean war and the Lebanon and Cuba actions would require additional funds, but the amount was not revealed today. This effort also will require a longer period of time and could take considerably more than five years, officials said.

Mr. Ehrlichman said that it also was possible that Government secrets related to other international incidents would be given the same accelerated declassification. The list is "open-ended as of now," he said, but he did not identify other possible subjects for early release.

Criteria Outlined

According to Mr. Ehrlichman, the study group, which is headed by William H. Rehnquist, an Assistant Attorney General, had tentatively established some criteria to follow. He mentioned the following requirements:

"There should be new rules that individuals who have a specific security clearance, such as 'top secret,' would have access to documents only on a strict 'need-to-know' basis."

"New restrictions would be developed to curtail individuals' rights to duplicate classified matter or to disseminate it."

"Secret documents should be released automatically after a specified period of time unless their publication would 'jeopardize current intelligence sources,' imperil relations with other governments or 'needlessly embarrass individuals' in other nations."

As a general rule, the study group is tending toward reversing the established practice of keeping documents secret unless it can be demonstrated they are no longer sensitive, Mr. Ehrlichman said.

"The President believes past practice has resulted in classification of a number of documents that need not have been classified" for national security reasons, he added.

Restricted Circulation

At the same time, he emphasized that Mr. Nixon had followed a "set of principles" in his personal dealing with diplomatic and domestic issues that included highly restricted circulation of documents and extremely limited sharing of information with staff members.

The "cornerstone of an era of negotiations" is confidentiality, Mr. Ehrlichman stated.

"You people do and should dig for every piece of information you can get," he told the journalists at the White House. But he said reporters could publish information "innocently" that might have a bearing on events that the journalists were not aware of and could thus "create a climate of doubt" about Government confidentiality.

Mr. Ehrlichman was asked if the Government's unsuccessful court actions to stop newspaper publication of the Pentagon study were undertaken to demonstrate to other nations the good faith of the Nixon Administration.

"Yes," he replied.

A Federal grand jury in Boston has been examining the disclosure of the Pentagon papers and considering whether some reporters might be liable to prosecution. Mr. Ehrlichman was asked if the Government had established, in light of his

comments about reporters "innocently" gathering news, whether the journalists who participated in the Pentagon disclosures were innocent.

He said he could not comment because the matter might be subject to litigation. The question was put by a representative of one of the newspapers involved, and Mr. Ehrlichman told him:

"Deep in the questioner's heart must lie the answer to that question."

STATINTL

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Nixon Moves To Protect U.S. Secrets

By Don Oberdorfer
Washington Post Staff Writer

President Nixon is tightening government control of current secrets in the diplomatic and military fields, while moving to release some still-classified papers from the Korean War, the 1958 Lebanon landing and the 1961-62 Cuban crises.

Presidential Assistant John D. Ehrlichman, in an interim report on a high-level study of government secrecy, said new rules will further restrict the distribution and duplication of classified documents in an effort to prevent leaks.

Among the reasons for tightening up, Ehrlichman indicated, are recent newspaper disclosures of Vietnam war secrets from the Pentagon papers and the government's unsuccessful attempt to stop their publication through legal action.

Ehrlichman said the "massive compromise" of secrets in the Pentagon papers had raised questions in the minds of foreign governments who are to participate in future negotiations with the United States.

He said Mr. Nixon is determined to safeguard the confidentiality of diplomatic talks and asserted that confidentiality is "a cornerstone of an era of negotiation."

At the same time, Ehrlichman reported, Mr. Nixon has asked government archivists to speed the process of declassifying historical papers. Last week the President asked Congress for \$636,000 to begin a five-year job of declassifying World War II secrets, and Ehrlichman said this request will be expanded to cover secrets of the Korean War, the Lebanon landing during the Eisenhower administration and the Cuban invasion and missile crisis of the Kennedy administration.

The historical documents will be released if they do not jeopardize current intelligence sources, imperil United States relations with other govern-

ments or cause "needless" embarrassment to foreign citizens, he said.

Ehrlichman would not say when the historical documents might be released, nor would he say whether some Vietnam war papers of earlier years would be declassified as part of the new policy.

Under previous policies, too many people had the right to classify documents and there was no workable system for review of their decisions to stamp them secret, the White House aide said. The new system now evolving will seek to insure automatic declassification of some documents after a period of years unless there is a showing that they should remain secret. As of now, the burden is on those who wish to remove the secrecy labels from historical documents—and this should be reversed, Ehrlichman said.

He added that the "general approach" of Mr. Nixon is that "the government has a duty to make disclosure of what is going on in the government except in those cases where disclosure would be inimical to the national security or the conduct of foreign policy."

On Jan. 15, Mr. Nixon ordered a study of government procedures for classifying documents. On June 30, shortly after the first of the Pentagon papers disclosures, he ordered government agencies to reduce the number of officials allowed access to secrets, and he ordered a "drastic" reduction in the holdings of highly secret papers outside the government.

Recent visitors to the White House have quoted Mr. Nixon as saying the publication of the Pentagon papers seemed for a time to jeopardize Henry A. Kissinger's secret trip to China. Mr. Nixon left the impression with some visitors that the Chinese had expressed concern about publication of the Pentagon papers—but White House officials have said this worry about confidentiality existed in Washington rather than in Peking.

Ehrlichman would not say yesterday whether the Peking regime was among the governments concerned about the Pentagon papers disclosures, nor would he comment on the conflicting reports regarding the Peking attitude.

The Nixon administration's action in seeking court orders to keep The New York Times

from publishing Pentagon papers data was related to the President's emphasis on the secrecy of diplomatic talks, Ehrlichman said.

The Supreme Court's refusal to stop the newspapers' publication of the document, he said, had given new impetus to a more discriminating yet more effective security system. It is evident from the decision that the government will be able to stop publication through the courts "only in the rarest of cases and only under the heaviest burden of proof on the part of the government," he added.

According to Ehrlichman, Mr. Nixon has ordered that current information on diplomatic negotiations be held very closely within the government. It is available only to principal officers on a "need to know" basis, with staff access extremely limited, he said.

The White House aide added that Mr. Nixon has followed the same practice of "extremely limited sharing of information" in some domestic matters, citing the recent presidential meeting management and labor negotiators in the steel industry as a case in point.

STATINTL

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CIA Establishes Precedent with Laos War Disclosures

BY FRANK STARR
[Washington Bureau Chief]
[Chicago Tribune Press Service]

WASHINGTON, Aug. 8 — A significant precedent in government secrecy was established last week when the Central Intelligence Agency, with White House approval, conceded for the first time its hitherto top secret role as the clandestine director of the United States war effort in Laos.

Administration sources say the rather startling public confirmation of what had long been charged or assumed constituted a deliberate decision to concede such a fact in favor of protecting other secrets less generally assumed.

But the sources attribute the decision largely to the pressure created by accurate and competent investigation by two former foreign service officers now working for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the strength their material lent to the legislators in their confrontation with the Executive Branch.

How Times Change

"Times have changed," said one administration source who recalled how President Kennedy had protected from public exposure the CIA role in the 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion by taking the blame for it himself.

Two years ago the administration was not mentioning American involvement in Laos, another source noted, while now as much as 50 per cent of the U. S. role there is a matter of public record.

Most of it became public last week after five weeks of negotiations between the two investigators and representatives of the Defense and State Departments and the CIA who were faced with what is readily admitted to be an extensive, detailed and accurate account of

News Analysis

the U. S. role in Laos and the possibility of an extended and bitter debate over its secrecy if much of it weren't disclosed.

Object of Bargaining

The object of the bargaining was what would or would not be censored in a 23-page staff report entitled "Laos: April 1971" written by James G. Lowenstein and Richard M. Moose as a result of 12 days spent in Laos at the end of April and the beginning of May.

"They are competent investigators and they knew the right questions to ask because they know where the bodies are buried," one well-placed source said.

Lowenstein was a foreign service officer in the State Department from 1956 to 1965, as was Moose from 1957 to 1966. Moose additionally worked as a special assistant of former Presidential adviser Walt Rostow, then in the Defense Department's Institute of Defense analysis, and finally during the first year of the Nixon administration as a staff secretary on the National Security Council under Presidential adviser Henry Kissinger.

Had Full Authority

On the other hand, as Lowenstein readily admits, much of the top secret information was given them in the first place with the full authority of

the Executive Branch in the persons of embassy sources in Laos who, when asked for the secret data, gave it.

To that degree and to the degree that the final decision to release as much as was released, including the CIA's involvement, were approved by President Nixon, the disclosures do represent the effect of Nixon's announced policy of making more information available to the public.

But there is a strong belief on both the Executive and Legislative sides of the argument that the administration was faced with the possibility of a strong challenge to the conduct of a secret war in Laos as opposed to a nonsecret one, and possibly over the larger issue of secrecy itself in the wake of the Pentagon papers.

In any case, the CIA, State, and Defense Department representatives finally conceded the CIA role in Laos, the extent of the CIA-backed army of Laotian irregulars, the extent of the air war, and the extent of U. S. expenditures on the total effort in Laos.

There were many facts, Lowenstein said, which both sides agreed were and should remain secret for obvious reasons, and the first of the five weeks was spent narrowing down to four or five the areas on which Lowenstein and Moose held out for publication. The administration representatives then needed to start the process

of gaining approval of higher authority.

Much finally was censored; particularly on the subject of U. S. support of Thai irregulars fighting with CIA support and training among the force of 30,000 Laotian irregulars.

But among the information not censored were the reasons for secrecy given the two investigators during their 12-day visit to Indochina.

"The principal arguments we heard for the need to continue to maintain secrecy were these: first, that Gen. Vang Pao [commander of the irregular forces] does not want to allow the press to visit because his military security would be compromised; second, that if reporters were permitted to visit Long Tieng [the irregulars' principal base], they would concentrate on the role of the U. S. overlooking Vang Pao's contribution; third, that the CIA is a clandestine organization not used to operating in the open and that its operations in other parts of the world might be compromised if the techniques and individuals involved in Laos were to become known; fourth, that were U. S. activities publicized, American would be accused of violating the Geneva Agreements of 1962 and it would thus be more difficult to reestablish the Geneva Agreements as a framework for a future settlement in Laos; and fifth, that the details of the Thai presence would become known which would [deleted]."

STATINTL

HUNTSVILLE, ALA.

TIMES

AUG 9 1971

E - 53,936

S - 51,808

Why must an 'information' agency run these wars?

When the Central Intelligence Agency was established, in the late 1940's, the explanation was that we needed a specially trained and equipped organization to gather information on political, economic, and military situations all over the world. We needed an organization that could give the President reports on these situations every day. The CIA was to be a well-camouflaged if not a secret agency—so that it could go about its data-gathering assignment with a minimum of trouble.

The CIA has, indeed, gathered information and prepared the confidential evaluations for the presidents. Some of these evaluations, like those that forecast the problems in Vietnam, turned out to be good and prescient judgments, even if they were ignored. The CIA would look a lot better today if it had stayed with information gathering—instead of getting into the business of designing and executing adventures like the Bay of Pigs.

It has been rumored for a long time and now is finally confirmed that the CIA has been running the "secret war" in Laos. This is the operation in which an irregular army of more than 30,000 Meo tribesmen, Thai volunteers, and men from the Royal Laotian forces has been waging nine years of relatively unavailing war for the Plain of Jars and the hamlets of the eastern half of the country. Our attempt to keep the operation secret has made our motives look too much like the motives of the Communists.

To the extent that the United States must carry on military programs in South Asia—and elsewhere—it would seem more reasonable and satisfactory to have them carried on openly and by the Department of Defense. We may not accomplish what we set out to do in every case. But at least we'll know what the United States is doing. That isn't too much to ask of the government.

Guatemala Politician

By DON BOHNING
Herald Latin America Editor

Roberto Alejos, wealthy Guatemalan businessman-politician and honorary chairman of the Fidelity National Bank of South Miami, has been kidnaped in Guatemala City, police sources in the Central American country reported Wednesday.

There has been no official confirmation of the kidnaping although Guatemalan newspapers have reported it unofficially as such.

DETAILS ARE sketchy, but United Press International, quoting police sources in Guatemala, said Alejos was seized by two armed men in broad daylight Tuesday after his car was halted while he was driving in Guatemala City.

Alejos' alleged kidnaping, presumably, is another incident in the undeclared civil war that has been raging in Guatemala for years between extremes of the right and the left.

A number of wealthy Guatemalans have been kidnaped



Roberto Alejos
... no ransom note

and held for ransom by leftwing extremists while rightwing groups, some believed to have the support of Guatemalan security forces, have physically eliminated many known and suspected leftwing extremists and some leftist intellectuals.

SOURCES IN Guatemala told The Herald by phone Wednesday that there have been no known ransom demands yet made for Alejos, if that were the intent of the kidnaping.

Alejos, 46, is well known in Miami business and financial circles and among Cuban exiles.

The 1961 exile Bay of Pigs invasion brigade, supported by the CIA, was trained on the Alejos coffee plantation in Guatemala. His brother, Carlos, was Guatemalan ambassador to Washington at the time.

Kidnaped

Alejos later became the government-backed candidate to succeed President Manuel Ydigoras in 1963 presidential elections. The elections were canceled, however, when Ydigoras was overthrown by a military coup in March, 1963.

ALEJOS CAME to Miami as an exile, living on Palm Island and acquiring business interests in Dade County. He sold his Palm Island home and returned to Guatemala after the country restored constitutional government in 1966.

In January, 1969, Alejos, together with Carlos Hegel, another Guatemalan, purchased controlling interest in the Fidelity National Bank of South Miami. Alejos was named honorary chairman, a position he still holds although residing in Guatemala.

In Guatemala, Alejos was a founder of the Bank of Commerce and Industry. He now operates an auto dealership in the Central American capital along with other commercial interests.

WASHINGTON POST

2 AUG 1971

STATINTL

Kennedy Papers: Insight on Bay of Pigs, Dallas '63

Castro Detailed Invasion Flop

By Murray Seeger
Los Angeles Times

WALTHAM, Mass., Aug. 1

Two years after the American-sponsored invasion of Cuba, Fidel Castro took two American lawyers to the Bay of Pigs site and demonstrated why it had failed so disastrously.


It was April 1963, just days short of the second anniversary of the invasion which John F. Kennedy later acknowledged was one of the great mistakes of his presidency, and Castro was playing host to James B. Donovan and John E. Nolan Jr., as he had several times in the previous five months.

"He'd get out of the car and describe different aspects of the battle; where he was when he got such and such a message from the troops and what he did, and so on," Nolan recalled in a recorded interview made for the John F. Kennedy Library located in temporary quarters in this Boston suburb.

This interview, recorded in April 1967 by Nolan in Washington, is just one of the many revealing new pieces of history now available to researchers at the library.

Effective Monday, the Kennedy Library is making available 95 per cent of the 3.3 million documents it has relating to the Kennedy administration. A small, initial portion of the documents was opened to the public in October, 1963.

The Nolan interview is especially interesting for its descriptions of Castro with whom he and Donovan negotiated for the release of the 1,100 survivors of the disastrous invasion and 23 other American prisoners. Added to other recorded memories of such participants in the prisoner deal as retired Gen. Lucius D. Clay and the late Richard Car-



FIDEL CASTRO
... explained debacle

dinal Cushing, the interview supplies details not previously known of the negotiations with Castro.

Wouldn't Square

Speaking of the mercurial Cuban leader, Nolan said, "Many of the impressions that we had, and I think that my impressions were about the same as Jim's (Donovan), would not square with the commonly accepted image of Castro in the United States.

"During the time that we were with him, Castro was never irrational, never drunk, never dirty," Nolan recalled. "In his personal relationships with us and in connection with the negotiations, he was always reasonable, always easy to deal with. He was a talker of very significant proportions. I mean, he would come over at midnight or 1 o'clock in the morning and stay all night talking. But he wasn't a conversational hog. He'd ask questions, listen for viewpoints. He was easy to talk to, good conversationalist, hardsell guy, constantly plugging his programs, his government."

Donovan, a New York attorney who had previously negotiated the exchange of Soviet spy Col. Rudolf Abel for the American U-2 pilot held by Russia, Francis Gary Powers, was also present and did not leave an interview at the library.

Nolan was enlisted to help

by Milan Mikovsky, one of the Justice Department aides of Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy. They were under orders to get the Cuban invaders back to the United States by Christmas Eve.

Donovan negotiated an agreement under which the United States would give Castro food and medicine worth \$53 million in exchange for the prisoners. In addition, Castro insisted on getting \$2.9 million in cash which had previously been offered by Cuban refugee organizations as payment for sick and wounded brigade members already released.

It was during a conversation that lasted until 1 a.m. in early April, 1963, that Castro announced he would take Nolan and Donovan to the Bay of Pigs. They left from Castro's beach home at Verdadera, on the north side of the island nation, at 5 the same morning and drove to the bay on the south shore.

Sampled Swamp

"At one point, there's an area there which is marshy land, swamps and there's only one road that runs across it to solid ground," Nolan recalled. Castro "got out, walked off the road and into the marsh to see how swampy it was.

"You really had a sense of history listening to someone like Castro describe something like the Bay of Pigs. And then the feeling that in walking out into the marsh, which was considered impassable by him and also by the brigade, if he stepped in the wrong spot or something, that he might just disappear beneath the ooze and that would be the end of the whole problem.

"And he sank down and it was up to his boots, but he got back."

Castro and Donovan developed a warm relationship that enabled the hard-drinking lawyer to joke with the dictator in a way that his associates could not, Nolan related.

Just before Christmas 1962, when Castro came to Havana airport where the prisoners were waiting for the ransom goods to arrive, a flight of Cuban Mig fighters swooped so low over the field that the men on the field had to crouch down.

"Donovan was standing next to Castro, elbowed him and said, in his loud voice that was clearly audible to me and other people around, 'It's the invasion.'"

"It seemed to me to be a very jocular remark to make. Castro laughed at it. And then it seemed to me that the other people around, who initially didn't think it was funny at all, looked at Castro and saw his reaction, and they laughed, too."

In the April meetings, held to clean up details of freeing the 23 Americans, including three CIA agents, Donovan and Castro talked about improving relations between the United States and Cuba.

"I think Jim (Donovan) always had his eye on this as a possibility," Nolan said. "He felt that his maximum usefulness lay in the direction of providing that kind of alternative to American policy. And I think that Castro had a similar interest in Donovan . . ."

Nolan gave another example of Donovan's manner with the Cubans, describing a tense scene when the Americans were desperately trying to get \$2.9 million into a Havana bank before 3 p.m. Christmas eve, 1962.

"Look, Mr. Minister, if you want to be helpful in this regard, there's one thing you can do," Donovan told the cabinet official who was driving Nolan to the airport. "When you get out there and that big plane is waiting to take off for Miami, don't defect."

In his interview, Gen. Clay recalled that he was summoned to Robert Kennedy's office on the day before Christmas, 1962. "Most before I knew, I signed a note for the \$2.9 million

STATINTL

29 JUL 1971

Soviet Account of Missile Crisis Stresses Summit Offer

By BERNARD GWERTZMAN
Special to The New York Times

MOSCOW, July 28—According to Soviet archives just made public, four days before President John F. Kennedy informed the world about the Cuban missile crisis, Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev proposed a meeting with him that Mr. Kennedy first seemed to support but rejected later in the day.

The Foreign Ministry documentation dealing with the 1962 crisis over Soviet missiles in Cuba was included in an article by Anatoly A. Gromyko, the son of Andrei A. Gromyko, the Soviet Foreign Minister, which was published in the monthly historical journal *Voprosy Istorii*.

Reports Meeting with Rusk

The first of two articles, entitled, "The Caribbean Crisis," covers events up to Mr. Kennedy's speech of Oct. 22, 1962, in which he reported on the discovery of Soviet offensive missiles on Cuba and demanded their withdrawal by Soviet authorities.

Presumably, the second article will cover events up until Mr. Khrushchev's decision to pull out the missiles in return for an American pledge not to invade Cuba.

Mr. Gromyko's article reports on a private meeting be-

tween Secretary of State Dean Rusk and the Soviet Ambassador, Anatoly F. Dobrynin, shortly before Mr. Kennedy's speech. Mr. Rusk gave Mr. Dobrynin a copy of the speech and a message for Mr. Khrushchev.

Mr. Dobrynin said after reading the documents that "the United States has deliberately created a dangerous crisis."

In his article, Mr. Gromyko also rebuked those Americans who later accused his father of bad faith when he failed to disclose the presence of the missiles when he met with the President at the White House on Oct. 18.

The article recalls the attempted invasion of Cuba at the Bay of Pigs in April, 1961, and asserts, "The Soviet Union and Cuba, in full conformity with the norms of international law, in the summer of 1962 reached an accord on the strengthening of the defense capabilities of Cuba."

Calls Missiles 'Defensive'

"Medium-range missiles were deployed on the island for defensive purposes. This was an action aimed at exerting a sobering influence on the advocates of military adventure in Washington and the preventing of a new American invasion against the Cuban people," the article says. It does not mention that on Oct. 14 American aerial reconnaissance and film also disclosed plans to build bases for intermediate range missiles.

Mr. Gromyko is a section chief of the Institute of the U.S.A., a research institute of the Academy of Sciences.

Accounts of the meeting between Foreign Minister Gromyko and Mr. Kennedy, which lasted more than two hours on Oct. 18, say that Mr. Kennedy decided against raising the matter of the missiles and that Mr. Gromyko did not mention them. Later, American writers often accused the Soviet Foreign Minister of duplicity, something his son resents.

The article says that the goal of these accusations "was to hide the true character of the meeting and to invent still an-

other pretext to justify the violation of the norms of international law by the activity of the Government of the U.S.A. in the fall of 1962 against Cuba and the Soviet Union."

It also says that the Kennedy Administration "consciously rejected different diplomatic means, by the help of which it would have been possible to avert the confrontation."

To underscore this point, Mr. Gromyko says his brother gave Mr. Kennedy a proposal from Mr. Khrushchev—who is not mentioned by name in the article—suggesting the two men meet "to settle disputed international problems and the examination of questions which cause divergences between the Soviet Union and the United States." Mr. Gromyko quotes as his source the Soviet foreign policy archives.

American versions say only that such a meeting was mentioned obliquely.

The article says, "the President reacted positively to this proposal of the Soviet Union." But, according to the article, at a dinner that evening given by Mr. Rusk for Mr. Gromyko, Melwellyn E. Thompson, then a special adviser on Soviet Affairs to the President, told Mr. Dobrynin that "the White House would like to postpone the summit meeting."

The article said that it was difficult to determine whether Mr. Kennedy in fact wanted a summit and was dissuaded by his advisers, or whether his initial positive response was only "diplomatic camouflage" to disguise "the planned aggressive course against the Soviet Union and Cuba."

22 JUL 1971

STATINTL

A SPECIAL SUPPLEMENT:

Kennedy's Private War

STATINTL

Ralph L. Stavins

The article that follows is part of *The Planning of the Vietnam War*, a study by members of the Institute of Policy Studies in Washington, including Richard J. Barnet, Marcus Raskin, and Ralph Stavins.* In their introduction to the study, the authors write:

"In early 1970, Marcus Raskin conceived the idea of a study that would explain how the Vietnam disaster happened by analyzing the planning of the war. A group of investigators directed by Ralph Stavins concentrated on finding out who did the actual planning that led to the decisions to bomb North Vietnam, to introduce over a half-million troops into South Vietnam, to defoliate and destroy vast areas of Indochina, and to create millions of refugees in the area.

"Ralph Stavins, assisted by Cantan Pian, John Berkowitz, George Pipkin, and Brian Eden, conducted more than 100 interviews in the course of this study. Among those interviewed were many Presidential advisers to Kennedy and Johnson, generals and admirals, middle level bureaucrats who occupied strategic positions in the national security bureaucracy, and officials, military and civilian, who carried out the policy in the field in Vietnam.

"A number of informants backed up their oral statements with documents in their possession, including informal minutes of meetings, as well as portions of the official documentary record now known as the 'Pentagon Papers.' Our information is drawn not only from the Department of Defense, but also from the White House, the Department of State, and the Central Intelligence Agency."

The study is being published in two volumes. The first, which includes the article below, will be published early in August. The second will appear in May, 1972.

*The study is the responsibility of its authors and does not necessarily reflect the views of the Institute, its trustees, or fellows.

I
At the end of March, 1961, the CIA circulated a National Intelligence Estimate on the situation in South Vietnam. This paper advised Kennedy that Diem was a tyrant who was confronted with two sources of discontent, the non-Communist loyal opposition and the Viet Cong. The two problems were closely connected. Of the spreading Viet Cong network the CIA noted:

Local recruits and sympathetic or intimidated villagers have enhanced Viet Cong control and influence over increasing areas of the countryside. For example, more than one-half of the entire rural region south and southwest of Saigon, as well as some areas to the north, are under considerable Communist control. Some of these areas are in effect denied to all government authority not immediately backed by substantial armed force. The Viet Cong's strength encircles Saigon and has recently begun to move closer in the city.

The people were not opposing these recent advances by the Viet Cong; if anything, they seemed to be supporting them. The failure to rally the people against the Viet Cong was laid to Diem's dictatorial rule:

There has been an increasing disposition within official circles and the army to question Diem's ability to lead in this period. Many feel that he is unable to rally the people in the fight against the Communists because of his reliance on virtual one-man rule, his tolerance of corruption extending even to his immediate entourage, and his refusal to relax a rigid system of public controls.

The CIA referred to the attempted coup against Diem that had been led by

General Thi in November, 1960, and concluded that another coup was likely. In spite of the gains by the Viet Cong, they predicted that the next attempt to overthrow Diem would originate with the army and the non-Communist opposition.

The Communists would like to initiate and control a coup against Diem, and their armed and subversive operations including united front efforts are directed toward this purpose. It is more likely, however, that any coup attempt which occurs over the next year or so will originate among non-Communist elements, perhaps a combination of disgruntled civilian officials and oppositionists and army elements, broader than those involved in the November attempt.

In view of the broadly based opposition to Diem's regime and his virtual reliance on one-man rule, it was unlikely that he would initiate any reform measures that would sap the strength of the revolutionaries. Whether reform was conceived as widening the political base of the regime, which Diem would not agree to, or whether it was to consist of an intensified counter-insurgency program, something the people would not support, it had become painfully clear to Washington that reform was not the path to victory. But victory was the goal, and Kennedy called upon Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell Gilpatric to draw up the victory plans. On April 20, 1961, Kennedy asked Gilpatric to:

- a) Appraise the current status and future prospects of the Communist drive to dominate South Vietnam.
- b) Recommend a series of actions (military, political, and/or economic, overt and/or covert) which will bring about Communist domination of that country.

STATINTL

DOCTOR GLOBE
20 July 1971

STATINTL

How the CIA can help

While there is much that can be criticized in the secrets revealed in the Pentagon papers, one agency that comes out of them with a record for calling its shots correctly is the Central Intelligence Agency. As Crocker Snow Jr. pointed out in last Sunday's Globe, it suggests that the last few Presidents should have listened more to the CIA than to the State Department, the Pentagon, the National Security Council and the White House advisers.

For it appears that if they had, there would have been no doubts about President Diem's regime in Saigon; the domino theory would not have been trotted out to justify the war, and the war would not have been escalated.

Why were not the CIA reports given greater credence? The answer may come only with less secrecy in Washington. But perhaps part of the answer lay in the disastrous 1961 invasion the agency ran at the Bay of Pigs in Cuba (for which President Kennedy, nonetheless, took all the blame).

And perhaps another part lies in a deliberate downplaying of the CIA's role. It had been an operational as well as an intelligence agency

when John Foster Dulles was Secretary of State and his brother Allen was CIA director. But after the Bay of Pigs, Robert Kennedy urged a tight control of operations and, according to what CIA director Richard Helms told the editors last April, the CIA was urged to present options rather than hard recommendations.

It is not publicly known what role if any the CIA played in the futile invasion of Cambodia and the abortive raid on an empty North Vietnamese prison camp. Enough is known about its role in Laos to make it subject to severe criticism, however.

All of this makes more attractive the proposal of Sen. John Sherman Cooper that the CIA share its intelligence estimates with Congress, which passes on its secret budget without knowing, for the most part, where the money goes. This would help Congress reach a judgment on important policy questions.

At a time when Congress is rightly reasserting its responsibility, that would be most helpful. It would be infinitely preferable to having to vote on the basis of limited information designed to support administrative policies.

STATINTL

WORCESTER, MASS.
TELEGRAM

1 JUL 19 1971
M - 62,339
S - 108,367

Probing the CIA

✓ Congress, which is in an anti-Vietnam, anti-Administration mood, is directing its attention to the Central Intelligence Agency. A number of bills being debated would flush some of the CIA spooks out into the daylight and give Congress more of a say in the agency's operations.

It is a sensitive subject, to say the least. The CIA says it must be close-lipped to be effective. But some of its critics think its curtain of secrecy gives it the power to act as an invisible government, accountable to no one.

✓ The various proposals offered attack the problem from different angles. Rep. Herman Badillo wants an amendment which would confine the CIA to gathering and analyzing intelligence. Sen. George McGovern wants all CIA appropriations and expenditures to appear in the budget as a single line item. (CIA expenses are now concealed). Sen. Clifford Case has introduced legislation to prohibit the CIA from financing a second country's operation in a third country (as the CIA is doing now with the Thais in Laos). Senator Sen. John Cooper, who is a former ambassador and friendly to the CIA, nevertheless wants its "conclusions, facts and analyses" distributed in full to the relevant committees in Congress as well as to the executive branch. This would require an amendment to the National Security Act.

It is plain that some of these proposals are aimed at the executive

branch, which Congress has become very suspicious of. Many congressmen have the feeling that they have been hoodwinked by various presidents (the Tonkin Gulf Resolution affair, for example), and they are convinced that the powers and secrecy of the CIA permit the executive branch to do things in foreign affairs that would otherwise be impossible under the Constitution.

Congress' attitude is understandable. After all, the Constitution regards the legislative as perhaps the most important branch of the government, yet Congress does not even know what is going on in foreign affairs half the time, and is powerless to do anything when it does learn the facts. The war in Laos, for example, has been run by the CIA without congressional approval or even debate.

Yet, how effective can an intelligence agency be if its activities are exposed to congressional scrutiny? How long would its secrets remain secret if they were pored over by congressional committees?

The questions raised by these proposals in Congress are fundamental in their implications. On the one hand, the United States must have effective ways to gather intelligence — and it also must on occasion be able to operate clandestinely.

On the other, it cannot tolerate an agency that functions under too tight a secrecy curtain with almost unlimited funds and powers. That way lies other Bays of Pigs.

18 JUL 1971

The CIA looks good in Pentagon papers

By PAUL W. BLACKSTOCK

Ever since the Bay of Pigs fiasco in April, 1961, the Central Intelligence Agency has had a bad press in this country and abroad. The 1967 "revelations" that the agency had secretly financed the National Student Association, plus a number of university-affiliated research institutes and anti-Communist cultural fronts, came as a shock to both students and the public.

Professor Blackstock, a former military-intelligence research analyst and author of several books on the intelligence process, now teaches at the University of South Carolina.

As the United States became bogged down in the Vietnam quagmire and the student anti-war protest gathered momentum, the CIA became a favorite target of abuse. Agency recruiters were driven from college campuses. CIA-financed study centers were "trashed" at a cost of many thousands of dollars. New Left orators, armed with a sense of outrage and an encyclopedic ignorance of the intelligence community and its functions, instinctively assumed that the CIA was a major factor in the escalation of the war in Vietnam.

But the Pentagon study of the war, recently published by the New York Times proves conclusively that the Don Quixotes of the New Left have been charging at the wrong windmill. For many years and at critical stages of the escalation, the CIA and other members of the intelligence community, especially the State Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research repeatedly warned against the hazards involved, including flat predictions that the strategic bombing of North Vietnam would fail to accomplish its objectives.

Deceived Themselves

How these estimates and warnings were ignored by top policy-makers as they carried out their deliberate and "immaculate deception" of the American public is one of the more fascinating aspects of the Pentagon papers. But in deceiving the public, the decision-makers also deceived themselves, and eventually came to believe optimistic "military progress" reports, released to the public as based on the "latest intelligence," when in fact at the highest level, the estimates were quite different. Reports from the field, including typical "show-

Harold Wilson, when appointed shadow Foreign Secretary, rushed to Washington to assure President Kennedy that Labor would stand four-square behind the U.S. in the Far East. There is no evidence that he subjected American intentions to any very close scrutiny. He recognized a fellow Boy Scout when he saw one, and did not scruple to borrow the Kennedy overblown rhetoric in explaining to doubting colleagues the nature of Britain's East of Suez peace-keeping mission.

job" briefings in Saigon, deceived only those officials, either civilian or military, who wanted to believe them.

What is the "intelligence community"? How is it organized and what role should it play in decision-making at the national level in such foreign entanglements as the war in Vietnam? The answers to these questions have been cloaked in secrecy when they should be a matter of public knowledge.

To begin with the basic institutions, the U.S. intelligence community is made up of the separate agencies of such key government departments as State and Defense, the National Security Agency, and the CIA, which has the overall responsibility for "coordinating, evaluating, and disseminating intelligence affecting the national security."

"First Line Of Defense"

It has often been said that "intelligence is the first line of national defense." Most citizens are vaguely aware that foreign policy and military decisions are made by the President with the advice of his secretaries of State and Defense, based, in theory at least, on the best information available to experts throughout the government. The collection, evaluation and dissemination of such information is one of the primary functions of intelligence.

But in foreign and military affairs, strategic decisions should also take into

account careful estimates of the capabilities and probable courses of action of friends, allies, neutrals and "enemies." The production of such national estimates is a second major function of the entire intelligence community, although the board of estimates in the CIA coordinates the individual agency contributions and disseminates the final results.

As a rule, the various intelligence agencies are staffed on the working level by thousands of anonymous civil servants whose painstaking work and devotion to duty are seldom equaled elsewhere in either government or private enterprise.

Many of the men on the CIA's Board of National Estimates and its staff have more than two decades of intelligence experience. Better than 90 per cent of the officials on this top echelon have advanced academic degrees in history, political science, or economics directly pertinent to their work. About 75 per cent have enhanced their area and subject knowledge by living overseas. The estimators in State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research are equally competent and well-qualified.

Advice To President

On the national level daily and weekly reports are promptly distributed to the President and his chief advisers, and special estimates or briefings are made as required in response to developing crises. In short, the intelligence community provides the decision-maker with carefully evaluated information and estimates which he can either use for guidance or disregard.

History is full of illustrations how national leaders have ignored the estimates of the intelligence agencies with disastrous results. Napoleon's intelligence aide, the Marquis de Caulaincourt, explained why, for obvious strategic reasons, the planned invasion of Russia would fail. His advice was ignored.

A century later, Adolph Hitler's ambassador in Russia, Count Brockdorff-Rantzau, used the same reasoning in his estimate of why Hitler's plan would fail. His warning was also ignored and Hitler launched his invasion, which was widely heralded as the final showdown in his lifelong crusade against world communism. The campaign ultimately floundered in a sea of blood—20 million Russian casualties alone, not to mention German losses which also ran into the millions.

Nothing quite as dramatic has hap-

13 JUL 1971

Free Press, Free People

By OGDEN R. REID

Our democracy does not work well in secret. The Pentagon Papers illuminate the arrogance of those in high places and the serious erosion, if not breakdown, of our constitutional system of checks and balances.

At least two Administrations, if not three, believed that they were not accountable to the Congress and the American people for watershed decisions taken about Indochina.

The present Administration has gone even further and launched the most serious attack on the press in our history: subpoenaing reporters' notes, threatening reprisals against television and radio stations under the power to license, and, for the first time nationally, invoking prior restraint against the right to publish.

This precensorship was claimed to be justified because of an "immediate grave threat to national security." Critical national security touching our very survival is not in fact at issue here—nor is cryptographic intelligence.

While the Kennedy and particularly the Johnson Administrations' failure to inform Congress is a shocking example of unilateral executive decision-making, the attempted effort by the Nixon Administration to prevent what is essentially past history reaching Congress or being published is hardly more reassuring.

After six days of hearings before the Government Information Subcommittee of the House of Representatives, certain remedies are clearly called for if the Congress is to reassert its constitutional role.

First, the Congress must enact a new statute governing classified documents. This law must sharply limit that which should be labeled secret and it must provide for automatic declassification and Congressional oversight. If a matter should remain secret after a stated period, there should be an affirmative, positive finding as to why continued secrecy is necessary.

The Congress should explicitly reserve the right to make public material improperly classified by the executive contrary to statute when its classification is not a matter of national security and is simply a device to avoid governmental embarrassment.

Equally, no Executive order on classification should be issued that subverts the intent of the Congress. Above all, there must be a vast reduction in the corps of 8,000 Defense Department officers who now have authority to originate top secret and secret designations.

Second, the Freedom of Information Act should be tightened in two respects. The types of information now permitted to be withheld must be sharply limited, and time permitted for Government response to a court suit must be reduced from the present 60 days.

Third, the Congress must come to grips with executive privilege. Here we are dealing with a collision between the executive and the Congress that has been going on since George Washington assumed office. It should be subject to accommodation, but that will never happen if the Congress does not assert the powers and responsibilities given to it by the Constitution.

Fourth, legislation may well be required to protect the Fourth Estate. The press often serves as a coordinate branch of our democracy, especially when a breakdown occurs between the other three. Specifically, we need a national Newsmen's Privilege Act—now law in six states—protecting the confidentiality of sources, absent a threat to human life, espionage, or foreign aggression. Legislation should be enacted to prohibit the issuance by the courts of injunctions against publication, thereby removing prior restraint from the reach of the executive.

Congressional legislation and assertion of appropriate initiatives can help redress the current situation. If need be, the power of the purse can be more resolutely used vis-à-vis an unresponsive executive. But more fundamentally, what we need is government with faith in the American people and in their right to participate in the great decisions. If we do not see this now, after the Bay of Pigs, the Dominican Republic intervention and the whole tragic history of Indochina, then as a nation we do not really understand democracy.

Ogden R. Reid, Republican, is member of Congress for the 26th New York district.

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Editorials

DeGaulle Warned Against a Bog

IF WE PINPOINT the decision that really changed the United States role in Vietnam from one of advice to one of intervention, it will be clear that this was President John F. Kennedy's decision and that he made it on May 11, 1961.

The Pentagon Papers prove beyond question that that month ten years ago was the critical time in the development of a war of which, even yet, we cannot see the end.

The decision made that day was to send 400 Special Forces troops and 100 other American military advisers to South Vietnam, also to start up a campaign of clandestine warfare against North Vietnam, to be conducted by CIA-trained South Vietnamese agents.

THUS, WAYNE HEDRICK SMITH of the New York Times, "The limited-risk gamble undertaken by General Eisenhower had been transformed into an unlimited commitment under Mr. Kennedy."

The fateful date is notable both for what had gone before the decision and for what came soon after. John F. Kennedy was less than four months into his presidency; he was feeling his way through and around the jungles of the CIA and the Pentagon. He had taken a colossal beating at the Bay of Pigs, in Cuba, April 19, 1961, for which he accepted (but loathed having to accept) full responsibility.

Moreover, Kennedy made his moves in secret, and the deception of Congress and the people which Lyndon Johnson was later so much blamed for can certainly be made out here.

STUDENTS OF THE CATASTROPHIC Vietnam war will find an ironic and illuminating footnote to the Kennedy commitment of May 11, 1961, if they turn at this point to the memoirs of Charles deGaulle, recently published in France.

"On May 31, 1961," writes de Gaulle, "John Kennedy arrives in Paris, full of energy. . . . It is mostly about Indochina that I underline to President Kennedy how much our policies differ: he recognizes that the United States is getting ready to intervene . . . they are starting to set up the first elements of an expeditionary force under the pretext of assistance . . . John Kennedy gives me to understand that the whole business is going to be enlarged in order to set up in the Indochinese Peninsula a bulwark of resistance against the Soviets."

DE GAULLE CONTINUES: "For you, I tell him, 'an intervention in that area will be an endless task. From the moment that a nation wakes up, no foreign authority, whatever its means may be, has any chance of imposing itself. . . . The more you will involve yourselves over there against communism, the more the Communists will appear as the champions of national independence, and the more help they will receive, first of all from the despair of the people.'"

"We French have experienced it. Yesterday, you Americans wanted to take our place in Indochina. Now you want to rekindle a war we have finished. I predict that you will be sucked down step by step into a bottomless military and political bog, in spite of the losses and expenditures you may lavish."

President de Gaulle concludes this chapter of his history: "Kennedy listens to me, but the outcome will show that I have not convinced him."

STATINTL

JFK Tried To Curb CIA But Failed, Officer Says

LONDON — (UPI) — A former Pentagon officer said that President John F. Kennedy incurred the hatred of the Central Intelligence Agency because of his attempts to harness its power after the abortive Bay of Pigs invasion.

In an interview with British Broadcasting Corporation television, Lt. Col. Fletcher Prouty indicated that the late president's efforts to curb the CIA had failed. He said two presidential directives designed to limit the agency's powers in 1961 never had been implemented.

Prouty, interviewed on the BBC's "24 Hours" program, was Pentagon liaison officer with the CIA, a U.S. Air Force colonel, and Director of Special Operations for the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1962 and 1963. He is now a banker in Washington, D.C.

AFTER THE investigation into the Bay of Pigs failure in 1961, Kennedy issued two

national security memoranda to the CIA, Prouty said.

"One of them he signed personally, explicitly stating that any operational activity of a clandestine nature would be either so small that CIA agents alone could operate it, or would be referred to the J.C.S. (Joint Chiefs of Staff) rather than permitting the CIA to mount something as large as the Bay of Pigs again," Prouty said.

"I think he (Kennedy) reacted strongly to the defeat at the Bay of Pigs and moved against the CIA to control them," he said.

THE COLONEL said he personally had handled the directives, but "for some strange reason, although they were issued and signed by the president, there was no implementation of them."

Asked by interviewer Robert MacKenzie if he thought Kennedy had incurred the hatred of the CIA by trying to clip its powers, Prouty answered "I do."

8 JUL 1971

Bay of Pigs tale

CIA hated JFK, former officer says

LONDON (UPI) — A former Pentagon officer said yesterday President Kennedy incurred the hatred of the Central Intelligence Agency because he tried to harness its power after the Bay of Pigs invasion.

In an interview with BBC television, Lt. Col. Fletcher Prouty indicated that the late president's efforts to curb the CIA had failed. He said two presidential directives designed to limit the agency's powers in 1961 never had been implemented.

Col. Prouty was Pentagon liaison man with the CIA, a U.S. Air Force officer, and director of special operations for the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1962 and 1963. He is now retired and a banker in Washington, D.C.

After the Bay of Pigs investigation in 1961, President Kennedy issued two memoranda to the CIA, Mr. Prouty said.

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3 JUL 1971

Rusk Says He Misjudged Hanoi's Will to Wage War

By Philip D. Carter

Washington Post Staff Writer

ATLANTA, July 2 — Former Secretary of State Dean Rusk conceded today that he had underestimated the determination of the North Vietnamese to wage war in Southeast Asia.

But Rusk also strongly defended himself and the two Presidents he served against charges that they tried to deceive American public opinion about the war in Vietnam.

"I don't believe there was any attempt to deceive anybody during all that," he said. Rusk served Presidents Kennedy and Johnson as Secretary of State from 1961 through 1968.

Rusk also took sharp issue with several conclusions contained in the secret Pentagon study on the Vietnam war. He sharply rejected one suggestion that he had considered using nuclear weapons against China in 1963.

"Let me say very simply that under no circumstances at any time did I ever recommend any use of nuclear weapons," he said. "I don't believe any man in his right mind could rationally make such a recommendation as a matter of policy."

In the course of apparently soul-searching replies in interviews this afternoon, Rusk conceded, however, that he had made mistakes while serving as Secretary of State.

"I personally, I think, underestimated the persistence and the tenacity of the North Vietnamese," he said. Considering the relative sizes of the two countries, the estimated 700,000 casualties suffered by the North Vietnamese, he said, was the equivalent of 10 million American casualties, and yet "they're continuing to come" because of "the divisions here at home."

The United States also erred, he said, in not stressing "prevention" of conflicts like the Asian war, and in "not pressing much harder for U.N. intervention in the conflict."

And, he later added, "one of the severe prices we may have paid for Vietnam is that it may have stimulated ... a period of isolationism" in the United States.

He nonetheless insisted that those who argue that the United States should "get out now" also are mistaken. And he held fast to the basic position he defended throughout his eight-year tenure in the Cabinet: that the United States had no choice but to defend South Vietnam against North Vietnamese aggression if the world was to be saved from general conflict.

"The overriding moral question," he said, "is, 'How do we avoid World War III?'"

Most of his comments came during the taping here of an hour-long interview conducted by NBC television reporters Barbara Walters and Edwin Newman which was later broadcast as a network "special." Additional comments followed during taping of an NBC "Today" show interview with Miss Walters and a subsequent informal press conference in the studio of WSB-TV, the local NBC affiliate.

With the exception of an interview published today in the Daily News in Athens, Ga., where the former Cabinet Secretary now works as professor of international law at the University of Georgia, it was Rusk's first public comment since publication of parts of the 47-volume Pentagon history of the war.

Rusk said he had not heard of the study until he read of it in The New York Times, after which he telephoned former President Johnson and former Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara, the man who originally authorized the history.

President Johnson, he said, told him that the study had just recently been delivered to the new Johnson Library in Austin, Tex., and that he had Austin, Tex., and that he had not yet examined it.

According to Rusk, McNamara originally had in mind "a much more informal collection of documents" in the compendium ultimately

produced by the Pentagon researchers. The history, according to Rusk, was to have been more of an "in-house affair," on the lines of the kind of material usually contained in the "loose-leaf notebook" Rusk himself relied on while appearing before congressional committees to defend the war.

Rusk noted that the "history" was exclusively a Defense Department project. "I'm curious about why the analysts didn't interview any of us" at the White House and the State Department, he said.

"The analysts are anonymous, so in a certain sense these have some of the characteristics of an anonymous letter," he said in reference to the study's authors. He called on the media to "make their names known."

But he said he felt the study was fair "to some extent" insofar as it made clear that "we were looking at all the alternatives throughout the war."

Rusk said he had deliberately withheld comment on the study until after the Supreme Court ruled last Wednesday that The Times and The Washington Post could continue publishing stories on the Pentagon history. He added that he did not take exception to the court's decision, but that publication would complicate American diplomacy.

The public's "right to know" is balanced by the government's responsibility for preserving diplomatic secrets, he said.

Rusk specifically challenged the charge that President Johnson secretly was planning to escalate the war while telling the American voters, during his 1964 presidential campaign against Sen. Barry Goldwater (R-Ariz.), that he sought "no wider war."

Any proposals to the contrary, said Rusk, were only routine contingency plans. He said Mr. Johnson did not decide to expand the conflict until South Vietnam was invaded by regular troops from North Vietnam in December of 1964.

STATINTL

Rusk said he still strongly believes that there were two North Vietnamese attacks on U.S. destroyers in the Gulf of Tonkin in the summer of 1964 and that the United States did not provoke them. But congressional reaction, he said, would have been "relatively the same" even before the second reported attack, after which both congressional houses — with two dissenting votes — approved Mr. Johnson's "Gulf of Tonkin resolution" extending broad war powers to the President.

Rusk also countered charges that the United States was actively supporting a coup against South Vietnam's President Diem. Instead, he said, the United States "drew aside on a wait-and-see kind of basis" after Diem failed to respond to U.S. pressure for reform of his government. "Well, he refused to do that, and the military and the Buddhists and the students got together and threw him out of office," Rusk said.

He acknowledged that lower-echelon U.S. officials in Saigon may have encouraged the coup without high-ranking approval in Washington, but he denied that there was any general concern that Diem was attempting to end the war through an agreement with Hanoi.

"We had no indication that this was more than a rumor, that there were any actual talks going on," Rusk said.

While denying that U.S. officials had lied about the war, Rusk explained that public officials are usually strong advocates of their policies. "I don't know any sector of our society that goes around poor mouthing what they're trying to accomplish," he said. "I never saw a Buick salesman driving around in a Chrysler."

In another context, he declared that the nation's "greatest mistake" was the Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba.

He tacitly endorsed President Nixon's Vietnam policy, which he described as trying to "bring this war to a conclu-

continued

3 JUL 1971

Colonel Says Kennedy's Attempts to Curb CIA Failed

LONDON (UPI) — A former Pentagon officer says President John F. Kennedy incurred the hatred of the Central Intelligence Agency because of his attempts to harness its power after the abortive Bay of Pigs invasion.

In an interview with British Broadcasting Corporation television, Lt. Col. Fletcher Prouty indicated that the late President's efforts to curb the CIA had failed. He said two presidential directives designed to limit the agency's powers in 1961 never had been implemented.

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After the investigation into the Bay of Pigs failure in 1961, Kennedy issued two national security memoranda to the CIA, Prouty said.

"One of them he signed personally, explicitly stating that any operational activity of a

clandestine nature would be either so small that CIA agents alone could operate it, or would be referred to the JCS rather than permitting the CIA to mount something as large as the Bay of Pigs again," Prouty said.

Prouty said he personally had handled the directives, but "for some strange reason, although they were issued and signed by the President, there was no implementation of them."

Asked how the CIA could have gotten away with violating the directives, Prouty said, "There must have been some pretty violent meetings in there between June of '61 and say the beginning of the buildup in Vietnam, because to my knowledge the documents were never retracted."

Reluctant Move by JFK Set Viet Stage

1961 Memo Envisioned Maximum U.S. Troop Level of 205,000

By Chalmers M. Roberts
Washington Post Staff Writer

On Nov. 11, 1961, President Kennedy was told that Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara and the Joint Chiefs of Staff "assume" that if Hanoi and Peking overtly intervened in South Vietnam after the United States sent its first troops there that the maximum American force "required on the ground in Southeast Asia would not exceed six divisions, or about 205,000 men."

This assumption was contained in a joint memorandum to the President by Secretary of State Dean Rusk and McNamara in preparation for a National Security Council session at which Mr. Kennedy, in essence, accepted the Rusk-McNamara recommendations for a fateful step into direct involvement in the war.

This is among the many new facts contained in the Pentagon documents made available to The Washington Post relating to the Kennedy era and the war.

In actual fact, there was barely disguised North Vietnamese intervention some three years later, but thus far there has been no Chinese intervention. The total American manpower sent to Vietnam reached a peak of more than a-half million men before the beginning of the withdrawals by the Nixon Administration. The 205,000 estimate was but one of the many miscalculations of the war.

The available documents portray a President Kennedy reluctant, in 1961, to become fully committed to the war by sending in combat troops but being advised and pushed by top officials in his administration to commit the United States.

For example, the first of 10 recommendations, with many sub-recommendations in the Rusk-McNamara memorandum, was that "We now take the decision to commit ourselves to the objective of preventing the fall of South Vietnam to Communism and that, in doing so, we recognize that the introduction of United States and other SEATO [Southeast Asia Treaty Organization] forces may be necessary to achieve this objective."

When the President approved a National Security Action Memorandum (NSAM 111) on Nov. 22, however, that sweeping commitment language was omitted.

Nonetheless, the NSAM was headed "First Phase of Vietnam Program" and it did contain presidential approval for sending to Vietnam helicopters, light aircraft and transport planes, manned by American personnel in uniform in a new "partnership" between the United States and the government of South Vietnam then headed by President Ngo Dinh Diem.

The first helicopters and their crews arrived in Saigon on Dec. 11, 1961, aboard the U.S.S. Core, a former escort carrier. Four days later, Washington and Saigon made public an exchange of Kennedy-Diem letters announcing in general terms a stepped-up American aid program. These moves composed the most fateful step in 1961 regarding Vietnam.

When John F. Kennedy entered the White House on Jan. 20, 1961, the focus in Southeast Asia was on Laos. Three days earlier, one of the strongest advocates of American intervention, Brig. Gen. Edward Lansdale, had reported to the outgoing administration that "the U.S. should recognize that Vietnam is in a critical condition and should treat it as a combat area of the cold war..."

This theme, in one form or another, was to be pressed on the President from the day of his inaugural to the day of his assassination. The rhetoric of his Inaugural Address was that of the cold war period. His attitude toward the Vietnam problem, as is well known from what he said in public, was deeply affected by Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev's famous speech in January, prior to the Kennedy inauguration, commending "wars of national liberation" in a period when nuclear war was too dangerous to contemplate and when small conventional wars could lead to a world war.

This led the President to approve a number of covert operations both in Laos and in South and North Vietnam. It led him to build up a constant in much of the advice given him. For

example, on Nov. 3, 1961, in the letter to the President transmitting a report on his mission to Vietnam, Gen. Maxwell Taylor wrote:

"It is my judgment and that of my colleagues that the United States must decide how it will cope with Khrushchev's 'wars of liberation' which are really paravers of guerrilla aggression."

Added Taylor: "This is a new and dangerous Communist technique which bypasses our traditional political and military responses. While the final answer lies beyond the scope of this report, it is clear to me that the time may come in our relations to Southeast Asia when we must declare our intentions to attack the source of guerrilla aggression in North Vietnam and impose on the Hanoi government a price for participation in the current war which is commensurate with the damage being inflicted on its neighbors to the South."

But that time was not to come until the Johnson era, after Hanoi matched the American buildup on the ground. In the first Kennedy year, the problem appeared this way, as described in the Rusk-McNamara memorandum to President Kennedy under the heading of "The Problem of Saving South Vietnam":

"It seems, on the face of it, absurd to think that a nation of 20 million people can be subverted by 15-20 thousand active guerrillas if the government and the people of that country do not wish to be subverted."

The American answer, tortuously arrived at in lengthy debate within the administration from January to November, 1961, was to pressure Diem to improve the caliber and effectiveness of his government as well as to introduce some American military personnel and equipment as an earnest of the United States commitment to defeat that particular war of liberation, as Washington viewed it.

(There is no evidence, incidentally, in the documents available to The Washington Post to show that the debacle of the Bay of Pigs in April, 1961, affected President Kennedy's actions reacting to Indochina one way or the other.)

For 1961 as a whole, it is evident that two missions to Saigon ordered by Mr. Kennedy were of great importance—those of Vice President Johnson and of Gen. Taylor. There were other activities here in Washington that also affected the outcome, of course. And there could be additional evidence in White House and State Department records, which are sparse in the Pentagon study.

Barely a week after taking office the Pentagon analyst noted, Mr. Kennedy approved a modest counterinsurgency program for South Vietnam drafted by the Eisenhower Administration. There followed alternate coaxing and pressuring of Diem for "reforms" to make such programs work.

On April 27, on the heels of the Bay of Pigs, a crisis in Laos reached its peak. The combination, the analyst suggested, led a task force headed by Deputy Defense Secretary Roswell L. Gilpatric to suggest American help to increase Diem's forces and what the analyst termed "a modest commitment of U.S. ground combat units in South Vietnam with the nominal mission of establishing two training centers." The President took no action on the latter, although he approved the aid to Diem's forces.

A State Department redraft of this report recommended stationing U.S. troops in Vietnam but not for combat against the Vietcong. It also raised the idea of a bilateral American-South Vietnamese defense treaty. But on May 5 Rusk declared that "we should not place combat forces in SVN at this time."

The Vice President's visit to Vietnam is first mentioned to defeat that particular war of liberation, as Washington viewed it.

STATINTL

GEN. ROBERT L. SCOTT, JR. SPEAKS
TO AMERICANS

HON. JOHN R. RARICK

OF LOUISIANA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, June 29, 1971

Mr. RARICK. Mr. Speaker, in a speech entitled "The Bitter Cost of a Bogus Peace," Brig. Gen. Robert L. Scott, Jr. retired professional soldier, emphasizes in an impassioned tone his love of dedication to God and country while elaborating on the bitter price we pay for a tenuous, bogus peace—the erosion of liberty and of the God-given freedoms bequeathed to us by our U.S. Constitution.

Being the realist that he is, General Scott rejects the "inevitable wave of the future" propaganda being repeatedly hammered into the consciousnesses of the American people to condition them to accept apathetically without resistance the "blowing winds of change" even when they are obliterating our U.S. Constitution and traditional American way of life.

General Scott knows from first hand experience that people cause things to happen. Someone is prohibiting our military commanders from winning the Vietnam war which fettered military commanders affirm could be won with conventional weapons in a matter of months. The exportation of sophisticated electronic computers to the Soviet Union and such items as diesel engines and parts, aircraft propeller assemblies, electron tubes, and generators to East European satellites of Russia—countries which provide 80 percent of the materials of war to North Vietnam for use against American servicemen—just did not come about automatically or by accident. They were the result of people. Certain anti-Americans made these decisions. Just as when the dedicated patriot Otto Otepka was dismissed from his State Department security position where he exposed actual and prospective employees as security risks, one or more real persons at a higher level ordered him purged.

General Scott, best known for his bravery and achievements as a World War II flyer and for his several books, especially "God Is My Co-Pilot," reminds his audience that while each new administration promises changes, America keeps losing; and he states:

At last, though, there is a faint glimmer of hope. Not that we are about to win even a scrimmage, but that finally, more Americans come to realize that our bungling policymakers are not stupid fools or just doing the best they can in their complicated thankless job, but are part and parcel of the greatest, the most insidious conspiracy the world has ever known. Following carefully-laid plans for our convergence with the Soviet Union as the base for dictatorial government of the world. (Where, as Senator — says, there'll be no armies, no navies, no air forces except those of the United Nations. In fact, there'll be no United States as we know it.)

On the west side of Park Avenue in New York City, sit two imposing buildings sort of kitty-corner to one another. One is the Soviet Embassy to the United Nations, the other the Headquarters of the Council of Foreign Relations, the infamous C.F.R. Prob-

ably the most influential, surely the most secretive of societies, not only for the foreign policy of the United States, but for the world. That one world. Formal membership is composed of 1400 of the most elite names in the worlds of government, labor, business, finance, communications, the foundations, and the academics. And despite the fact that it, the Council of Foreign Relations, has staffed almost every key position of each administration since F.D.R., it is doubtful that one American in a thousand so much as knows its name. Or that one in ten thousand can describe anything about its function. Such anonymity can hardly be an accident.

I insert the text of General Scott's timely and significant speech at this point in my remarks. I urge that our colleagues read this speech and get better informed with facts about the Council on Foreign Relations—CFR—the influential organization which has led and continues to lead America on a retrogressive course of destruction, by reading "The Invisible Government" by the noted writer, Dan Smoot.

Since the national news media is afraid to tell the American people about the CFR, I exhort our colleagues to do so in order that the people may know the truth, a knowledge of which is essential for taking prudent action to reverse the present trend and to preserve our country and Constitution.

If the people know the truth, they will keep America free.

The speech follows:

THE BITTER COST OF A BOGUS PEACE—IS THE
BROKEN CROSS OUR SYMBOL OF BETRAYAL?

(By Brig. Gen. Robert L. Scott, Jr.)

When the man who is the President of the United States now, made the best of acceptance speeches that ever has been made, at Miami Beach in 1968, every American must have been not only pleased but thrilled, because in the strongest of voices he said words such as these: "When the nation which can land an army upon the shores of Normandy in 1944, and capture a continent, cannot now take a dinky little beachhead of guerrillas in Vietnam, then I say this nation needs a change in leadership." And on and on he went, inspiring all Americans. There was the new Administration, the new leadership we had all been praying for. He promised the stopping of riots in our streets, dignity would be restored to our police, our nation's campuses would be freed of revolutionaries parading as dissatisfied students. We would aid the enemy no longer. We'd recognize the Communist for what he was—the enemy—and go to work. All of these things if only we elected him. There would be changes.

Well, we believed him. And we elected for America a new Commander-in-Chief. And now we would have leadership. Only, there has been nothing but more of the same. We still wage that no-win war of attrition bogged down right where the enemy wants us, using weapons that enemy carefully selected for us, and back home we are torn apart internally, primarily because there is no leadership. So, disgusted at all this, we sit down and write letters to Mr. Nixon asking why, and sometimes there are replies such as this one.

"THE WHITE HOUSE,
November 5, 1970.

"DEAR SIR: On President Nixon's behalf, I wish to acknowledge your letter and to thank you for letting him have your views. You may be sure your comments on problems facing our Nation at home and abroad have been fully noted.

"The Administration believes that the massive destruction of facilities in the cities of North Vietnam would not spell victory but

would instead admit defeat by indicating the inability of the United States and its allies to cope with 'a war of national liberation.' This sophisticated form of aggression uses terror and subversion to gain the allegiance or the submission of those it purports to liberate.

"Such aggression must not be allowed to succeed. Our objective therefore is not the annihilation of one country but the protection of another. This is the victory we seek."

Oh, there was more of the double-talk in the reply that I received, given gratis in the name of the President, but surely as you let those words rattle around in your mind, there's no need to further bore you with additional quotes. I can only be respectful to the White House and the President, even with this idealistic guff. Yet what frightens me, given as it is, it has to be the policy of this Administration. Signed by one Noble N. Mellonkamp, Staff Assistant to the President of the United States. Wishing me best regards, and adding finally, "you may be sure that President Nixon is determined to continue the pursuit of our country's goal of a just and lasting peace in Vietnam."

Ladies and gentlemen, as a professional soldier, I feel flattered when I receive any communication, even indirectly, from the Commander-in-Chief. But after reading and re-reading such utter drivel, I am astounded that we are so naive. Can it be that we are already in the hands of the enemy? We are not only being buried as Khrushchev shouted while he beat his shoe upon the U.N. desk; we are helping the dirt being shoveled into our own graves.

Now my mother used to say to me, those last years of her life when I was Director of Information of the United States Air Force, and I dared even then to find fault with the way the White House was running this same no-win war: "Son, she would admonish me, please don't criticize the President. I'm certain he does the best he can." And she would terminate the discussion by adding, "though things may look dark, I truly believe everything will come out alright in the end."

In fact, that last is just about the essence of the opinion I hear voiced across the United States as I cover this land making speeches. And there comes upon me the horrible realization that the way things are going, the President of the United States does not run this country. Doesn't run it as my mother used to think, and as the average American rests assured of today. What a blatant thing to say! What would my mother say if she heard me now?

Administrations come and go with elections—particular heads vested in the Nixons and Johnsons and Kennedys, promising changes and improvements—but nothing really changes except the name. The riots and the treason and the no-win fiasco bleeding us to death continue. America keeps losing.

At last, though, there is a faint glimmer of hope. Not that we are about to win even a scrimmage, but that finally, more Americans come to realize that our bungling policymakers are not stupid fools or just doing the best they can in their complicated thankless job, but are part and parcel of the greatest, the most insidious conspiracy the world has ever known. Following carefully-laid plans for our convergence with the Soviet Union as the base for dictatorial government of the world. (Where, as Senator Blank says, there'll be no armies, no navies, no air forces except those of the United Nations. In fact, there'll be no United States as we know it.)

On the west side of Park Avenue in New York City, sit two imposing buildings sort of kitty-corner to one another. One is the Soviet Embassy to the United Nations, the other the Headquarters of the Council of Foreign Relations, the infamous C.F.R. Probably the most influential, surely the most secretive of

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One Who Was There Adds To the Vietnam Autopsy

By far the most perceptive analysis of how the United States role in Vietnam grew under the Kennedy and Johnson administrations has come from the pen of William R. Polk, who was on the policy planning council of the U.S. State Department 1961-65.

A feeling of excitement and pride in the supposed capacity to act pervaded the ranks of those brought into the Kennedy administration, writes William R. Polk. The normal machinery of government was ignored and bypassed, he adds, while "all of us who had come into the government from the outside were fascinated with the techniques and toys of power. . . CIA, Army, Air Force and Navy each offered a gimmick to solve the mysterious and complex dilemmas before us. . . The CIA constantly informed us that it had assets capable of restructuring politics almost anywhere in the world."

THE FIASCO IN CUBA known as Bay of Pigs and the hardnosed confrontation between Nikita Khrushchev and John Kennedy in Vienna heightened an urge to show the world something about American power, the writer says.

This urge was fed by a "war gaming concept," Polk writes, in which "the world was assumed to be a place of inherent conflict and jostling for power. There were only two serious contenders, the Soviet Union and the United States. The result of the gaming scenarios was to clarify the options of the players and to attempt to define ways in which ambiguity can be clarified and miscalculation by the superpowers avoided."

This led the Kennedy administration, he adds, into a startling misconception of the world as it really exists:

"In the international arena we attempted to substitute a disembodied view of the world for the reality. In place of politics, we sought an intellectual vision of strategy. In place of the rough and tumble of the marketplace, we sought abstract plans. All of us sought, in short, to pass our individual responsibility as citizens on to some imagined expertise."

VIEWING THE DETERIORATION of Vietnam under Communist bloodshed, the Kennedy and Johnson advisers recalled that military assistance and civilian aid had enabled the Greek government to defeat communist insurgency in 1948-49; that the British had defeated the Communists in Malaysia through ruthless use of force, and the fortified village concept though it took 11 years; that civic action had enabled the Philippines government to destroy the Huk movement. By combining these lessons with the bag of tools in Uncle Sam's kit — the light-weight rifle, the helicopter, defoliation agents, etc., and by lacing the admittedly corrupt, inefficient and backward army of South Vietnam with our own troops, we thought we could win. . . .

What this framework overlooked, he adds, is that guerrilla warfare is 80 per cent politics, 15 per cent administration and 4 per cent military action, and that Ho Chi Minh had won the political scramble when he took over the Vietnamese independence movement in 1945 and mercilessly subverted it to Communism.

There will be millions of words written and spoken on the Vietnam war but the essence of how it grew is outlined clearly in the above analysis.

WHILE IT IS POPULAR NOW to label Vietnam a disaster, there is a strong body of opinion among the statesmen of non-Communist Southeast Asia, as reported from Malaysia, by Robert S. Elegant of the Washington Post, that:

"1. American intervention in Indochina has decisively stabilized Southeast Asia and prevented external conquest while encouraging internal progress and regional cooperation, and

"2. The United States has won in a limited, political war. American has attained its chief goals by nurturing a Republic of South Vietnam with a much better than even chance of survival; by stabilizing the area; and by catalyzing internal change which makes the People's Republic of China less aggressive and more inclined toward normal diplomatic interchange."

So the verdict of history may be far different from that being glibly repeated about Vietnam in current hand-wringing clamor.

CHICAGO, ILL.
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JUN 27 1971

CHICAGO SUN-TIMES, Sun, June 27, 1971

The take-charge team and Vietnam

William R. Polk, president of the Adlai Stevenson Institute of International Affairs and a professor at the University of Chicago, was on the Policy Planning Council of the U.S. State Department from 1961 to 1965. Following is his insider's analysis of the foreign policy that led to involvement in Vietnam.

By William R. Polk

Publication of government documents about the U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War provides an occasion to raise fundamental questions on U.S. political action in recent years.

The first of these difficult-to-answer questions is: Why did the new Kennedy administration (and later President Lyndon B. Johnson) continue so much of the foreign policy conceived by President Eisenhower's secretary of state, John Foster Dulles?

The second question is: Why did successive U.S. governments appear so insistent—at times eager—to be committed to the Vietnam war?

Running through all the memoranda so far published—and many that have not been published—are feelings of excitement and a pride in a capacity to act.

Both for better and for worse, this was the mood of the 1950's. After dull, gray years of a lackluster Eisenhower administration, a new team, bright, alert and sophisticated, arrived to take charge.

What were the major elements in this new mood?

The first, undoubtedly, was set during the campaign. President John F. Kennedy emphasized the so-called missile gap to demonstrate that a fumbling, inept Republican administration had allowed U.S. capacities to wither. The new administration went to great pains to project an image of zest and energy. It is not, perhaps, an exaggeration to say that a key element in the Democratic victory in 1960 was the familiar magazine program of the youthful, handsome and dynamic Massachusetts senator and his glamorous wife.

Administration in 3 traps

Yet, no sooner had the administration taken power than it found itself caught in three traps.

The first was its failure to understand a fundamental fact about the U.S. government: The postwar bureaucracy had a pattern of

action, a will and a philosophy of its own. Any incoming administration had only a few months to stamp its personality upon the bureaucracy. Thereafter, the pattern became hardened and beyond the reach of the President. The Kennedy administration largely missed its opportunity. The Johnson administration never had a chance, and the Nixon administration never tried.

The Kennedy team had no major programs, it had not identified appropriate numbers of persons to implement the ideas that it had and it was prepared to give away to its natural enemies positions of great opportunity.

It is startling that President Kennedy did not know two of his principal top aides, the secretaries of defense and state, before his election. While he constantly complained of the State Department, he undercut the two principal officials of his own party, Adlai E. Stevenson II and Chester Bowles; allowed the senior bureaucrats of the State Department to maintain intact the "machinery" of policymaking he despised, and brought in so small, heterodox and unco-ordinated a team of new people as to make virtually no impact on the vast and unwieldy organization.

Frustrated, without clear guidelines, Kennedy and his close circle of associates simply neglected or bypassed the machinery of government. For awhile, this appeared to be a pragmatic, sensible approach. In many areas, however, the Kennedy administration allowed decisions to be taken, often almost absent-mindedly or with little appreciation of their long-term importance, have set the course of subsequent U.S. policy.

The Bay of Pigs fiasco further called into question in the President's mind the governmental "machine." He particularly distrusted the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Central Intelligence Agency. Ironically, however, the casualty in the CIA was not the culprit. Rather, it was the analytical, "overt" part of CIA, which had not been informed of the Bay of Pigs operation until the 11 hour and which steadfastly opposed the operation.

The whole procedure of appreciations of intelligence that emanated from the U.S. National Intelligence Board was largely neglected throughout the rest of the Kennedy-Johnson period.

The Policy Planning Council in the State Department—which had been "promoted"

in the first blush of concern with thought—planning analysis never really got underway. In the formative early months of the Kennedy administration, the Policy Planning Council went through a bureaucratic "exercise" of such lamentably poor quality as to convince the entire government apparatus that the Kennedy administration was interested only in show and not in the realities. Months were spent turning out turgid, relished and inapplicable "guideline papers".

It never gets off ground

The second trap was created by the Administration's need to establish its international "credibility." We had received a black eye in Cuba, and in the Vienna test of wills, the young President Kennedy appeared to have been faced down by a tough, experienced and wily Nikita S. Khrushchev.

All of us who had come newly into the government from the outside were fascinated with the techniques and toys of power. Touts from the Air Force, CIA and the Army and Navy each offered a gimmick to solve the mysterious and complex dilemmas before us. The CIA constantly informed us that it had "assets" that were capable of restructuring politics almost anywhere in the world.

Even the laborious and somewhat pathetic efforts of the Agency for International Development could be orchestrated into diplomatic and other efforts to control, damp down or redirect the energies of a score of nations. The bewildering statistics of speeds and capacities of high-performance aircraft, to which we were all treated to rides, were seductive. Independent branches of the services, even the chemical and biological warfare groups, dangled before us their capacities and begged only to be used. The new weaponry offered itself as "surgical," precise and disembodied. And, of course, we knew so much. Communications intelligence and glamorous classified documents, whether worthy of the designation or not, dominated our thinking.

From the academic community had come two sets of concepts. One was built on a series of almost incomprehensible, largely abstract or uninteresting and highly self-con-

24 JUN 1971

Political Exiles Flock To New York to Plot Fall of Home Regimes

Greeks, Haitians, Dominicans
Join East Europe Refugees;
Many Deplore U.S. Diplomacy

By RAYMOND A. JOSEPH

Staff Reporter of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

NEW YORK—Vaclavas Sidzikauskas, 77, is Minister Plenipotentiary of Lithuania. Mario Marinho, which is not his real name, advocates guerilla warfare in Brazil and approves of the kidnapping of American diplomats there. Phintso Thonden, 32, is the New York Permanent Representative of His Holiness, the Dalai Lama, of Tibet, and runs a three-man Office of Tibet on Second Avenue.

These three men are political exiles. New York is their home, but not their homeland. But they aren't lonely here. Whenever there's a political upheaval somewhere in the world, the U.S.—and New York in particular—stands to get a new batch of political refugees. Not even U.S. immigration officials can tell just how many there are here, because many don't bother to go through the formality of registering as residents of the U.S. once they've entered. For example, only 16,541 of the more than 150,000 Haitian refugees believed living in New York have registered with the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service—even though all resident aliens are required by law to register with the service each January.

Dictatorships in the Caribbean—Cuba and Haiti—have produced the most refugees in the past decade. About 50,000 Cubans still come to the U.S. each year, and a big proportion of them settle in New York and New Jersey. The Haitian population here grew to its present proportions from fewer than 5,000 when the late dictator "Papa Doc" Duvalier took power in 1957. The Dominican Republic also has produced a lot of exiles; one big influx came in 1963 after the overthrow of President Juan Bosch, and a new contingent came when the U.S. intervened in 1965.

Old-Timers and Parvenus

Refugees from Chile now are adding to the South American ranks here, joining Paraguayans, Brazilians and Argentinians. Greeks are arriving in force, too, fleeing their military regime. All these folks are joining a long-established group of Eastern Europeans who left their countries because of Soviet takeovers before and after World War II.

At times, exile status amounts to a state of mind. A Cambodian student already was in the United States when Prince Sihanouk was overthrown last year. "I wasn't really an exile," he says, "but for six or eight months I heard nothing from my parents, and I was afraid." He since has heard from them, but he still isn't sure that it's safe for him to go home.

Though exiles normally find the U.S. a secure haven, many display pronounced anti-American attitudes, largely because they dislike U.S. foreign relations with their homelands. Some deplore U.S. policy toward the U.S.—for seemingly encouraging their revolt

against their Soviet-backed government in 1956 without giving them any real help. Cubans complain of U.S. double-crossing in the abortive Bay of Pigs invasion in 1961. Iranian students claim that Savak, their country's secret police, cooperates with the CIA and the FBI to spy on them here. And Haitian exiles are incensed with the U.S.'s black ambassador to Haiti, Clinton Knox, who they insist wore Duvalier buttons in his lapel at the recent funeral of the late dictator Papa Doc. (The State Department says it knows nothing of that.)

Politically active exiles sometimes are in danger. A few years ago, Jesus de Galindez, an exiled college professor, was kidnapped near a subway entrance allegedly by agents of Rafael Trujillo, late dictator of the Dominican Republic. He is presumed dead.

Though many exiles keep up running propaganda battles against their governments, few are well-financed. "Few people bet on an exile even if he has the best of contacts," says Mr. Marinho, the Brazilian, who claims that American officials and businessmen can get what they want out of his country from the "crooks in power."

Passion Dwindles

The exiled governments of the Baltic States—Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania—are, however, relatively flush. They kept reserves in the U.S. when they were occupied by the Soviet Union just before World War II. A State Department official says the U.S. "unfreezes" some of these funds each year to finance the governments in exile, still officially recognized by the U.S.

Militantly anti-Communist Lithuanians used to show a lot of fervor here, especially during Captive Nations Week. After some 30 years in exile, though, many now are fired up only by extraordinary events, such as the recent refusal of the U.S. Coast Guard to give asylum to a Lithuanian seaman who jumped his Soviet ship off the East Coast. "We're Americans, we have plenty of things to change here," says a young Lithuanian.

Yet some exiles use violent means in their "liberation" warfare here. Bombs and Molotov cocktails have exploded or been found undetonated in the U.S. at consulates and offices of governments including those of South Africa, Portugal, Haiti and the Soviet Union. Often the actual bomb plantings are undertaken by American sympathizers of the exiles.

As the chance to return home and seize power keeps eluding many political exiles, they tend to form and re-form into querulous, suspicious and back-biting factions. They bandy about a large collection of epithets against their fellow exiles: "pro-American," "CIA man," "State Department running dog," "Stalinist," "revisionist," "Nasserite," "Guevarist" and plain old "fascist," to cite a few.

Nevertheless, some exiles remain potent political figures. One is Theodore Stathis, a mathematics teacher who is unofficial representative of Panellinio Apeletherotiko Kinima (Panhellenic Liberation Movement), headed by Andreas Papandreu, son of the late Greek premier. The group has helped generate diplomatic pressure—but not from the U.S.—on the military government.

A few exiles eventually may meet with as much success as the Russian who used to tell his New York friends he would return home. "I talked with took my words as a joke," he said. His name was Leon Trotsky.

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Ray Cromley / Facts ignored



A MOST worrisome aspect of the Pentagon Vietnam papers is their evidence on how frequently high officials of the government have ignored facts presented by their own professional subordinates, whether these professionals were in the Pentagon, the State Department or the Central Intelligence Agency.

Sometimes the unpleasant or "non-conforming" data was screened out by White House assistants, sometimes by the President.

The Vietnam papers don't of course, tell the whole story.

• • •

I HAVE knowledge of one reasonably high official with access to President Johnson and with some considerable technical skill at analyzing military action reports who, in a face-to-face session, warned the President that the Tonkin Gulf messages from the officers in that affair were too vague and inconclusive, and that they should be treated with extreme caution.

President Johnson looked up and said sharp-

ly: When your advice is wanted you will be asked for it. Good day.

There followed shortly after a transfer to a post out of the direct line of action.

Those who said what pleased the President were moved in closer to his ear.

• • •

BUT there are other examples from one administration and another.

The evidence of the technicians was largely ignored in the Bay of Pigs invasion. They were, in the main, overruled by men with little or no experience in this type of operation. ✓

The technical evidence of the Defense Department's own top experts in guerrilla strategy and tactics was largely passed over in planning and fighting the Vietnam war. Search and destroy sweeps, aerial bombings of the type routinely ordered, the use of large numbers of conventional troops — all were anathema to those high officials and officers most experienced in guerrilla operations.

More recently, the Pentagon's own official research study on the lessons learned from the Vietnam war to be applied in any future similar situation has been put on the shelf. It hasn't been contradicted; it has been ignored.

LONGVIEW, WASH.
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JUN 23 1971

Withholding news seldom good

THERE IS THIS to consider: the action of the New York Times in publishing the Pentagon's Vietnam documents may, by ripping away the curtain on these sordid details, help immeasurably in ending our involvement in the war.

The current flap over what the Justice Department says is the "defense interests of the United States" is not the first and will probably not be the last. There are times and occasions when voluntary censorship is advisable, with emphasis on the "voluntary." This the press has given, and at least once a President of the U.S. noted afterward that it would have been better had the newspapers not heeded requests for this voluntary withholding of news.

The occasion was the ignominious Bay of Pigs incident, when Cuban exiles under control of the Central Intelligence Agency embarked on an ill-prepared invasion of Cuba. President John F. Kennedy complained that newspapers had leaked information about the invasion and suggested self-restraint.

But five years later it was disclosed that

the New York Times had indeed known the 1961 invasion was imminent, but refused to publish it because of national security considerations. Also disclosed was the fact that President Kennedy had told officials of the Times that, "If you had printed more about the operation, you would have saved us from a colossal mistake."

Newspaper people also recall the Cuban missile crisis in 1962, when the Defense Department deliberately issued false information. It was justified by Arthur Sylvester, then Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, on the grounds that the government had a right to lie to mislead the enemy and protect the people.

Amazingly, when he was criticized for this position, he declared that failure to expose these lies meant newsmen had failed to do their job.

Which would seem to mean that if the government has a right to lie, the press has a duty to expose the lies — which is just what the New York Times and other newspapers are trying to do.

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Variety of Military Operations

U.S. Feared Peking Action in Viet

Officials in three administrations were interviewed for the following analysis which discloses how once secret military information led to sometimes secret policy-making decisions.

BY WILLIAM ANDERSON
[National News Correspondent]

[Chicago Tribune Press Service]

WASHINGTON, June 19—The United States engaged in a wide variety of once highly secret military operations thruout Indochina partly because of a Pentagon fear that Red China might begin direct field support of North Viet Nam.

In addition, the intelligence agencies relied on an extensive electronic network of space satellites so sensitive they could detect diseased rice crops and camouflaged missile sites installed by the Russians.

While one stated mission of Navy ships in the Tonkin Gulf was the interdiction of weapons from fleets of junks, a deeper role included keeping a careful watch on the Communist Chinese island of Hainana.

U-2 Planes Keep Watch

U-2 spy planes also ranged the area from Thailand, Taiwan [Formosa] and Korea bases to monitor troop movements and the Chinese development of their nuclear bomb plants deep in the mainland.

Small, elite American units, later to be known as the Green Berets, aided friendly forces in Thailand, which had been the object of a mini-invasion in the isolated northern section; in Laos, a major retreat and staging area for the Communists a decade ago; and Cambodia, a supply base.

By 1964, these forces had detected a large buildup by the Chinese of its forces on Hainan, 20 minutes flying time from American and South Viet Nam land installations — and 10 minutes to U. S. aircraft carriers on Yankee Station in the South China Sea.

This espionage disclosed that the Russians had furnished some high performance MIG-21s for air bases at Hoihow and Yulin on Hainan, along with a buildup of Communist submarine activity at the Red Chinese naval base at Yulin.

Chinese Rebuild Bridges

After the U.S. started its bombing attacks on Hanpi's military installations, the intelligence network discovered that thousands of Chinese had moved into North Viet Nam from Pingslang, China, and were working on bombed out bridges and roads as coolie labor.

Photographs of the Haiphong harbor showed not only Russian and East German ships unloading cargo, but ships flying the British, West German and Swedish flags.

Russian nuclear-powered submarines were detected trailing American carriers, along with some conventional diesel underwater boats operated by Chinese crews.

This broad intelligence picture was drawn between 1963 and 1966 and was the basis of many decisions—both military and diplomatic—made by Presidents Kennedy and Johnson as they escalated the American activity in Indochina.

Fiasco in Cuba a Factor

It was in the Kennedy administration that a basic decision was made to keep all potential Communist military moves under intense observation, with the military providing many "options" on how the U. S. would—or could—react to the threats.

The overriding reason was the failure to overthrow Cuba's Castro government in the Bay of Pigs invasion earlier in the Kennedy administration. Both the President and Robert S. McNamara, secretary of defense, shared the view that the invasion was not only marked by inadequate planning, but was compromised by leaks of information prior to the invasion.

Essentially planned by the Central Intelligence Agency during the administration of President Eisenhower, the Kennedy administration concluded that another reason for the failure was that the operation did not have enough coordination—or control by a central source.

From then on, the Kennedy administration began to bring operations once closely held by the CIA, Army, Navy and Air Force under more direction of McNamara's office. Public disclosures of major importance from the three military services then came had been

cleared or actually announced by McNamara or the White House.

Intelligence reports from all areas of the government then began to flow to a central well, one that either McNamara or his aides used to dip out information to newsmen in the Pentagon. This well contained information on the growth of Russia's nuclear capability, along with reports of the activities of friendly and unfriendly nations.

It was former Sen. Kenneth Keating [R., N.Y.], however, who first warned the American public that the Russian government had installed six missile launching sites in Cuba. As this was being debated—and denied—in October, 1962, the American military moved secretly to position itself for a possible confrontation with Russia and a large-scale American invasion of Cuba.

Bits and pieces of information were the main military plans and operations of the time remained unknown to the American public outside of a relatively small circle of Pentagon observers until after Russia agreed to withdraw.

The military, however, was at a full, war-time alert status. Strategic Air Command B-52 bombers were actually flying in holding patterns off the Alaskan coast, with nuclear bomb loads and pre-designated targets in Russia.

American bomber pilots on these planes over international waters also revealed later that Russian MIG fighters were flying alongside, so close that American crewmen could see the faces of the Russians.

Even as this crisis was building, the Viet Cong intensified its raids on South Vietnamese villages and the American forces who were in the country as "advisers."

In this whip-saw of the threat of nuclear war, plus conventional and guerrilla military threats on the flanks, the Kennedy administration shifted from the Eisenhower-Dulles concept of "massive retaliation" to "flexible" forces that were intended to be used to put out brush fire conflicts.

This "flexible" approach was strongly interlaced with foreign policy. The Kennedy administration relied heavily on the intelligence gathering efforts, and also engaged in secret talks with

19 JUNE 1971

News fit to print

The New York Times carries a slogan on its masthead: "All the news that's fit to print." It means, when it sees fit to do so, that is.

The New York Times thought that the secret Pentagon report prepared in 1967-68 on instructions from Robert S. McNamara, then Secretary of Defense, on the involvement of the United States in a war of aggression in Indochina was "news... fit to print."

It assembled a staff of people to prepare a series of articles from the 47-volume report with such secrecy that even many senior Times editors in New York and Washington had no knowledge of its contents until they read the first installment in the paper last Sunday.

The Nixon Administration did not think the articles were news fit for the public to read. U.S. Attorney General John N. Mitchell informed the paper that "Publication of this information is directly prohibited by the provisions of the Espionage Law, Title 18, United States Code, Section 793."

Mitchell asked for a court injunction to halt publication of the articles, and got it. Mitchell also went into court to demand that the New York Times return the documents to the Pentagon.

The New York Times editorially called Mitchell's intervention "an unprecedented example of censorship" and said it would "continue to fight to the fullest possible extent of the law what we believe to be an unconstitutional prior restraint by the Attorney General."

The exercise by the New York Times of the right of free press has been upheld by newspapers, organizations and individuals in the United States and abroad. There has been some dissent from this approval, notably that of Vice President Spiro Agnew.

The Daily World said editorially (June 16):

"The publication of the documents exposing an imperialist aggression serves the national interest and should be continued.

"The right of the New York Times to publish these documents must be upheld by every democratic-minded person because they serve the public interest."

This is one aspect of this situation. Another aspect is why did the New York Times undertake the publication of selections from this 47 volume secret report.

The Times has not always been so clear about where the public — and national — interest lies.

It had in its possession information about the training by the Central Intelligence Agency of mercenaries for an invasion of Cuba—the Bay of Pigs invasion, but it did not reveal it.

After the invasion was crushed, President John F. Kennedy reportedly chided newsmen, saying in effect that this is one story they should have broken, because if they had, it would have saved much anguish. In other words, breaking the story would have served the national interest.

In the case of the genocidal war in Indochina, the New York Times formerly supported the war.

When well-substantiated reports spread that President Lyndon Johnson had already worked out plans for bombing of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV)

during the 1964 election campaign in which he posed as a man of "peace," the New York Times did not investigate and expose this deception.

But, now, in 1971, it prints documents which do, and much else as well.

What happened in the interval was that the evil effects of the Indochina war have become so destructive that sections of the ruling class have turned against it.

The New York Times has an additional, special reason to be keenly aware of the evil effects of an evil war. It has been a target of violent and unrestrained attacks by the ultrarightists who today are most closely associated with efforts to drag out the war.

The Nixon-Mitchell-Agnew team and their associates, carrying on from where Sen. Joseph McCarthy left off in the 1950s and with the additional advantage of sitting in the seats of state power, have not spared their attacks on the "Eastern Establishment" and what they call the "radic-lib" papers, such as the New York Times.

Another factor is that some ruling class circles are worried about the police-state mentality in the White House and other Administration circles, particularly since the mass arrests of more than 13,000 peace demonstrators in Washington in May.

The exposure of the vast military and other spy networks which have snared millions of people, including Senators, judges, bishops and civic figures for computerized ready-reference has alarmed some big bourgeois circles.

But, above all, economically bankrupting and crisis-causing effects of the Indochina war have alarmed these sections of the ruling class.

As a result, W. Averell Harriman, adviser to Presidents, Governor, Ambassador to the Paris Vietnam talks and banker, Clark Clifford, also an adviser to Presidents, a former Defense Secretary and prestigious lawyer, among many others, now favor a complete withdrawal of all U.S. forces from Indochina by December 31, 1971.

The war in Vietnam has produced a division in the ruling circles and the makings of a political crisis.

LUBBOCK, TEX/
 AVALANCHE-JOURNAL
 M - 62,423
 E - 29,872
 S - 73,507

JUN 19 1971

PREFERABLY VOLUNTARY

Official Secrets Restraint Needed

IN "GETTING into the act" in connection with the official secrets controversy, Sen. Edward Kennedy has shown typical inability to think a serious matter all the way through.

He suggests that "now that they have printed the material relevant to the Johnson Administration" (on Vietnam policies) the same should be done with secret Government papers on the policies of the late President John F. Kennedy.

To Kennedy, this might seem "the fair thing to do." However, the idea suggests that there would be no stopping place in the barring not only of "dirty linen" but also of clean linen which should not be exposed to public view.

Publication by the *New York Times* of secret Pentagon reports in Vietnam has revived old arguments, and created new ones, between segments of the Federal Government and segments of the press over "the best means of protecting the national interest."

Just a decade ago, President Kennedy and press executives were studying the possibility of some system of voluntary censorship that might head off disclosures the Government considered harmful.

The study was touched off by security leaks during and after the April 17, 1961, "invasion" of Cuba by exiles operating under control of the Central Intelligence Agency. Ten days after the Bay of Pigs disaster, President Kennedy complained angrily to the American Newspaper Publishers Association that in many instances newspapers "recognized only the tests of journalism and not the tests of national security."

He said he was not suggesting any new

forms of censorship but was asking that newspapers "re-examine their own obligations to consider the degree and the nature of the present danger and to heed the duty of self-restraint which that danger imposes upon us all." The study ended in stalemate.

Five years later, it was disclosed that the *New York Times* knew that the 1961 "invasion" was imminent, but had declined to publish it because of national security considerations. In disclosing this decision, Clifton Daniel, then Times managing editor, said that if the newspaper had published its information the Bay of Pigs operation "might well have been canceled and the country would have been saved enormous embarrassment."

There's an unproven claim that President Kennedy agreed, more or less. But during the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 the Defense Department deliberately issued false information. Arthur Sylvester, then assistant secretary of defense for public affairs, defended the action on grounds that "the Government had the right, indeed the duty, to lie if necessary to mislead the enemy and protect the people it represented." Later, Mr. Sylvester granted that, "if the Government has the right to lie or dissemble, the press has a duty to expose it."

Of course, if every segment of "the press," with all sorts of axes to grind, indiscriminately searches out and publishes military and diplomatic decisions and operations the possibilities for great damage to the national interest are limitless.

The need for a voluntary, but workable, system of restraint still is very much evident.

STATINTL

WAUKESHA, WISC.
FREEMAN

E - 20,659

JUN 18 1971

...when the Press Failed to Publish

This is a classic case of disagreement between government and press; the debate is hardly a new one. Just a decade ago President Kennedy and press executives were studying the possibility of voluntary censorship that might stop disclosures government deemed harmful. The search was touched off by security leaks accompanying the April 17, 1961, invasion of Cuba by exiles operating under control of the Central Intelligence Agency.

Ten days after the Bay of Pigs disaster, an angry Kennedy went before the American Newspapers Publishers Association to complain that newspapers "recognize only the tests of journalism and not the tests of national security." Five years later, in June 1966, it was disclosed the New York Times had prior knowledge that the 1961 invasion of Cuba was imminent but had declined to publish it because of national security considerations.

Clifton Daniel, then Times managing editor, combined this disclosure with his conclusion the Bay of Pigs operation "might well have been cancelled and the country would have been saved enormous embarrassment if the Times and

other newspapers had been more diligent in the performance of their duty." Daniel came to that conclusion for the reason President Kennedy had told Turner Catledge of the Times, "If you had printed more about the operations, you would have saved us from a colossal mistake."

During the Cuban missile crisis of October, 1962, the Defense Department deliberately issued false information for so-called security reasons. Arthur Sylvester, the Assistant Secretary of Defense, claimed this was necessary because the "government has the right, indeed the duty, to lie, if necessary, to mislead the enemy and protect the people it represented." But later, when Sylvester joined the Johnson Administration, he made an about-face by saying it is the function of the press to "penetrate this protective coloration behind which all men attempt to mask their errors . . . If there is a credibility gap, it measures the failure of newsmen to do their job."

So we are again faced with those in government attempting to mask their errors, even if it means going to court and jail those who dare reveal the truth.

15 JUNE 1971

U.S. WAR PLOTS EXPOSE SPURS QUIT-VIET VOTE

STATINTL

By S.W. GERSON

NEW YORK, June 14 — Despite President Nixon's feeble denials, official Washington is in a tailspin over publication of top secret Pentagon documents revealing massive government deception to sell the American people on U.S. aggression in Vietnam.

Impact on the government at home and abroad was regarded by most political observers as incalculable. In another country, such revelations would have brought down a government.

Repercussions of the exposure of systematic lying to the American people by a succession of American presidents to carry on an imperial aggressive policy were not clear as of today, but that official Washington is in a state of alarm was evident. Defense Secretary Melvin Laird called for a Justice Department investigation of the "leak."

The New York Times yesterday and today published — apparently after some soul-searching in its editorial sanctum — detailed stories on and excerpts from a 40-volume, 7,000-page Pentagon report on the origin and development of the war.

Commissioned in 1967

Former Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara, now head

of the World Bank, had commissioned the study in June, 1967. About 25 to 30 Pentagon experts helped draft the report, along with some figures in the academic world, according to the Times.

The revelations come shortly before a key vote Wednesday in the Senate on the amendment to set the date for withdrawal from the war, sponsored by Senators George McGovern (D-SD) and Mark Hatfield (R-Ore.).

The McGovern-Hatfield measure would order withdrawal of all U.S. forces from Vietnam by the end of the year.

Tracing the steady escalation of the war — beginning with President Truman's support to the French colonialists in 1950 — the Pentagon document also reveals details of the CIA-run war in Laos. On this score, Sen. Stuart Symington (D-Mo) in a televised NBC interview yesterday termed the revelations "startling."

Senator Symington apparently had missed the series of exclusive article in the Daily World in June, 1970, by co-editor John Pittman, the only American newsman to have visited the liberated areas of Laos.

Pittman's first article, published more than a year ago in the Daily World, are today corroborated by the secret Pentagon study.

Other facts that emerged from the huge report included these:

- o President Truman gave military aid to France in her colonial war against the Vietminh and "set" U.S. policy.

- o President Eisenhower sought to support the puppet South Vietnam regime, undermine the Democratic Republic of North Vietnam (North Vietnam) led by Ho Chi Minh, and helped upset the 1954 Geneva settlement.

- o President Kennedy moved from his inherited "limited-risk gamble" to a "broad commitment" to back the South Vietnamese puppet regime.

Johnson deceived voters

- o President Johnson stepped up covert warfare against North Vietnam and began planning in the spring of 1964 to wage an overt war against Hanoi. In his election campaign that year, when he ran against Sen. Barry Goldwater, the Republican candidate, Johnson sought to reassure the American people of his peaceful intentions.

- o Long before the Tonkin Gulf resolution was adopted by the Senate in August, 1964, the Johnson Administration was planning provocative moves to create a justification for escalating the war and for heavy bombing attacks on North Vietnam. In fact, the term "provoking" appears in a number of the official memoranda made public. Assistant Secretary of Defense James McNaughton

STATINTL

NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS

3 JUNE 1971



THE PUT-ON

BY JACOB BRACKMAN

With Original Illustrations by Sam Kirson

Your leg's been pulled so often, it's no wonder you're off balance.

Welcome to the Age of The Put-On.

From Bob Dylan to Stokely Carmichael, from the U-2 to the Bay of Pigs, from art to advertising to politics, the Put-On has become an American way of life where nothing is accepted "straight" . . . because it probably isn't.

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HONOLULU, H.I.
STAR-BULLETIN

MAY 27 1971
E - 115,688
S - 166,171

Red Hand in Cairo

There is just enough Russian political involvement in the Cairo goings-on to smell. When the CIA tried to overthrow Castro and instead was thrown out of the Bay of Pigs, we didn't think it smelled too bad. That was because it was our guys at work. This time the odors wafting along the Nile are all but stenchy. ✓

When Nasser died, a genuine rivalry arose between the two vice-presidents, Anwar El-Sadat and Aly Sabry. Sabry, according to reliable reports, thought there would be a joint leadership between him and Sadat. Sadat thought otherwise and, when Sabry challenged him, had him arrested.

Sabry, just incidentally, has been one of the strongest Soviet supporters in the Egyptian government. Once he was pro-Western. But when Washington gave him the run-around over funds for the Aswan Dam, later provided by Moscow, Sabry's sympathies shifted.

But Sabry's imprisonment did not end strong pro-Russian support within the government. Three other members of the eight-man executive committee of the Arab Socialist Union, Egypt's guiding political organization, remained there, all Soviet sympathizers. Now Sadat has had them arrested and put behind bars: Labib Shukair, the deposed national assembly leader; Diaddin Daoud and Abdel Mohsen Abul Nur. The last-named had become secretary-general of the socialist union after Nasser's death last September.

Whether the Soviets were trying to rig the Cairo government in their favor may never be known. Right now they are protesting righteously that whatever is happening is an internal affair. Their record in such places as Warsaw, Prague and Budapest suggests, however, that if they were not involved it was only because they thought they could not get away with it.

A BOOK FOR TODAY

A Personal Account Of Robert Kennedy

By MIRIAM OTTENBERG

WE BAND OF BROTHERS. A Memoir of Robert F. Kennedy. By Edwin Guthman. Harper & Row. 330 Pages. \$7.95.

Of all the books written so far about Robert Kennedy, this warmly personal account likely is to mean the most to those whose relationship with him spanned his public years.

Like the good newspaperman he is, Pulitzer Prize-winner Ed Guthman, now national editor of the Los Angeles Times, writes what he knew. And as the Justice Department's press officer in the Kennedy years, he was in a position to know a lot. But Guthman's relationship to Kennedy went far beyond the formal requirements of a director of public information, just as all of Kennedy's assistants willingly performed any job required of them.

That's why they followed him from the Senate Rackets Committee to the Justice Department and on to the office of senator from New York.

Guthman himself had been with him in his Ambassador Hotel room only a few minutes before Kennedy left to claim victory in the 1968 California primary and fell to an assassin's bullet. Guthman takes a favorite passage of the Kennedy brothers, Bob and John, to describe the men who faced mobs angered at various times by the Freedom Riders and the first blacks to enter the Universities of Alabama and Mississippi, men who skillfully went about cleaning up James Hoffa's Teamsters Union, men who made good Bob Kennedy's promise to get the Bay of Pigs prisoners home by Christmas.

These words, quoted by Guthman, are from Shakespeare's King Henry V in his remarks to his men before the Battle of Agincourt:

*"We few, we happy few, we band of brothers.
For he today that sheds his blood with me*

*Shall be my brother. . . .
And gentlemen. . . now a-bed
Shall think themselves
accursed they were not
here. . . ."*

Guthman frankly admits that even after six years, I know that I cannot be objective about these men. . . . And I suspect that the department had not seen their likes before."

He says he's not objective about Bob Kennedy either but he spent too much time with Kennedy who always turned his humor on himself to permit himself the luxury of becoming maudlin. Instead, he pictures the man those of us who covered the Justice Department in those years came to know — a shirt-sleeved driving force, a man of humor and compassion, impatient with small minds.

Guthman goes beyond that to picture "a man of unlimited courage and capacity who experienced life to the fullest, who grew with every experience and tirelessly sought new challenges."

The book details many of those experiences and challenges. It begins back in 1956 when Kennedy, a lawyer-investigator for the Senate Investigating Subcommittee, was beginning to investigate corrupt unions and Guthman, then a reporter on the Seattle Times, was investigating Dave Beck, then international president of the Teamsters Union.

It follows the Kennedys through the Democratic Convention when Sen. "Scoop" Jackson seemed likely to be tapped as vice president but Lyndon Johnson got the nod.

Commenting on what he called "rancorous relationship" between Johnson and Bob Kennedy, Guthman said "they mistrusted each other almost from the beginning and their mistrust turned to bitter enmity at the end."

The relationship with J. Edgar Hoover, as Guthman pictures it, was different. In the

beginning, Guthman reported, Kennedy asked Hoover's advice on whether he should accept the post of attorney general and Hoover said he should. In the end, however, their relationship was strained, and hostile.

As Guthman reviews the trials and triumphs of Bob Kennedy, he reveals untold stories behind the headlines not only at the Justice Department but also at the White House for, as he points out, "Never before had a man so shared the burdens of the Presidency without actually holding the office."

He spares us the horror of the last night. Instead, he concludes: "Yet all he had accomplished was only a beginning, for to know anything about him is to know that had he lived and won in 1968, he would have been a great president; that had he lost, he would not have despaired or retreated but would have fought on as best he could."

M - 541,086

S - 697,966

MAY 17 1971



KUPCINET

KUP'S COLUMN

OUR FISHING EXPEDITION THIS YEAR, aboard the sleek 60-foot Isle of June, owned by Ted Ledger, president of Abbott Laboratories, was the most productive in all the years we've been playing Izaak Walton in the Bahamas. Our companions, all ardent disciples of ichthyology, were Lou Zahn, the drug tycoon; Seymour Orner, vice president of Standard Industries, and Miami realtor Manny Goldstrich, and between us we bagged 17 dolphin, two tuna and a blue marlin.



HOWARD HUGHES

WE DID MOST OF OUR FISHING at Chub Cay, one of the world's fishing paradises, but our most exciting hours were in the waters off Nassau, some 35 miles away. There, at one time, we had three tuna on our lines at the same time. Zahn landed his 100-pounder after a one-hour fight, thereby reaffirming his reputation as "the old man of the sea." Orner, after 48 minutes of a bitter battle, was about to boat his tuna when a huge blue marlin, some six feet long and weighing an estimated 250 pounds, was attracted by the tuna, hit the line with his tremendous power and snapped it. (Ever see a grown man cry?)

SIMULTANEOUSLY, YOUR REPORTER was engaged in a life-or-death struggle with the third tuna. After some 35 minutes of back-breaking tugging, we felt a sudden slack in the tuna's resistance. "Shark!" screamed our captain, Phillip (Flip) Armstrong. And shark it was. We continued to reel in our quarry, but by then it was only half a tuna. The shark had chewed off half our catch as cleanly as if it had been cleaved by a butcher. (Ever see two grown men weep?)

OUR FISHING EXPEDITION WAS MADE more delightful by our colorful crew — Capt. Armstrong and a mate who shall remain nameless. Armstrong once was featured in Time mag for his role in a weird scheme to corner the world's copper market. Armstrong was offered \$25,000 to use his Korean War knowledge of explosives to blow up a bridge in Zambia (in Africa) to stem the flow of copper to the world market and thus enable two plotters to reap a fortune. Armstrong reported the bribe to the FBI and the result was imprisonment for the two schemers for violation of the Neutrality Act. (P.S. — The two schemers refused to acknowledge the \$25,000 bribe and Armstrong was advised by the U.S. to keep the money.)

THE MATE IS A CIA AGENT who joined our week-long trip at the invitation of Armstrong. His name can't be disclosed at this time for obvious reasons. But he did fascinate us with his version of the Bay of Pigs, for which he helped train Cubans who sought to overthrow Fidel Castro. His version is that the invasion was going well, despite published reports to the contrary, and the order to abort the Bay of Pigs still confounds exiled Cubans and CIA agents.

BY STEWART ALSOP

VIETNAM: BOOBY TRAP?

WASHINGTON—The Vietnam war has again become what it was not in the 1970 election—the central issue as between the President and the liberal Democrats. What impact is the issue likely to have on the election in 1972?

A couple of brief exchanges bear on the answer to this question. One was an exchange last week between this reporter and one of the Army's most perceptive and influential generals. It was as follows:

"General, isn't the Army in very bad trouble, as a result of Vietnam—maybe the worst trouble it's ever been in?"

The general, without hesitation: "Of course."

"Then isn't it in the Army's interest to get our ground forces out of Vietnam just as quickly as can safely be done?"

The general, in a tone of surprise, as though the answer was so obvious that the question need never have been asked: "Of course."

THE PLIGHT OF THE GENERALS

The meaning of these two two-word responses is simple—the President does not need now to buck the generals in order to get out of Vietnam. In September 1969, the "Nixon game plan" for Vietnam was described in this space. The plan called for an orderly withdrawal of American troops from Vietnam, in recognition of the fact that "the war, as it is now being fought, is poisoning the body politic of the United States; and that it is better to risk military disaster in Vietnam than political disaster in the United States." There was a caveat: "If the Nixon game plan is to operate on schedule, the President is going to have to buck the generals." That is no longer true.

Until recently, the Army high command favored a leisurely withdrawal, down to a big "residual force" of 50,000 to 100,000 men. But all generals are not fools, contrary to the mythology of the left, and the high command has become desperately aware of what Vietnam is doing to the Army—the Calley horror, the drug epidemic, the threatened breakdown of morale and discipline, the near-total destruction of the prestige of the uniform.

Because all generals are not fools, a lot of them, in Saigon as well as Washington, are as eager for extrication as any dove. A high-ranking Pentagon civilian estimates that about two-thirds of the generals now favor risking a rapid

drawdown after next November to a minimum professional force. The general quoted above, for example, believes that it should be possible to cut back to "the Kennedy level" of fewer than 20,000 men by the autumn of next year.

The fact that it is no longer necessary for the President to buck the generals is politically important. Any President with any sense of responsibility must listen to his professional military advice. But listening to the military can be dangerous politically, and so can not listening to them. President Kennedy got in trouble at the Bay of Pigs in part because he listened to the military, and President Johnson got into much worse trouble in Vietnam for the same reason. One reason they got in trouble was that they feared, with good reason, that if they failed to go along with the military they would be accused, with devastating political effect, of being soft, of "chickening out." President Nixon no longer has any worries on this score, and that is an important political fact.

Now consider the second recent exchange. This exchange, as reported by The Washington Post's able David Broder, took place in New Hampshire between the Democratic front runner, Edmund Muskie, and a dovish lady called Mrs. Betty Eberhart.

THE PLEA OF MRS. EBERHART

Senator Muskie said in a question period that he was all for withdrawing all U.S. troops by the end of this year, but that "supplies and money" for South Vietnam "may have to continue for a longer time." Mrs. Eberhart argued that in that case the war would go on, and anyway, "I don't want to support a government that does not represent the people." Muskie countered that we can't "just say that unless you turn out your government, we're not going to help you people. Now that's not a moral position."

Mrs. Eberhart, a McCarthy alternate in 1968, was thoroughly miffed by Muskie's response, and told reporters that the chance of her supporting Muskie in 1972 was "pretty remote." There are a lot of Mrs. Eberharts in the Democratic Party. There may well be enough to create a big booby trap for the liberal Democrats.

The rhetoric of the liberals has helped to create the booby trap. They have orated so much about the "immorality" of the war, and about how the United States is destroying Vietnam,

that a great many people—no doubt including Mrs. Eberhart—now suppose that the American Army in Vietnam consists wholly of Calleys, and that Vietnam is a vast bombed-out wasteland, like a landscape on the moon.

The Mrs. Eberharts, in short, have a mental image of the war that has no relation to reality. The result is that they are perfectly ready—and indeed eager—to commit this country to an act of betrayal. The United States has made South Vietnam dependent—pathetically dependent—on U.S. support. To cut off support to the South Vietnamese Army of more than a million men would render that army nakedly defenseless before the North Vietnamese Army, now being lavishly re-equipped by the Russians and the Chinese with excellent weapons.

THE PROBLEM OF THE DEMOCRATS

It is hard to imagine a more revolting act of betrayal by a great nation toward a small ally. Yet this is precisely the direction in which the left wing of the Democratic Party is pushing the whole party—a cutoff is included in the demands of all the various groups currently demonstrating in this city. There are enough Mrs. Eberharts to make the question argued between her and Senator Muskie a major issue—probably the major issue—at the Democratic convention, and quite possibly the election too.

The mood of this country is now so rancid that it could conceivably be a winning issue for the Democrats. But the mood may have changed by next year. Suppose that the American commitment in Vietnam has been reduced, with the full support of the military, and without disaster, to a small professional force, and no young man is being drafted for Vietnam service.

In that case, it seems a good bet that the President's argument—that we must give the South Vietnamese "a reasonable chance to survive as a free people," and that we cannot withdraw all our forces from Vietnam until we have our prisoners back—will sound sensible to a lot of voters. Perhaps it will seem more sensible than an act of betrayal that would not only be "not moral," but which would destroy the credit of the United States as a great power. This is why the Vietnam issue—as President Nixon confidently expects—could turn out to be a booby trap for

Breakthrough Welcomed

Rusk Urges Caution On Ties to Red China

By JOHN P. WALLACH
News American
Washington Bureau

WASHINGTON — Former Secretary of State Dean Rusk has cautioned that Peking's ping pong diplomacy is "something less than the second coming of Christ," students at John Hopkins School of

International Studies disclosed today.

"I'd like to remind you that Adolf Hitler was host to the whole Olympic games in 1936 and then rushed down the street to start World War II," Rusk reportedly told about 400 Hopkins students during an unusual question-and-answer session Wednesday night.

RUSK SAID he nonetheless was

pleased by the ping pong breakthrough, that "we have to recognize realities" and "permit both Chinas to be represented at the UN, but that there was 'no point' in the United States extending diplomatic recognition to mainland China.

"I would like to see a consistent attitude on the part of those advocating a change in U. S. policies," Rusk reportedly said. But he added that he also wanted to see both Koreans, both Vietnams and both parts of Germany in the United Nations, the students said.

Rusk is one of the few members of the Johnson administration who has declined to write his memoirs of the turbulent period.

HE TOLD THE students, many of whom will join the Foreign Service, that he has tape-recorded recollections that will be made public in 1990.

In his first wide-ranging discussion of world affairs here since he became a professor of international law at the University of Georgia two years ago, Rusk was said to have made these comments:

On the Mideast: He was "pessimistic" about prospects for a settlement because "neither side is ready to make peace."

"The Arabs are not ready to give Israel the right to exist in peace and Israel is not ready to withdraw from occupied territories," Rusk predicted that "There will be no peace while those facts remain."

On Vietnam war demonstrations: "I'd be more respectful of those who say 'Get out of Vietnam' if they would only show the same compassion to victims of other oppression," he said.

The former official was not asked and did not attempt to defend President Johnson's role in Vietnam.

On the My Lai massacre: "It was a cold-blooded affair and not typical," Rusk said. "War is a frightful thing," he added, "but I feel that I know there wouldn't be a single American in uniform in South Vietnam if North Vietnam

On the bombing halt: "I will tell you that I proposed a stop on or about March 4, 1963." (Bombing was actually halted Nov. 1, 1963.) "President Johnson said to me, 'Get on your horse and make some plans,'" Rusk recalled.

On the Gulf of Tonkin resolution that led to the start of bombing: "It was no plot on the part of LBJ," Rusk said. "There is no doubt of the first attack on the U. S. destroyers and only some doubt about the second attack. There was no 'hanky-panky' by the administration."

"As far as the charge of deluding the Senate," Rusk said, "we have to assume these people (congressmen) are literate. In fact, Sen. Wayne Morse, D-Ore., got up on the Senate floor and told them what it meant."

"What changed between 1954 and 1955 was that North Vietnamese regulars began to enter South Vietnam and the Tonkin resolution therefore took on less and less importance," he said.

On encroaching isolationism in the United States: "There are signs of it in Southeast Asia and in the resistance to NATO," Rusk said.

He pointed out that during the Korean war, the United States was spending 3.5 per cent of its Gross National Product on foreign aid, and now less than one-half of one per cent is devoted to foreign aid, "and there is difficulty getting that."

On the role of Dr. Henry Kissinger as a kind of super secretary of state: "Ultimately it is a question that can only be resolved by the President," Rusk said.

He quoted Dean Acheson, who quipped that, "in the relationship between the secretary of state and the President, it is vital that both should know who is President." Rusk left out the latter part of the quote, "and who is secretary of state."

Rusk agreed with a questioner that the Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba "was a colossal mistake and everybody knows that." Then he advised the youthful audience, "I hope that in rejecting the mistakes of your fathers, you don't embrace the mistakes of your grandfathers."



DEAN RUSK

Letters From The People

'Prove You're Honorable'

What the Central Intelligence Agency is shrouded in basically is the shrug of American shoulders convinced that all the secrecy and covert activity is necessary. To take more on "faith," as Richard Helms asks us to do, is to further turn our backs on an agency that seems to exist outside the reach of the U.S. Government and its controls.

What Americans must assume is that the same President who looks earnestly into the TV cameras and promises to extract us from a monumental blunder initiated by this constitutionally questionable organization is at that very moment instigating other such manipulations in the "national interest" that could lead us right back into another Vietnam or Bay of Pigs or Laos (and what are they doing in the Congo?).

Perhaps the CIA is a necessary part of the system, but Americans are no longer blindly taking on "faith" honorable men devoted to service. We say prove you're honorable.
Geraldine Ferris
Ballwin

27 APR 1971

STATINTL

The Washington Merry-Go-Round

Telltale Traces of CIA Cache Found

By Jack Anderson

My associate Les Whitten has just returned from a treasure hunt for buried CIA cash in the Florida Keys where pirates once stashed Spanish gold.

He found one cache where thousands in molding \$20 bills had been buried. But someone had reached the secret site ahead of him. All Whitten found were six weathered, matted \$20 bills that apparently had been dropped about 200 yards away.

In an earlier column, we reported that the Central Intelligence Agency had delivered bales of \$20 bills to Cuban exile leaders to finance clandestine operations against Communist Cuba.

Assassination teams, sabotage squads and commando units were sent against Castro after the abortive Bays of Pigs invasion. These missions apparently were halted after President Kennedy's assassination. But the CIA continued to slip infiltration teams into Cuba to gather intelligence.

The CIA paid all expenses, apparently, in cash. Huge sums were turned over to exile leaders, who gave no accounting of how they spent it.

There were whispers that some money had disappeared into private bank accounts, that other thousands were bur-

ied in former pirate lairs in the Florida keys.

Secret CIA Site

One who perked up his ears over the whispers was Bradley Ayers, a former Army captain, who was on loan to the CIA in 1963-64 to train Cuban assault teams. One training site had been located on Upper Key Largo on land that the Monroe County tax assessor's office identified as belonging to the University of Miami.

The CIA also operated out of a front, called Zenith Technical Enterprises, on the university's south campus. Thus the respected university, wittingly or otherwise, provided the site for an extension course in infiltration and demolition.

Ayers learned enough from his former trainees to figure out where some of the CIA money might be hidden. He told us he discovered a half-buried suitcase full of molding, mutilated \$20 bills.

The suitcase was in a remote spot that he was confident wouldn't be discovered. He took out a dozen bills to make sure they weren't counterfeit. Banks redeemed all but two badly weathered \$20 bills.

Then Ayers' house was mysteriously broken into and records of his find were taken. Fearing the CIA or Cuban exiles were watching him, he dared not return to the cache.

However, he told us his story and showed us the bank records. We also checked out his veracity carefully. I sent Les Whitten to accompany him back to the keys to recover the CIA money. We notified the Treasury Department, in general terms, that all recovered CIA cash would be turned over to the Treasury.

Treasure Hunt

Whitten, Ayers and Ayers' wife flew to an air strip on Upper Key Largo. Using it as a base of operations, they reconnoitered the dark mangrove thickets, sluggish canals, treacherous swamps of sea grass and crocodile-infested creeks where Ayers had once trained Cuban commandos.

For two days, they chugged through the creeks in a shallow-draft 18-foot skiff, startled occasionally by the barks of crocodiles. When they were convinced no one was following, they plunged through underbrush so thick they couldn't see four feet ahead.

Finally they came upon the bramble-cloaked site where Ayers said he had discovered the suitcase. The soil at the hiding place had been turned up and sifted for 10 yards in all directions. The underbrush and sea grass were trampled as if by many feet.

The suitcase full of currency was gone. Disappointed, they combed the area. Within a quarter mile, Whitten spotted a tattered \$20 bill. Ayers found two more, then Whitten

discovered a sheaf of three bills matted together with mud and grass.

The bills were near scraps of a road map, which Ayers said had been used as a wrapper for the suitcase bills. Treasury records show the bills were printed between April, 1966, and August, 1968. There is no way to prove this was part of the money which the CIA continued to provide anti-Castro exiles. But the stories that led to the cache came in part to Ayers from Cubans he helped train for the CIA.

Washington Whirl

Volunteer Army—President Nixon is leading the opposition to his own proposal for a volunteer Army—at least for the next two years. At a secret White House legislative conference, he warned GOP congressional leaders: "Some votes to end the draft may look popular temporarily. But in the long view, our recommendations (to extend the draft for two years) will prove to be right." White House aide Peter Flanigan explained to the leaders that "A short-fall of 100,000 men is expected" next year. He described the administration's plans to encourage volunteers by offering financial incentives, including a \$3,000 bonus to those who will re-enlist for combat duty. But he warned this "would mean cuts in other vital areas in the Defense Department."

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INQUIRER

APR 25 1971

M - 483,650

S - 887,627

Bay of Pigs? Even Name Got Fouled

WASHINGTON.

WHEN the 10th anniversary of the Bay of Pigs affair slips by with no blasting of trumpets it is time to cry over our failure to distinguish between the trivial and the highly important.

No other boner in American history quite compares with it. The selling of that plan was a feat to be compared with the purchase of the Brooklyn Bridge by the visiting hick in Manhattan.

Today the country is little wiser as to how and why the slippage came about, those so-called inside views which have been published being greatly in error and by nature apologetic.

It will probably be no better off 20 years hence when some of the official papers are made public, since they will be defensive and self-serving, reflecting only one view from the center.

Even the place name of the fiasco is wrong. There is no Bay of Pigs. It is a mistranslation of the Bahia de Cochina, the body of water off the great Zapata Swamp.

The cochina is also a small fish that abounds in those waters. So it would be more accurate to call the place the Bay of Sardines or maybe the Bay of Small Fry.

No Eisenhower Plan

On the day after, when the young palace guardsmen who attended President John F. Kennedy were sadder but hardly any wiser, they deliberately tried to shift the burden of blame to the preceding administration, saying or implying that a going plan had been taken over from President Eisenhower.

Mr. Kennedy was no party to that fraud. He was indignant about the deception.

There had never been such a plan under Gen. Eisenhower. In existence only was a quite limited number of assets, a relatively few young Cubans in training, with no direction as to how they might be used.

The outgoing President had kept saying that nothing was anywhere near a state of readiness as to Cuba and he was more concerned with what was happening in Laos than with what might be done with the young trainees in Guatemala.

Mr. Kennedy did not, however, object to the studied attempt to pass the buck to the military, or more specifically, to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In the aftermath, the horns were pinned on them and the professionals have never quite recovered from that stigma.

So let it be said first off that the JCS had no responsibility for the conception, or indeed, for the execution. That was the work of the Central Intelligence Agency.

GEN. S. L. A.
MARSHALL
Military Affairs

No one of the JCS even saw a plan—that is, a scheme of operation definitely committed to paper. There were only oral briefings and those of a very vague sort.

So well kept was the secret that those who had to make the decision (and the military are not in that category) never fully understood what was intended or were permitted to weigh out in detail the prospect for getting away with it.

The CIA was the source of all intelligence. It was also the operator. This is ever an inexcusably bad arrangement. Yet no one at the center tried to fault it.

All hands that engaged in the councils were thrown off by the word "covert," since the CIA was the agency accountable for operations of that nature.

The military—that is, the JCS and all others in the Pentagon—were in no sense privy to any part of the secret until late January 1961 following Mr. Kennedy's seating at the White House. They knew nothing about the training activities in Guatemala and Nicaragua and they had no plan of action against Castro and Cuba.

Landing Plan Shifted


The first operation rigged by the CIA for presentation to the new President called for an amphibious landing by the "brigade of exiles" near the port of Trinidad on Cuba's south coast. The terrain, the near mountains and the communications all favored that location. But after getting only a sketchy outline of the proposal, experts on the JCS said the chance of success was no better than fair.

The President nixed that place, saying it too clearly revealed the hand of the United States in the business, which was bound to come out in any case. Then when, due to these fanciful political considerations, the site was shifted westward by the CIA to the Zapata Swamp or Bay of Pigs area, the JCS was not even asked to re-evaluate the undertaking, much less approve it.

One overriding mystery, probably never to be penetrated, is what happened to the Cuban underground. There was such an apparatus and the CIA had been in contact with it. But it was never alerted, and by the hour when Havana knew of the landings, it was too late. Shortly thereafter its key figures were executed by Castro.

Up

Jack Reined Says



Cleaver-Guerrilla Split: Unusual Algiers Saga

WHEN U THANT retires as secretary general of the United Nations, his successor may well be chosen from Ethiopia, Nigeria, Ghana, Ceylon or Indonesia. One objection to a Swede or a Finn taking office is that a white man will not be favored. Black, brown, yellow, si; white, no.

The flip side of the coin is also unusual. Eldridge Cleaver heads a chapter of Black Panthers in Algeria. They collaborated with Arafat's Palestinian guerrillas against Jordan's King Hussein, though the revolution is none of their business. But, comradeship seems to have puffed off in angry recrimination. Cleaver claims blacks are discriminated against by Arafat, and are not taken into high councils when strategy and tactics are discussed. So, now Black Panthers and the Arab guerrillas are on the outs.

THE FEDERAL Bureau of Investigation, under J. Edgar Hoover, became the world's greatest crime-fighting organization. Now the Bureau and Hoover have come under attack from politicians, several of whom have beady eyes fixed on the presidential

nomination. No man, over the years, has done more for his country than the director. It may be time has come for him to pass in the responsibility of his post. But, Hoover's record does not warrant the snide attacks. The presidential aspirants smear their own image by making them. If there is a governmental bureau that should have a studied investigation, it is the CIA. According to reports, it has authorized murder, spends billions without having to account for a penny, and puts out intelligence reports (as in the Bay of Pigs) that often fall far short of accuracy. Why doesn't Muskie stick his New England nose into that Pandora's box?

THAT THE old days are gone forever is demonstrated by the disappearance of elevator operators, golf caddies, shoeshine boys, butchers who gave away liver, kidneys and brains, trolley car conductors able to retire on fares they didn't ring up, newspaper copy desk men who wore green eyeshades, politicians who thought all our country's ills could be cured by a good five-cent cigar, ladies who wore high-

button shoes. But they may come back any day now. Most of those people and things I could do without, but they're nice to remember.

* * *

A LADY writes, asking help in promoting hotpants for men. The answer is no, no, 1,000 times no. The very thought of pot-bellied, hairy-legged males trotting forth in such apparel shakes my aesthetic principles to their very foundations. It's bad enough to see that type in Bermuda, or walking shorts . . . but hotpants? Perish the very thought.

* * *

THE PERUVIAN government has seized American fishing boats, even though they were in international waters. Owners were fined \$50,000. A congressman has introduced a bill that would suspend sugar imports from countries that illegally seize our fishing vessels. A heart-broken wail burst from President Juan Velasquez. He said: "I do not believe Americans can do such a barbarous thing. They have human feelings and a sense of justice, and will not harm my country." Don't be too sure, Velasquez. We've had a bellyful of Peruvian piracy. Stop har-

rying our tuna hunters more than 12 miles off your coast, and return the money you blackmailed out of them, then maybe we'll buy your sugar.

* * *

REMEMBERED by all old timers is Mother Kelly's noted groggery on Dade Boulevard, long gone but not forgotten. "Mother," of course, was no woman, but a stout Irishman, who made the beginnings of his fortune by tending bar for Helen Morgan in high old prohibition days. The solid rock of the Kelly entertainment routine was Bennett Green, singer and master of ceremonies, and pianist Jack Reynolds. Reynolds stayed here, and has played at many places. Bennett went to the coast, got into movies and TV, particularly as a regular on the "Lucy Show." He's retired now, which shows how fast time goes. But Jack keeps merrily on his way. Bennett, incidentally, had a part in the original "No, No, Nannette" musical, which has become the biggest 1971 hit on Broadway. "Nanette" first appeared in 1925, so you can see how far back the show (and Mr. Green) go.

STATINTL

ALEXANDRIA, LA.
TOWN TALK

E - 26,842

S - 25,372

APR 23 1971

The Bay of Pigs: Ten Years Later

"There an old saying," President John F. Kennedy said in the wake of the Bay of Pigs debacle 10 years ago, "that victory has one hundred fathers and defeat is an orphan."

It was a decade last Saturday since some 1500 Cuban refugees, trained and equipped by the United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), landed on the south shore of Cuba in an abortive invasion that ended two days later.

Looking back over the intervening decade, that debacle was surely the young president's greatest mistake. Although Mr. Kennedy manfully took the responsibility, what was involved was far more than a question of victory or defeat. The Bay of Pigs set in train a host of actions the results of which are in many cases still with us today.

With additional information now at hand, including Nikita Khrushchev's reminiscences, it is worth a look at those wide ramifications.

The ramifications are like the circles produced by tossing a stone in a pond, circles that widen to a seeming infinity. Close at home the disaster produced in the president a skepticism about advice and advisers, above all about the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the CIA. It was not long before all the leading figures in those sacrosanct establishments were replaced. Organizationally, McGeorge Bundy was moved into the White House from across the street, there to be succeeded in a new locale of power by Walt W. Rostow and Henry A. Kissinger.

It was the larger circles that now seem the more important. Here were involved not just the United States relationship with Latin America but the relationship with the Soviet Union

and even the relationship between the Soviet Union and Communist China.

Affected, too, was Mr. Kennedy's view of Indochina and the view of his successor, Lyndon B. Johnson, when a crisis arose in the Dominican Republic. What the two presidents did in those widely separated areas of the world, in turn, relates directly to the status of America today, both its internal divisions over the Indochina war and its growing aversion to international commitments.

Of course, it is absurd to pile all the ills of today's America on the back of Mr. Kennedy's error in giving the go-ahead for the invasion of Cuba. But that there is a relationship is beyond doubt.

The Bay of Pigs details are well known and need not be repeated here beyond the simplest facts. He inherited the plan from the Eisenhower administration, he agonized over it but in early April finally approved the invasion on the advice of his senior aides, military and civilian.

The course of history in the decade since the Bay of Pigs debacle has been affected by thousands of facts, suspicions, theories, calculations and miscalculations plus the nature of the personalities who have reigned or ruled in many nations. The web of history is not reordained and the Bay of Pigs cannot be credited or blamed for the course of events.

Still, looking back, the evidence now available more than suggests that major elements in the action-reaction phenomenon in international affairs this past decade did indeed have an origin in, or receive an impetus from, that disastrous error of America's popular young president.

STATINT

ROANOKE, VA.
WORLD-NEWS

E - 49,146

APR 23 1971

'Bunch Of Guys With No Ax To Grind'

In his report to the American Society of Newspaper Editors, CIA-head Richard Helms not surprisingly had some kind words to say about his agency: It is doing a better job of intelligence gathering than ever before; it has managed to maintain its objectivity in the gathering and screening of information; it has "no stake in policy debates."

What struck us about the statements was that they constituted a fairly accurate portrait of the man Helms; if, in an uncharacteristic fit of self-propulsion, he had said "I have managed to maintain my objectivity; I have no stake in . . .", etc., we would have found the report beyond criticism.

By all accounts, Richard Helms is a near-perfect man for such a sensitive job. He briefs Congress candidly and to the limits of what he feels national security will allow. He has gone a long way toward changing the CIA's image, that of a cloak and dagger operation existing in the dark tunnels of Washington. He seems supersensitive to the problems of operating a largely secret organization within a democracy.

★ ★

And, as far as the CIA's main task of gathering and evaluating information, we heartily agree with his statement to members of Congress that the Soviet Union could benefit from a "bunch of guys with no ax to grind and beholden to no one sitting down in a back room and deciding what the raw intelligence means."

On this level, the CIA is virtually unassailable. But it hasn't gotten headlines for this kind of invaluable function. Its position has been compromised by its quasi-policy operations, such as the Bay of Pigs debacle and its training operations in far-flung places.

Columnist Jack Anderson, in his inimitable, gee-whiz way, has revealed the details of a CIA-planned raid on a Cuban oil refinery in 1963, a raid that was canceled shortly after President Johnson was sworn in. Even taking into account Mr. Anderson's tendency to overstate his case, the allegation will be widely believed.

What worries us is not the CIA director, with his decidedly unspiratorial exterior and his democratic interior, but the vast organization he heads. As with all complex organizations, one part can sometimes take a direction of its own, rather like a neurological breakdown that would cause a finger to disobey the commands of a brain.

If that Cuban raid had taken place, it would have been an act of U.S. policy, no matter how loudly the State Department and the President had denied involvement.

★ ★

True, Mr. Helms was talking about the new CIA, the one that has greatly reduced such clandestine activities. But they are still going on, and we would feel much better if the CIA were limited to the admirable tasks of that "bunch of guys with no ax to grind."

10 APR 1971

*Letters to the Editor***To Control Spying**

To the Editor:

I take issue with James Reston's suggestion [April 2 column] that the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board provides a model for assisting the President effectively to control domestic spying by Government secret agents.

The President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, originally the "Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities," was established in 1953 with the main purpose of forestalling the creation of a Congressional Joint Committee on Intelligence Activities.

Such a Congressional committee was recommended by General Mark Clark's Hoover Commission Task Force. But intelligence leaders persuaded President Eisenhower that this was a bad idea. And so Senator Mike Mansfield's proposed Joint Congressional Committee was defeated by Senate vote in 1956.

A President's Board was created in 1953 and Mr. Reston is correct in saying that it has had some distinguished chairmen and members over the years. But it has had a tiny staff, its chairmen and members have been busy with other careers, and it normally met no more than a dozen times each year. It has seemed to function as little more than a polite alumni visiting committee.

All the while, some horrible activities were sponsored by the C.I.A. and related agencies. Examples: the Bay of Pigs and secret financial subsidies of more than 200 private domestic organizations, such as the National Students Association. Also, a long list of intelligence failures has plagued our foreign policy, Vietnam being the most colossal.



Bill Mauldin in The Chicago Sun Times

"I only tap people who deserve it"

To operate a Presidential Advisory Committee on Domestic Spying may, as Mr. Reston argues, be of some value. But the record of the existing board, insofar as it is viable, raises serious doubts whether it will provide the proper balance between national security and individual rights.

There can be no substitute for a Presidential sensitivity and careful attention to the problem which no President from Truman to Nixon has shown; or for a more active legislative surveillance in place of abdication, until recently, of Congressional authority in the whole field of domestic and foreign intelligence and counter-intelligence activities.

HARRY HOWE RANSOM
Professor of Political Sciences
Vanderbilt University
Nashville, April 4, 1971

CUBAN REFUGEES MARK '61 INVASION

Exiles in Miami Dedicate Bay of Pigs Monument

By GEORGE VOLSKY
Special to The New York Times

MIAMI, April 17—Several hundred Cuban exiles gathered here today to dedicate a modest monument on the 10th anniversary of the ill-fated Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba.

The nostalgic ceremony in the center of the Cuban district contrasted with ebullience displayed by the exiles here 10 years ago when the refugee community, at that time some 40,000 strong, bustled with political activity.

As every Cuban then knew, an exile force had invaded Cuba from Central-American bases. There were few who doubted the success of the United States-sponsored expedition, which had been recruited in the Miami area.

The defeat of the invasion, which began at dawn on April 17, 1961, and ended 72 hours later with the capture of most of its 1,500 participants, stunned Cubans here but did not immediately diminish exile political activity.

Through the middle nineteen-sixties meetings of about 200 anti-Castro groups were generally well attended. Public rallies, frequent at that period, would attract thousands of persons at a few days' notice.

There were few Cuban "fiestas" in Miami at the time, because many exiles considered it unpatriotic to attend or to give parties, and also because not many of them had the money to spend on anything but the essentials of life.

Political Activity Minimal

Today's celebration notwithstanding, interest in political activities among some 350,000 Cubans living in this area has been minimal of late. Only a handful of exile organizations are barely active.

At the same time, many of the Cuban restaurants, cafeterias and nightclubs are doing a booming business. There are frequent and often lavish private parties, and a social life is being revived at a private club, many of whose members are former Havana socialites.

Greater Miami has become the second-largest Cuban city after Havana, whose population is 1,700,000. Santiago, Cuba's second metropolitan area, has a population of only 270,000.

According to a recent survey by a private research organization, the median annual income of a Cuban family in Miami is about \$3,000, probably four times that of a family in Havana.

Many Cuban refugees, who by and large have been arriving here penniless, have become relatively well off, and some even wealthy. The upward mobility stems in large part from the fact that many of the exiles are educated or skilled workers.

Florida's tallest building, a 40-story office building in downtown Miami, is being constructed by a group headed by Enrique Gutierrez, a Cuban architect. David Egozi, who came from Havana in 1960 with \$500, owns a shoe factory whose sales last year totaled \$35-million.

Spread of Businesses

There are about 6,000 Cuban-owned businesses in Miami, initially concentrated in a 10-block area of southwest Eighth Street, the heart of Miami's Little Havana, these shops, service establishments, restaurants and small industries have later disseminated throughout Greater Miami.

In 1960, southwest Eighth Street was part of a dilapidated section of Miami. Today it is the city's liveliest street, and rental space there is at premium.

Recognizing the commercial potential of Miami's Latin market, Spanish-speaking news media have also expanded.

Last month, TV channel 23 went all-Spanish, including its two 30-minute newscasts. Channel 6 has also several hours of Spanish programs each day, among them a heavy dose of soap operas, now very popular among Latinos here.

Of Miami's 14 AM radio stations, three are full-time Spanish. There is one daily Spanish newspaper, *Diario las Americas*, and a dozen weekly and bi-weekly publications.

But, according to knowledgeable observers, significant inroads by Cubans into the area's center of financial and business power are not likely to occur in the immediate future.

With few exceptions, Cuban businessmen do not usually delegate responsibility, a practice that makes expansion of their small, family-run enterprises slow and difficult.

Principally by virtue of being

mix socially with Americans. About three years ago, a social club was organized here principally aimed, as one member put it, "at preserving our traditions and way of life."

Called the Big Five Club, it recruits former members of Havana's five most exclusive private clubs.

The Big Five has about 600 active members, some of whom paid a \$1,000 entry fee. Until next year when a new clubhouse is built, replacing the present small and modest one where men play dominos and women canasta, no new members will be admitted one club official said.

18 APR 1971

CEREMONY AT MIAMI

Roll Is Called for 107 Killed at Bay of Pigs

MIAMI (UPI) — Tomas Cruz, a tall veteran of Assault Brigade 206, stood stiffly at attention and shouted roll call for the 107 men who died in the Abortive Bay of Pigs invasion on April 17, 1961.

Beside Cruz, two fellow veterans responded for the absent men, at a ceremony in Miami's "Little Havana" district yesterday dedicating a monument to the dead.

"Julio Acosta Ruiz!" Cruz shouted gruffly.

"Aqui," came the response, answering "here" for the dead man.

"Eufrasio Aleman Aleman!"

"Presente," cried another vet-

eran, responding "present" for the fallen comrade.

The last four names on the list were hard for Cruz to pronounce. They were the names of four Americans, Alabama National Guardsmen who died piloting B26 planes in the CIA-managed invasion.

"Riley W. Shamburger Jr.!"

"Aqui."

"Thomas W. Ray!"

"Presente."

"Leo F. Baker!"

"Aqui."

"Wade C. Gray!"

"Presente."

Shamburger, Ray, Baker and Gray too were present and accounted for in the honor roll of Assault Brigade 206.

KANSAS CITY, MO.

TIMES

M - 334,249

APR 17 1961

Cuban Recalls Bay of Pigs as Betrayal

By Michael J. Satchell

A Member of The Star's Staff

Ten years ago last night, Osvaldo Enriquez crouched in a small landing craft that butted through choppy seas toward a rock-strewn spit of land flanked by swamp and called Giron beach.

His carbine was loaded and the safety was off. Six hand grenades hung from a belt on his camouflage suit. He smiled at his companions, their eyes and teeth gleaming strangely white against recently blackened faces.

Enriquez and his companions were nervous but happy.

"We knew we were going to win," he said. "We were sure. Everybody was feeling happy. We were going home."

Along with 1,500 of his fellow countrymen Osvaldo Enriquez was going to liberate Cuba, and the waves that pounded their little flotilla of landing craft as they headed for Giron beach washed ashore in a V-shaped cove called the Bay of Pigs.

In the predawn darkness a decade ago today the eager force landed and the long-awaited invasion of Fidel Castro's Cuba was under way.

Unknown then to the refugees turned guerrilla fighters, the Bay of Pigs invasion was doomed long before it began.

"Why were we so confident we would win?" Enriquez asked. "Because we had been told that the United States was backing us up."

"We were told to hold the beach for three days. There would be airplanes and covering fire from offshore ships. And after three days the U. S. Marines would come in and join us and we would march to Havana."

"Of course we thought we would win. The ships and the planes were right there 20 miles offshore as we landed."

Enriquez, who was captured and later released in the 1963 ransom deal the U. S. government made with Castro for the return of the captured invasion survivors, lives with his wife and family at 5349 North Woodland avenue.

He expressed no bitterness, only regret that the CIA-backed plan to trigger a popular uprising against Castro degenerated into a military debacle.

A sergeant in Fulgencio Batista's army when Castro took over, Enriquez and his wife, Mrs. Gloria Enriquez, escaped their homeland in 1959 after hijacking a Cuban passenger plane and forcing the pilot to fly to Miami, Fla.

As the invasion plan was fostered among the growing numbers of refugees, Enriquez became involved closely and October 22, 1960, he was flown from a little-used airfield at Opa Locca, Fla., in an unmarked aircraft to a training camp in Guatemala.

"The whole invasion plan was supposed to be a secret," Mrs. Enriquez recalled. "But it was common knowledge that the men were being trained in Guatemala. We used to listen to the Cuban radio broadcasts in Miami and Castro would come on telling the people all about the plans to invade the island."

"He knew all the details, even how many pounds of meat the men were consuming each week in their training camps."

While Mrs. Enriquez lived in Miami on a \$250 a month grant from the U. S. government paid to her through a Cuban refugee organization, her husband in the growing force of fighters was receiving guerrilla and infantry training.

"It was very well organized—run by Americans," Enriquez said. "We had tanks, B-26 aircraft, mortars, machine guns, all good equipment."

Around the first part of April 1961 it became evident that the invasion was soon to be launched. Mrs. Enriquez recalled that she stopped receiving mail. Her husband was ordered to be prepared to move.

And Fidel Castro, his intelligence lines apparently open and reliable, began moving 45,000 heavily armed troops into the Pinar del Rio province.

As the landing craft approached the Bay of Pigs Enriquez was thinking of the reunion he expected with his parents who lived in Matanzas, about 100 miles away from the spot where they would land.

"I was planning to see them . . . my old friends . . . it was going to be a joyful reunion," he recalled.

When the invasion force hit the beach, they were met with artillery fire from the Bay of Pigs airfield and heavy small arms fire from local militia.

The beach was secured quickly, five tanks were brought off landing craft, and the force began moving inland up a narrow corridor of land surrounded by impassable swamp.

But it soon became apparent that the support they had been expecting was not going to come.

"We advanced about 35 miles inland . . . then we were pushed back," Enriquez said. "We wondered when the air cover was coming, when were the marines coming, what was happening."

Pushed back to the beach the beleaguered force repeatedly called for the promised help, but it never came and on the third day they got the final word that it never would.

From the command post on board one of the offshore ships came the instructions: "Fight on . . . resist . . . keep fighting" but it was hopeless. Vastly outnumbered, strafed and bombed by Castro's planes, taking a pounding from his artillery, the tiny force split up and the men tried to escape. None did.

A U. S. aircraft carrier, reportedly the USS Boxer, was 20 miles offshore with jets and propeller-driven planes painted with the blue identifying stripe of the anti-Castro forces.

Some of these planes were airborne, but none attacked during the critical phase.

There was ample, but unused gunfire support available from the U. S. warships offshore. These included a cruiser, at least one frigate and several destroyers that had escorted the invasion force from their staging area in Nicaragua.

"We knew they were there . . . it was so frustrating," Enriquez recalled. "We kept wondering, why don't they help us. We felt we were betrayed. We had been promised help from the U. S."

Still dressed in his camouflage suit, Enriquez headed for his hometown but he was captured quickly and imprisoned. In 1963 he was returned to the U. S. when the 1,100 survivors of the invasion were ransomed from Castro for 53 million dollars.

But the ransom was only part of the cost of the Bay of Pigs invasion. It also cost 45 million

17 APRIL 1971

Pawley: Adlai Threatened to Quit Over Bay of Pigs

By NIXON SMILEY
Herald Staff Writer

The full story of the disastrous Bay of Pigs has never been told, but Miami's William D. Pawley, who played a major role behind the scenes, has thrown some new light upon the reasons for the failure. Pawley also revealed hitherto untold details about the role he played in obtaining the freedom of three of the survivors 15 months later with payment of \$175,000 ransom.


Pawley, a wiry anti-Communist, has been inside or about the fringes of U.S. activities in Latin America for more than 40 years.

"By the time the President (Eisenhower) realized that Castro was, indeed, a Communist and not the Simon Bolivar he had been depicted," said Pawley, "the State Department already had forced Batista to flee, leaving Cuba in control of Castro. I had several conferences with the President and finally he was convinced that the anti-Communist Cubans in Florida should be armed and given every assistance to overthrow the Communist regime."

PAWLEY WORKED closely with Allen Dulles and the CIA in recruiting young Cubans from the anti-Castro refugees arriving in Miami. These were flown to Guatemala for training.

Among the Cubans assisting Pawley was Fabio Freyre, 40, father of eight. Freyre was from a well-known Cuban family and was then living in Palm Beach. After helping to recruit enough men for a brigade, Freyre insisted on going to Guatemala himself and joining the men he had signed up.

"The brigade had been given 12 attack bombers," said Pawley, "and in the plan it was contemplated that Castro's small air force would be destroyed and the band went ashore. In



William D. Pawley
... recalls his role

fact, it was the opinion of the military experts who advised us in connection with the landing that if the enemy air force was not destroyed the invasion should not be attempted. The Cuban fighters were led to believe, as were the rest of us, that there would be no air power to confront them."

In order to throw Castro off guard, President John Kennedy announced on April 12, five days before the scheduled invasion, that there would be no "intervention in Cuba by United States armed forces." At that time Kennedy had been President a little more than three months and appeared to be strongly in favor of the invasion, planned during the administration of his predecessor.

IN THE PREDAWN darkness of Saturday, April 15, bombers belonging to the invaders bombarded four Cuban airports, destroying all but six of Castro's planes. A second strike, planned for Sunday morning, never came off.

"What happened," said Pawley, "was that Adlai Stevenson, the United States ambassador to the United Nations, got in touch with the secretary of state, Dean Rusk, and got him to go to the White House and tell President Kennedy. Steven-

son made it clear to Rusk that he would not remain as ambassador to the United Nations if the United States permitted any more bombing of Cuba.

"Rusk went to the White House, accompanied by Chester Bowles, the President's special adviser on Latin American affairs, and they persuaded the President to call off the air strikes planned for Sunday morning. Use of the bombers was limited to the invasion area, and the admiral in charge of the Navy operations was ordered to give no air assistance to the invaders.

"Right then and there the President should have ordered the admiral to call off the invasion and return to Puerto Cabezas (the Nicaraguan port which served as the staging area). Unfortunately, the landing of the men was allowed to proceed on Monday morning as planned. The operation was carried out with the full expectation that the men would be free of attack from the air. When Castro's air force struck they were unprepared."

THE FIRST DAY Cuban jets shot down five of the invaders' bombers which were on the scene to protect the landing. The Castro forces also sank one of the ships used to transport the exiles, with considerable loss of life. Another of the transport vessels was damaged.

"Meanwhile, 35 of our jet fighting planes were flying above the battle and could have knocked Castro's planes out of the sky in a few minutes," said Pawley, "but the admiral had orders from the White House and he dared not interfere.

"After witnessing the fiasco, the admiral ordered the remaining boats to withdraw and the men ashore were abandoned. They eventually fell to the

overwhelming numbers of Castro troops.

The prisoners were paraded into the huge Elanquita Theater in Havana where they were individually interrogated before television cameras and radio microphones. Pawley heard the voices of two close friends, Fabio Freyre and George Govin, listening with admiration and concern as they defended the United States and condemned Cuban communism.

A year passed. Efforts to obtain the release of the men proved futile. Meanwhile, Pawley received word that his friends, Freyre and Govin, were starving to death in prison.

"I THOUGHT there must be some way to get these men out," said Pawley. "I knew Castro needed money desperately. It occurred to me that for a price we might get the men released. I consulted with Freyre's relatives, and they agreed that if the price was within their means they would raise the money. I went to see Govin's family and got the same answer."

Pawley called his friend, Livingston Merchant, U.S. Ambassador to Canada, a country which maintained diplomatic relations with Cuba. Would Merchant ask the Canadians to find out from Castro if he would put a price on the prisoners? Castro agreed.

Pawley, meanwhile, had begun to worry about the consequences of ransoming two men from well-to-do Cuban families in exile — and both of them white. It would give Castro an important propaganda lever. He would be able to point out that only the rich came out, while the poor boys, particularly the black, were given no consideration.

"I remembered the name

continued

E - 93,538

APR 7 1971

Miamian tells how he hired invasion pilots

By MILT SOSIN
Miami News Reporter

Ten years after the Bay of Pigs, a Miami Springs lawyer today withdrew previous denials and told how he directed the recruiting of National Guard pilots and air crewmen for the invasion and how four of them were killed.

"Yes," said Alex E. Carlson, "I can say now that I directed the recruiting of these men and I can tell you how they died, but even now, 10 years later I am forbidden by professional ethics to name my client."

Through the decade that followed the unsuccessful attempt to overthrow the Fidel Castro regime, it has been charged by some sources that Carlson was acting for the Central Intelligence Agency.

Carlson revealed the widows of the four men are getting not \$300 a month as previously reported, but that one, the widow of Maj. Riley W. Shamburger, of the Alabama National Guard, is getting more than \$1,000 a month while the others receive amounts somewhat less, according to their rank.

Ever, month Mrs. Shamburger gets a check for a little more than \$1,000 from the U.S. Labor Department, under the War Hazards Act.

Mrs. Shamburger, reached by telephone in Birmingham, knew it was the Bay of Pigs 10th anniversary, but she remembers best that April 19th was the day her husband was killed.

"The 19th is our wedding anniversary," she said. "I still love Riley, although I do have dates."

"You know, when the telephone rang I was out in my yard doing a little gardening and I was wearing one of Riley's old flying suits."

Asked if she would state the exact amount of the check she receives each month, Mrs. Shamburger said — but without real annoyance — "I don't think that's really your business, do you?"

In the next breath she was saying, "I expect to be in Miami soon and I'll look you up. In the meantime, give my regards to that nice Mr. Carlson."

"That nice Mr. Carlson" — a husky, 45-year-old man with rugged features and direct manner, laughingly evaded attempts to

link him with the CIA.

"Do I look like a CIA type?" he asked. He does.

Although Carlson was open about some aspects of his activities 10 years ago, he showed reluctance to discuss others. The recruiting activities began "several months" before the invasion, but Carlson would not give a date.

When Shamburger was recruited he was a career officer pilot in the Alabama Air National Guard. He resigned his commission when he was recruited for the Bay of Pigs mission at \$1,000 a month.

Thomas Willard (Pete) Ray, another pilot; Wade Gray and Leo Baker, all had been working for an airplane overhaul and maintenance firm when they were recruited.

Carlson said, "The National Guard pilots and radio operators we recruited mostly from Alabama weren't supposed to take part in the actual invasion. They were supposed to train the Cubans."

"From reports that were made to me by Americans who had been there, by the second day of the invasion — April 19, 1961 — the Cuban boys had about had it. According to the reports given me, they were exhausted from flying the missions from their base

in Guatemala to the Bay of Pigs in B-26s, making their runs, bombing and strafing, and returning, and taking off again for another mission.

"Of course, all this is what I have been told. I wasn't there, but it was reported to me that some of the Americans — Shamburger, Gray, Ray and Baker among them — took over the job of the exhausted Cubans. They were supposed to be flying C-47 cargo planes, but according to what I was later told, they flew B-26 missions."

One pilot who was there in an observation plane told Carlson, "They were doing all right, too, shooting up Castro's planes

and making their bombing runs when suddenly they came up against Castro's T-33s — American jet trainers."

These had been provided by the U.S. several years before to the Fulgencio Batista government, overthrown by Castro.

"The Cubans had mounted machine guns on the trainers and were using them against us," the pilot related.

"The odds were too much. Riley's B-26 and Pete's both took hits. The first one crashed into the sea and the other on land."

Carlson added carefully, "That's the way it was told to me. All I know is what was reported."

An American Disaster

THEY WERE a dedicated group, some 1,400 strong.

They were well armed and well trained. And they thought they had the full support of the United States government. Their assignment: Win a beachhead on the southern coast of Cuba, establish a government which could ask for outside aid and overthrow the Castro regime.

It all happened a decade ago, but not according to script. A landing was made at the Bay of Pigs by this force composed of Cuban exiles, but their mission was doomed from the beginning.

The plan, initially shaped under the Eisenhower administration, called for the invaders to be accompanied by U.S. Naval forces. They also were to receive U.S. air support. But the attack was launched after Eisenhower had been replaced by a young American President, John F. Kennedy, whose record as a strategist was limited to the political field.

KENNEDY FACED the choices of permitting the invasion to proceed or calling it off. Unfortunately, he chose a middle route, authorizing the strike, but declaring that no U.S. forces would become involved.

Air support would come from Cuban piloted B-26 bombers flying out of Guatemala. The round trip for these planes took more than six hours and would permit only one hour of action over the target. Castro's planes could be over the beachhead in a matter of minutes.

CIA Deputy Director Charles Cabell pleaded for the needed air support, but the Kennedy administration continued its negative position. It was pointed out that the U.S. aircraft carrier Boxer was on station only 50 miles from the Bay

into action. They sank two transport ships loaded with reserve ammunition and drove off two others. On shore the invasion force was doing its job. By the second day it had gained planned objectives and had even seized an airfield. But it was by this time short of ammunition and food.

In Washington the Kennedys were holding a white tie reception; in Cuba brave men who had expected air support were reaching the limit of their endurance. All Castro's forces had to do was sit back and wait for the invaders to exhaust their ammunition. Then they simply walked in and took prisoners by the hundreds. Informed of the outcome, Kennedy ordered a destroyer to move in and pick up survivors. It found very few. Most of the invaders were either killed or captured.

COMMENTING on the debacle later, General Eisenhower observed, "Any second lieutenant with combat experience could have done better."

Kennedy was not without combat experience. He lost a PT boat in the South Pacific when it was sliced in half by a Japanese destroyer — perhaps an omen of things to come.

The Bay of Pigs is now history, an ugly blot which will not be easily erased. Eventually, the surviving invaders were ransomed by the United States, returning to this country to tell their sad story. They were young men, many bearing battle scars, who would willingly fight again, given the opportunity — and the support.

Today they are 10 years older and convinced, perhaps, that they may never live to see their native land again as free men. But they need not apologize for failing. The blame is not theirs. It rests with the leadership of this country — now and always.

Meanwhile Castro's jets went

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MIAMI HERALD
16 APRIL 1971

Bay of Pigs Still Echoes Decade After the Disaster

By FRANK SOLER
Herald Latin America Staff

"Alert! Alert! Look well at the rainbow.

"The first will rise very soon . . . Chico is in the house . . . Visit him . . . The sky is blue . . . Place notice on tree . . . The tree is green and brown . . . The letters arrived well . . . The letters are white . . . The fish will not take much time to rise . . . The fish is red . . ."

A CODED MESSAGE hurled through the humid tropical night by a clandestine CIA transmitter in the Caribbean.

Its command, urgent and simple: "Go."

They went. By first light of that April morning a decade ago, "Operation Pluto" was under way.

About 1,500 Cuban exiles, recruited, trained, armed and dispatched by the U.S. government, had landed at the Bay of Pigs on Cuba's south coast.

They went confident of victory; convinced they could drive Fidel Castro from power. And with the invaders went the prayers of some 10,000 Cubans who by then had found refuge from Castro in South Florida.

So certain of victory was Brigade 2506 that one of its members wrote a song that became a motto for the exiles:

"IT IS POSSIBLE that I may be killed. It is impossible to lose."

Brigade 2506 lost. The expected U.S. air support never came. The expected uprising inside Cuba never materialized.

On April 17, 1961, the brigade had pushed inland, overwhelming spotty resistance.

On April 18, Castro moved up thousands of seasoned troops and heavy armor, knocking the invaders back to the beach.

By April 19, with Castro fighter planes unopposed in the air, with ground forces tightening their noose, with food, water and ammunition spent, the brigade dissolved. It was each man for himself as they scrambled for the safety of distant hills or the sea.

A FEW MADE good their escape. But Brigade 2506 lost some 200 killed; the rest, about 1,200 others, were captured and ransomed nearly two years later for food and medicine.

The invasion, conceived under President Eisenhower and executed in the first days of the Kennedy Administration, had failed utterly.

And echoes of those decisive three days are still heard today.

The defeat at the Bay of Pigs had profound impact on the U.S., on Cuba and Castro. It also transformed the lives of hundreds of thousands of Cubans; and it had a lasting effect on shaping the destiny of South Florida as well.

Spring of 1961 Full of Hope

For the relative handful of Cubans who had already fled, and for the large number of Castro's opponents still in Cuba, the spring of 1961 was a wondrous time, full of hope and anticipation.

IN CLOAK - and dagger fashion, the CIA had spirited from Cuba and later recruited a young Cuban doctor named Manuel Arttime. Arttime had served briefly in Castro's Institute of Agrarian Reform, resigned as a result of Communist infiltration in the government's ranks and was active in an underground movement called MRR.

From the short, raspy-voiced Arttime, the son of a Communist but a Catholic,

himself, there sprang Brigade 2506.

First the united exile front or "Frente" and later the Cuban Revolutionary Council, the political arms of the invasion-to-come, openly recruited exiles in offices in Miami for combat duty.

Young and old Cubans, the same who had congregated at Walgreen's Drugstore in downtown Miami and Robert's Drugstore on West Flagler Street, would disappear, recruited for training in Guatemala and Nicaragua under CIA agents with names like "Frank," "Bill," "Big John," "Sonny" and "Scabee."

AND WHEN THE exiles dropped out of sight, their friends would wink and whisper to one another that they had "gone off to the camps."

It was an open "secret" that relatives of recruits were receiving monthly checks from the U.S. government to take care of expenses while husbands, brothers, sons and fathers marched off to war.

Talk of invasion filled the air . . . in Miami, the Caribbean and, tragically for Brigade 2506, in Havana.

Castro expected the invasion and was prepared for it. So certain was he that the time for the "action" was at hand, in fact, that he had taken to sleeping in the afternoon and remaining awake at night, when the invaders were most likely to strike.


BY THWARTING the invasion, Castro emerged stronger than ever, consolidating his power. A massive roundup of suspected opponents dealt a blow to the underground from which it never recovered. The flight of middle class Cubans following the invasion also removed his most potentially dangerous enemies.

Castro's Grip Now Secure

Today, by virtue of billions of dollars in Soviet aid, Castro's grip on Cuba has increased tenfold.

While in 1961 he only had a handful of planes to throw at Brigade 2506, Castro now has dozens of Soviet-built jet fighters, hundreds of tanks and surface-to-air missiles in an arsenal considered one of the most powerful in the hemisphere.

The regime, faced with increasing discontent, has become increasingly "Stalin-



Ernesto Oliva

... still active

ized"; repression is at a peak.

There is no known organized opposition to Castro inside Cuba. Outside Cuba, the anti-Castro exile movement, without the support of the United States and sometimes with its active opposition, is solutely convinced of its success fell into total despair.

UNTIL THEN, the exiles had not really comprised a community. They had been transient refugees. All had come to Miami knowing their return home would be only a matter of months. They had prayed and they had awaited that moment anxiously; suddenly, and just as fast it was gone.

APR 16 1971
M - 196,345
S - 308,949

Cuban Blames Stevenson for Bay of Pigs Disaster

Three Survivors Tell of 1961 Invasion

By PAUL ATKINSON

"Everyone has his scapegoat. Mine today is Adlai Stevenson. He really weakened President John F. Kennedy when he was all ready."

City International Relations director Alberto Fowler was recalling the harrowing Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba, in which he participated with nearly 2,000 other Cubans. They stormed ashore April 17, 1961, and were promptly captured.

Fowler was joined by two other survivors of the ill-starred invasion, Ramiro Montalvo, a McComb, Miss., truck dealer, and Johnny Lopez de la Cruz, home from his second tour of duty in Vietnam with the U.S. Army.

"You have to remember that President Kennedy was a very new President, a very young President. All he needed was the firm conviction of a statesman such as Stevenson, saying if you give air cover to the Cubans, the Russians will go into Berlin."

"That is right," agreed Montalvo.

'HE WEAKENED'

"He weakened," said Fowler of President Kennedy. "Don't forget that Kennedy was talking to an embittered Stevenson who had been put to shame in the eyes of the world when on April 14, 1961, he gave assurances at the United Nations that the United States was not engaging in any protection of the invasion. Two days later he had been used. I can imagine the confrontation between Kennedy and Stevenson must have been ugly."

Fowler, Montalvo and Lopez delaCruz all agree that the lack of air cover was the turning point in the fiasco.

"Basically, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) had a good plan," said Montalvo. "I think it was the politics that ruined the plan."

"If it was so good," interjected Fowler, "why right after the Bay of Pigs was Mr. (Allen) Dulles, head of the CIA, and about 600 members of the CIA

fired by President Kennedy?"

"Why was the air support cut off?" parried Montalvo.

"I have to see the reaction of the state, the government," said Fowler. "Everything could not have been very good. . . ."

'HE KNEW TOO MUCH'

"It is my opinion that Dulles was put out because he knew too much," Montalvo said. "He was a witness to the meeting that took place in the White House."

"Everything was set up and ready for a good plan. Cut the island in two, establish a government in a certain piece of the island and we will get the support of the American states."

"So what happened? Everything went down when our boats were sunk by Fidel Castro's air force. All our bombers were gone. We lost the whole deal."

"Why? Because those plans didn't have air support and who called it off? It wasn't the CIA or Dulles. It was Kennedy."

"Why did he do it? Immaturity, weakness . . . he didn't really have to put his hands in the problem. This training camp was started by (President Dwight D.) Eisenhower and (Vice President Richard M.) Nixon."

PLAN CHANGED

Fowler reminded that the original plan during the Eisenhower Administration was for a guerrilla infiltration operation.

"This operational plan was changed after the election," said Fowler. "It was changed to a conventional war. You can't blame the Republican administration for that. Whether Kennedy knew about it, whether they told him or not I don't know. I am sure he had to be informed of it."

Fowler recalls that the landing force of almost 2,000 had complete confidence that they could pull off the invasion and successfully overthrow Castro.

"We had adequate assurances that the operational plan was going through," said Fowler. "And that air cover was part of it. I speak for myself alone, but

certainly I had no idea of being a hero or martyr. I was just a man with a calculated risk as in any other war. But it was a com-

body else that the air cover wasn't there."

GROUP CONFIDENT

Lopez delaCruz said the feeling on the ship was "we are going to win. We were sure we were; there was no doubt in our minds. But we never suspected that our supplies were going to be cut."

Fowler said he first began doubting the wisdom of the invasion on the morning of April 17.

"We were on the beach and had been told that our air force had destroyed all of Castro's planes," explained Fowler. "Our bombers had dropped the last payload of paratroopers."

"We spotted a plane and thinking it was one of ours, many of us rushed out to wave at it. But the plane came down on us, and machine-gunned a number of the men."

"I saw another plane and knew very well something was wrong. We didn't know what. But it set a lot of us thinking out loud that something had gone awful."

'PICKING BERRIES'

Fowler said that Castro's troops—estimated over the years to be 40,000 to 60,000—soon had encircled the less than 2,000 force of invaders. "It was like picking berries from a field," said Fowler.

Montalvo became philosophical.

"The worst thing that ever happened to me is to lose my country," he began. "This is my second country and I love it like I did Cuba, and I would hate to lose it again. I wouldn't know where to go."

"This is a land of opportunity, but everyday we lose just a little bit more. And I put myself in the group which is not doing anything—which is what happened in Cuba."

PROSPERITY KILLED

"In Cuba the people who thought, backed away from politics. They were too busy with business; they had to create. There was lots of prosperity, but we killed it."

"In a sense we are doing the same thing here. We shy away. Maybe I could do more and

I don't. As a matter of fact, I went to the Bay of Pigs because of an inferiority complex. I am not a fighter. I am afraid of guns."

"I am not a fighter either," said Fowler with a chuckle. "I am a lover."

"I said for the first time I can do something for my country and that is why I joined," explained Montalvo.

'FELT GUILTY'

"We felt guilty," said Fowler. "We felt we had to do something. All of us had a little bit of that feeling, that perhaps we had contributed in one way or other by our apathy and now we had to put up or shut up."

"I don't think I could have ever faced myself if I hadn't done it. I hated everything that happened, but in the end I am a much happier human being because I did it."

"Oh, yes," agreed Montalvo.

OPINION DIVIDED

They were asked if they think there can be another Bay of Pigs invasion-type maneuver?

"I have to answer that with a question, with people like (Sen. J. William) Fulbright running the committees, would there be a chance to train people to invade Cuba?" asked Montalvo. "I think that would be quite impossible."

"I answer by saying yes it is possible," rejoined Fowler. "But 10 years have gone by, and the international situation is completely different."

"Still a military operation against Castro is always possible. A vehicle could be the Organization of American States. This someday could happen; they might jell and decide to do it."

"Where do you get the support?" replied Montalvo.

"Some of the big governments of Latin America have made insinuations that if it were a bona fide operation, they would participate with their armies," explained Fowler.

"To summarize," said Montalvo, "the Cubans would go back to fight and liberate their country."

"I don't know if we would like to have the CIA train us again."

NEW TIMES
16 April 1971

THE LESSONS OF PLAYA GIRON

B. GOREBACHOV

THE victory scored by the Cuban people in Playa Giron ten years ago is a memorable event not for the Cubans alone. The echo of the battle for freedom and socialism then fought against the counter-revolutionary forces and imperialism resounded throughout Latin America and the whole world. It has laid an imprint on the entire development of the liberation movement in the Western Hemisphere.

What happened in Cuba at the dead of night on April 17, 1961? Let us leaf through the time-yellowed pages of the Cuban newspapers of those days.

Under the cover of darkness, a 1,350-strong force of CIA mercenaries, armed to the teeth, landed in the area of Playa Giron. The invaders, recruited from among the counter-revolutionaries who had fled from Cuba, had artillery, tanks, planes and landing barges. Thoroughly trained by American officers and supported by the U.S. Air Force and Navy, they seized a small beachhead in the south of the country, intending to prepare the ground for the establishment of a counter-revolutionary provisional government to be followed by large-scale intervention by the United States.

Thus did U.S. imperialism seek to strangle the Cuban revolution with the hands of the Cuban counter-revolutionary émigrés, restore the capitalist order in the country and re-impose its yoke.

The White House expected early reports of victory, and even of uprisings, and was ready for the second part of Operation Pluto—for open armed intervention. Within 72 hours, however, the invaders were completely routed. More than 1,000 of them surrendered and many found an inglorious end in the Bay of Pigs. On April 19 free Cuba was already celebrating victory.

In those grim days the Cuban people rallied closely round the Revolutionary Government and proved their devotion

to the ideals of the revolution. Especially symbolic and impressive was the fact that the Revolutionary Government, supported by the working people, proclaimed that Cuba was fighting against imperialist aggression under the banner of socialism. The hour of trial became at the same time a historic landmark in the Cuban revolution.

THE imperialist invasion of Cuba set off a wave of solidarity with her people throughout the world. A serious warning to the aggressor was issued by the Soviet government which stressed the grave danger to peace presented by the imperialist policy of aggression and suppression of the peoples' right to free, independent development. The support of Cuba voiced by the Soviet Union and the peace forces everywhere showed that Cuba was not alone. International solidarity helped the Cuban people frustrate the imperialist plans. At the same time, the Playa Giron events revealed new features of the Cuban revolutionary process.

"Where did those who had so carefully elaborated the plans err? Where did they miscalculate?" Premier Fidel Castro asked in one of his speeches. "They underestimated our people's morale, the courage of our people, the power of revolution."

The Playa Giron invasion, it might be recalled, was not an isolated incident. In the very first months of the radical reforms in Cuba imperialism used all the means at its disposal against her: ruthless economic blockade, political pressure and blackmail (notably with the aid of the Organization of American States), sabotage, murder, lies and slander—the whole arsenal of means which had worked well in suppressing anti-imperialist and liberation movements in Latin America in the past. This time, however, they had the reverse effect. The Cuban people replied to imperialist pressure with redoubled revolutionary enthusiasm and vigilance. The entire course of the Cuban revolution, which took place in an extremely complicated international situation, showed that imperialism was no longer omnipotent even in such a traditional U.S. domain as Latin America.

The Playa Giron victory proved that the Cuban revolution was invincible and ensured its progress. Despite the difficulties created by the imperialist blockade, the Cuban people successfully carried out socialist transformations in the economy, social relations and in the cultural sphere.

Under the guidance of the Revolutionary Government and the Communist Party, they are solving the complex problems involved in reorganizing their economy and eliminating the disproportions and other pernicious consequences of years of foreign monopoly domination.

By transforming the country, the Cuban revolution is inspiring deep-going changes throughout Latin America. It is now impossible to speak of life on this continent without mentioning the impact made on it by this revolution, its creative spirit and liberation ideas. The significance of the Cuban revolution has far transcended the national boundaries.

To begin with, it has given the oppressed working masses of Latin America confidence in their strength and their ability to overcome the power of the exploiters and the imperialists. The "geographical fatalism," the myth that radical revolutions in Latin America were doomed to failure because of the proximity of the United States and the possibility of imperialist intervention, has been dissipated. The Cuban people not only overthrew the Batista tyranny but upheld their gains in Playa Giron and in many other political and economic battles with imperialism. This important fact has deeply impressed the Latin American peoples.

Agrarian reforms, nationalization of banks, transport, large and medium enterprises, and many other measures undertaken by Cuba have shown Latin American countries the way out of their own crisis situations. The Cuban revolution is profoundly democratic and humane. This is evidenced by unremitting solicitude for public health, social security and public education, by the establishment of women's equality and elimination of all forms of racial or national antagonism.

The Cuban revolution naturally takes its own national forms reflecting the his-

THE SEATTLE TIMES
16 APRIL 1971

The Times' opinion and comment:

Bay of Pigs in retrospect

TEN years ago tomorrow, the United States suffered its most embarrassing international incident of modern times. Some 1,500 Cuban refugees, trained and equipped by the Central Intelligence Agency, met disaster at the Bay of Pigs.

It is one of the ironies of history that in the same small country where the United States suffered so grievous a setback, the Russians suffered an even greater humiliation less than two years later.

The Bay of Pigs episode encouraged Nikita Khrushchev to think he could outflank the United States strategically by installing nuclear missiles in Cuba.

EVER since, there has remained what might be called a Russian-American standoff in Cuba: That country still has a Communist government, but no known Communist nuclear missiles.

Many of the fears of a decade ago have failed to materialize. Although Fidel Castro still rules in Havana, he has failed to "export" his revolution to a single Latin American country. Even those Latin governments vaguely sympathetic to Castro do not look to him for leadership or even advice.

Castro, in turn, does not always faithfully dance to the Russian tune, even though his economy is dependent on Russian subsidies.

Most anti-Castro refugees from Cuba have become well integrated into American life, and much of the heat has gone out of the Washington-Havana confrontation.

IN 1961 — and still in 1971 — the most disturbing factor about the Bay of Pigs is not that a band of bearded revolutionaries rules a Caribbean island, but that an American President could be misadvised so wretchedly by his top military and civilian officials.

Not only the C. I. A. and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, but such Kennedy-administration academic intellectuals as Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., and Richard Goodwin endorsed the adventure, originally conceived during the Eisenhower administration.

The principal lesson of the Bay of Pigs, it seems to us, is that a President must always seek out and weigh carefully the advice of "no men" who are not swept along by the popular passions or fashionable viewpoints of the day.

APR 15 1971
E - 32,464

The Bay of Pigs—he remembers

By DAN ALARCON
Times Staff Writer

"We enlisted, we trained, we fought."

That's how Tampan Jose Cardenas described his experiences in a CIA-directed Cuban military force which staged the unsuccessful Bay of Pigs invasion 10 years ago tomorrow.

But, rather than discuss his part in the assault against Fidel Castro, the Cuban exile seemed more intent on describing threats to the United States which he said were the symptoms of the advance of Communism in his homeland. "It's the same dog with a different collar," he said.

Campus and racial disturbances, bombings, a demoralized military, a mediocre and permissive government. These he said exist in this country today as they existed in the last days of Fulgencio Batista's Cuba.

Cardenas was a Cuban soldier from 1942 to Castro's takeover. In that time he served under Batista and two preceding presidents.

Towards the end, the national army was in turmoil along with the rest of the country, he said. Commanding officers sold out to Castro while the military condemned men "like your Lt. Calley" who slew rebels in revenge for the death of their comrades, he said.

Castro was not in power for a year before Cardenas left Cuba for Miami.

In November, 1960, he was making shoes when the "propaganda" of an anti-Castro invasion brigade swept through the Cuban colony.

"It was everyone's duty to enlist," he said.

A recruitment center for the Frente Revolucionario Cubano conceived by the Eisenhower Administration was feverish with activity as Cubans of all ages enlisted, said Cardenas. U.S. citizens attempting to join were rejected since the force was to be all-Cuban.

There was "talk" of CIA involvement in the project, he said.

After a medical check up a few days later Cardenas and about 40 other Latins were airbound to Retalhuleu, Guatemala. The men were kept a day at the town's airport until buses arrived to take them to the foot of the Sierra Madre mountains on Guatemala's Pacific coast.

It took a day's climb to reach the training camp (called Trax or Track) in the mountains. "The camp was so high you could look down and see houses this small," he indicated with two slightly-opened fingers.

Sometimes a cloud would sweep through the camp bringing snow and at other times the heat was unbearable, he said.

In the following months, recruits trained for combat with emphasis on direct assault rather than guerrilla tactics, he said. Camp personnel was mostly Cuban from instructors to cooks who prepared Latin dishes.

There were Americans at the base. But, Cardenas didn't have much to say about them other than "they had to be there."

Trainees spent their nights in wooden barracks, watching motion pictures and U.S. military training films.

Cardenas denied reports from other sources on friction among various factions within the camp.

Training continued. But battle plans weren't revealed until the last moment. As the embarkation approached, the trainees journeyed to Puerto Cabezas, Nicaragua, to board a flotilla to Cuba.

Cardenas said his group joined with another force which has trained at a camp called "Bluff" in Puerto Cabezas.

Besides this that group, he said other exiles had been taught guerrilla tactics at an unknown location.

He said another group had trained in Louisiana under a Capt. Higinio Nina Diaz but did not participate in the invasion, he said.

More than 1,400 men were finally involved in the attack,

On April 17, the brigade landed on the swampy beaches in the Bay of Pigs' area in Cuba's southern Las Villas Province. It penetrated into Matanzas Province 10 miles from the beachhead, according to news reports. Paratroopers dropped further inland.

Cuban planes, supposedly destroyed by brigade aircraft two days before, fired on the flotilla sinking boats carrying most munitions and communications equipment, said Schlesinger. Cardenas recalled only one boat, the Justo, being hit and said that each boat carried its share of supplies and equipment.

Castro responded to the assault April 18 by ordering 20,000 troops to the beachhead secured by the brigade.

Cardenas said small towns in the area of the bay's Giron Beach had gone over to the invaders' side.

But, the word came down through the ranks that U.S. backers of the operation were cutting off supply of the war equipment Cardenas said was supposed to flow from Nicaragua.

When Cardenas learned about the arms limit, "I flew into rage wanting to strike back at whoever was responsible," he said.

"With arms and the help of the Cuban people, we could have won," said Cardenas. "We fought until we ran out of arms . . . most of the men who fell on all sides were my friends."

Cardenas said he was evacuated with an injured leg by plane to Nicaragua. He said about 180 other invaders escaped by plane or by boat, a fact which wasn't evident in

11 APR 1971 STATINTL

10 Years Later, Bay of Pigs Veterans Are Eager to Fight Again

By The Associated Press

MIAMI, April 10 (AP)—Juan José Peruyero sat in his dusty, cluttered office in the rundown section of Miami where he op-
reminisced and he looked ahead.

"I will go again—all of us will someday," he said. "And next time we'll finish the job. There'll be no quitting or excuses. We're ready to fight again to free our country."

Ten years ago he and some 1,500 of his countrymen were in a Guatemalan training camp run by the Central Intelligence Agency. On April 17, 1961, they hit the Cuban beaches in the disastrous invasion at the Bay of Pigs.

Those who were not killed were captured by Fidel Castro's troops and spent 20 months of confinement in fear, confusion and bitterness.

Vocations More Prosaic

Today the ransomed "freedom fighters" pursue their more prosaic vocations in exile, making a living and providing for their families as cab drivers, accountants, lawyers, salesmen, mechanics and fighting men for the United States armed forces.

They are part of the more than half a million Cubans living in exile in this country and elsewhere, but they believe they are special, claiming unity that other exiles or refugees do not have.

Their "unifying bond," as Hugo Sueiro Rios, a retired United States Army captain, terms it, is their still-active invasion team, Assault Brigade 2506.

Mr. Sueiro limped out and held the door of his neat three-bedroom house for a visitor. He settled down on a couch and told about his service in South Vietnam and his dreams for the future.

"Cuba is my life," he said. "I've never stopped fighting for it. It's been a long time, but the struggle that was started then continues. We have a spirit of unity that will prevail—soon."

Tomás Cruz, a Negro who fights radical discrimination as readily as he does Communism, paced the floor and gestured emphatically.

Optimist and Realist

"I am an optimist as well as a realist about my homeland," he said. "The Nixon Administration has to act. Something will happen. I am ready."

When Mr. Sueiro was 21 years old he was leading the Second Infantry Battalion of Brigade 2506 onto Playa Giron, the beach leading from Bahia de Cochinos, or the Bay of Pigs.

Today he has a plastic plate in his head and a partial paralysis of his left side as a result of a mine explosion in Vietnam, where he served with the 82d Airborne Division and the 25th Infantry. He is studying accounting at the University of Miami while supporting his wife and two children.

With more than 200 of his countrymen, he joined the United States armed forces in March, 1963, following the Cuban Government's release of all but nine men of the brigade. Premier Castro demanded \$53-million in American food and medicines for their freedom.

"We expected to return rapidly to Cuba after the special officers' training course in Fort Benning, Ga.," Mr. Sueiro related. "We were badly mistaken. After President Kennedy was killed, there was a change in the political situation in this country and we were told another invasion of the island was impossible."

He joined the Army like many other Cubans, he said, because he felt, that besides fighting Communism, he was keeping himself ready "for any possible return to Cuba in a fighting capacity."

Opportunity Is All they Want

"Naturally, many of them have a career, good rank, prestige and have put in a good part of their lives as fighting men for the United States forces," the shy, mild-mannered former officer added. "But I feel sure that, given the opportunity, the majority would drop everything, leave their positions and families and return to fight in Cuba. I know all my friends in the Army feel this way. At heart, that's what we all want—an opportunity."

He said the brigade was formed "of all kinds of people—students, former army personnel with Batista or Castro, college graduates and peasants, laborers—all with different political beliefs and ideas."

"But Fidel Castro achieved one thing for us," Mr. Sueiro explained. "He made it possible for the brigade members to become unified. This spirit of unity continues to exist among the men of the brigade, be they dedicated army men tens of thousands of miles away from their ordinary jobs."

Assault Brigade 2506 still exists in a second-floor walkup above a photographers studio on West Flagler Street, in the heart of the Miami district known as Little Havana.

It is an "associatoin" now, it holds boisterous meetings in the smoke-filled hall but is dedicated to keeping the spirit of return alive. Still active are its leaders then and now, José Pérez San Román, Manuel Artimé, Mr. Peruyero and others.

Learned Trade in Prison

Its current president is a stocky, nervous barber, Hiram Gómez, who learned his trade in Mr. Castro's prisons.

Mr. Artimé, perhaps the most familiar among all the Bay of Pigs personalities, is a man of some mystery in Miami. As the civilian "political chief," he reportedly arranged for C.I.A. sponsorship and recruiting. Today he is the owner of a Miami store called Mon Petit, which sells children's furniture, toys, clothes and notions, but he is rarely in town, spending much of his time shuttling back and forth between Central America, Mexico and Miami.

He declines interviews, as does Mr. Pérez San Román, the fighting leader at the Bay of Pigs. Now 40, he works in Miami for a trucking concern.

The second in command, Erneido Oliva, is an official in the Office of Spanish-Speaking Relations in the District of Columbia government in Washington. He served for several years as a captain with the 82d Airborne at Fort Bragg, N. C.

Mr. Cruz, also 40, a salesman-collector for a Miami home-products concern, was commander of a parachute company in the 1961 assault and served as a second lieutenant until it became clear that he and his fellow Cuban officers would not be used against the Castro Government.

His colleagues hold him in high regard for a face-to-face encounter with Mr. Castro while they were prisoners. During the televised show trials in which the invaders were sentenced to 30-year prison terms, the Premier singled out Mr. Cruz and asked:

"What are you doing here? As a black man, don't you know that we have wiped out discrimination in this country? You can go anywhere, swim at any of the clubs, do what you want."

"I came here to go swimming. I came to free my country from Communism."

SPRINGFIELD, ILL.
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The State Journal-Register, Springfield, Sunday, April 11, 1971

American Wounds Still Haven't Healed From Bay Of Pigs Fiasco

By THEODORE A. EDIGER
Copley News Service

MIAMI — Just a decade ago, a Cuban exile fighting force of 1,200, recruited, trained and armed by the U.S. government, invaded Cuba seeking to overthrow Fidel Castro. It was the celebrated Bay of Pigs fiasco. Castro troops crushed the invader within three days.

Today the United States, its world prestige shaken by the incident, still smartens from wounds of inaction. The United States sent the refugees into Castro's military might, then forsook them, failing to provide promised air support, and left them to their doom.

Castro still boasts how his tiny nation so easily smashed the mighty United States. He remains on firmer ground at home and more respected abroad as a result of that April, 1961, victory.

No further all-out effort to overthrow him appears in sight. The once active anti-Castro underground, broken up with the invaders' rout, has never fully regrouped.

The Communist world undoubtedly has been emboldened. The Bay of Pigs set the stage for subsequent Soviet advances, in this hemisphere, at least.

Meanwhile, survivors wait, hope, reminisce and earn a living at sundry tasks in Miami and other cities.

Veterans of the invasion forces say their morale was high when in the predawn of April 17, 1961, they barked on Giron Beach off the

Bay of Pigs, 100 miles south-east of Havana. How could they miss? The United States supported them.

The plan was for an exile armada of planes to destroy Castro's air force craft on the ground before the invasion.

Brigade 2506, as the incursion force was called, would then land, seize the Giron Airfield and, with air cover, block the beachhead off from Havana. A provisional government would be flown in. The invaders would broadcast to people in Cuba and to Latin American governments asking them to join their cause.

The plan seemed foolproof.

The first air mission swooped over Cuba two days before the landing as scheduled. But President John Kennedy, fearful that a bigger squadron might tip off U.S. involvement — the pilots were supposed to be "defectors" from Castro — issued an order limiting the strike force to eight planes. This semi-squadron destroyed eight Castro planes, half Cuba's air force. Three "Freedom Fighter" planes were lost.

Cuban Foreign Minister Raul Roa told the United Nations that the United States did the bombing, and pretty well proved it.

President Kennedy canceled the second strike, scheduled for a day before the landing. Then, just as the invasion fleet of five small freighters escorted by U.S. destroyers approached the Bay of Pigs, the third strike was scratched by White House order. It was to have coincided with the landing.

Brigade 2506 won the first battle. It seized the Giron Air-strip, then waited for its bombers. They never arrived.

Castro's planes roared. Rockets sank two invasion freighters. One carried the broadcasting equipment and supplies for a week's fighting. Men swam ashore without arms. The other three freighters retreated.

Fighting was over by nightfall April 19. The men were without ammunition, food and water, and exhausted. Nearly 100 were killed, the rest were captured or hid in swamps where Castro's men plucked them out later. The United States did not abandon them completely.

Twenty months later, 1,113 Bay of Pigs prisoners were ransomed with \$3 million worth of medicines, baby food and other commodities donated by Americans with government approval.

President Kennedy welcomed the freed prisoners and other exiles in Miami's Orange Bowl in December, 1961, standing on a makeshift platform on the 50-yard line, the President was proffered a Cuban flag. He told the huge gathering: "I can assure you that this flag will be returned to this brigade in a free Havana."

Still, a year and a half later, Kennedy ended an eyeball-to-eyeball confrontation with the Soviet Union by pledging that Castro's realm would not be invaded if strategic missiles were

That missile crisis might not have occurred except for the Bay of Pigs defeat, many observers feel.

Richard M. Nixon wrote in the November, 1961, Reader's

Digest: "The Bay of Pigs led directly to the Soviet decision to move into the western hemisphere in force with both men and missiles."

Unexplained is lack of coordination between the brigade and the anti-Castro underground in Cuba but during the invasion, Maj. Humberto Sori Marin, a comrade-in-arms of Castro during the revolution, was summarily executed in Havana. Sori Marin had sneaked out of Cuba, was trained by the Central Intelligence Agency in underground tactics, then infiltrated back to become liaison chief between the invaders and the interior anti-Castroites.

The tenth anniversary of the Bay of Pigs is being observed on both sides of the Sugar Cane Curtain. In Cuba, a month-long observance, the official radio reports are highlighted by thousands of volunteer workers going into the cane fields. In Miami, Bay of Pigs Veterans Association president Hiram Gomez announced plans for a monument to invaders who fell.

Gomez is a barber. He learned the trade by practicing on fellow brigadistas in Cuban prisons.

The civilian head of the expedition, Manuel Artimo, said in a Miami speech: "Our plan was marvelous. We land on a beach, we take the beach, we

Kennedy's Bay of Pigs Has Infected a Decade

By Chalmers M. Roberts

Washington Post Staff Writer

GOVERNMENT'S AN OLD SAYING, "President John F. Kennedy said in the wake of the Bay of Pigs debacle, "that victory has 100 fathers and defeat is an orphan."

It will be 10 years next Saturday since some 1300 Cuban refugees, trained and equipped by the Central Intelligence Agency, landed on the south shore of Cuba in an abortive invasion that ended two days later. Looking back over the intervening decade, that was probably the young President's greatest mistake.

Although Mr. Kennedy manfully took the responsibility, what was involved was far more than a question of victory or defeat. The Bay of Pigs set in train a host of actions whose results are in many ways still with us today. With additional information now at hand, including Nikita Khrushchev's reminiscences, it is worth a look at the ramifications of that fiasco.

At home, the disaster produced in the President a skepticism about advice and advisers, above all about the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the CIA. It was not long before all the leading figures in those sacrosanct establishments were replaced. Organizationally, McGeorge Bundy was moved into the White House from across the street, there to be succeeded in a new locale of power by Walt W. Rostow and finally by Henry A. Kissinger.

But it was the wider ramifications that now seem more important. Here were involved not just the United States' relationship with Latin America but its relationship with the Soviet Union and even the relationship between the Soviet Union and Communist China.

Affected, too, were Mr. Kennedy's view of Indochina and the view of his successor, Lyndon B. Johnson, when a crisis arose in the Dominican Republic. What the two Presidents did in those widely separated areas relates to the status of America today, both its internal divisions over the Indochina war and its growing aversion to international commitments.

Presidential Agony

OF COURSE, it is absurd to pile all the ills of today's America on the back of Mr. Kennedy's error in giving the go-ahead for the invasion of Cuba. But that there is a relationship is beyond doubt. And John F. Kennedy's place in history will be the poorer for it.

The Bay of Pigs details are well known and need not be repeated here beyond the shapeliest facts. Mr. Kennedy inherited the plan from the Eisenhower administration, he agonized over it, and in early April, 1961, he finally approved the invasion on the advice of his senior aides, military and civilian.

That the President agonized, I can testify first hand, rereading now a memorandum of 45 minutes spent with him alone in the Oval Office on April 7. It is also true that I, like most other Washington journalists who knew something about what was up, failed to report it adequately.

To put the Bay of Pigs in context, one must recall the mood of the day, so different from that of April, 1971. In his presidential campaign, Mr. Kennedy had called for American help for the Cuban refugees from the island that Fidel Castro had conquered two years earlier. His opponent, Vice President Nixon, who knew what plans had been made in secret under President Eisenhower, replied that to do what Mr. Kennedy suggested "would lose all our friends in Latin America" and "would be an open invitation for Mr. Khrushchev to come in."

Remember that in his inaugural address, Mr. Kennedy declared to cheers that "we shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend or oppose any foe in order to assure the survival and success of liberty." Castro and Cuba fell within that pledge, and Mr. Kennedy's National Security Council found that the continued existence of Castro's regime would endanger American relations with Latin America.

A Fulbright Caveat

ON APRIL 3, two of Mr. Kennedy's youthful aides, Arthur Schlesinger Jr. and Richard Goodwin, produced a State Department pamphlet calling "the present situation in Cuba" a "grave and urgent challenge" and speaking of "the seizure by international communism of a base and bridgehead in the Americas."

Sen. J. William Fulbright (D-Ark.), in a memorandum to the President, declared that "Castro is a thorn in our flesh but he is not a dagger in our hearts." But Fulbright could not dissuade either the President or his top aides.

Even after the debacle, the President, defending himself against charges that he had left the refugee forces to die on the beaches, spoke of "subversion, infiltration and a host of other tactics" that made it "clearer than ever that we face a relentless struggle in every corner of the globe that goes far beyond the clash of armies or even nuclear armaments."

The most instant other problem at the time of Cuba was Laos. Gen. Eisenhower had told Mr. Kennedy just before the change of Presidents that if a political settlement could not be obtained in Laos, he would be willing, "as a last desperate hope, to intervene unilaterally."

Mr. Kennedy himself had told an off-the-record session of radio-TV officials April 6 that "intervention has many hazards, but a collapse is more hazardous. The alternatives are sober. We cannot permit Laos to be won by an insurgent group."

Doubtless he had in mind Khrushchev's January remarks approving insurgencies all over the world, which led Mr. Kennedy to promote counterinsurgency training and the Green Berets. But after the Bay of Pigs, the President's brother, Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy, remarked that if it had not been for the Cuban affair, the United States would probably be up to its ears "in the jungles of Laos."

PLAYBOY

1 April 1971

THE DEATH OF LIBERALISM

a radical journalist contends that the old-line liberals—obsessed with cold-war anti-communism, big government and unworkable social programs—have misled and misgoverned america

opinion By JACK HOLIFIELD

He not busy being born is busy dying.
—BOB DYLAN

THE OLD LIBERALISM is busy dying. As a theory, as a tradition, as a set of institutions, as a group of leaders, liberal anti-communism has become a God that failed. Liberals such as Hubert Humphrey and Nelson Rockefeller have become part of the problem—worn-out fig leaves covering the naked emperor's private parts. The New Deal has become the status quo; the old solution has become the new problem.

Let me be precise about who the liberals and the liberal center are: I'm talking about the Peace Corps, the Alsop brothers, the A.D.A. (Americans for Democratic Action), Bayard Rustin, the A.F.L.-C.I.O., *The New York Times*. I'm also talking about the Ford Foundation, the Office of Economic Opportunity and the Ripon Society—all self-proclaimed pillars of liberalism. There is also the liberalism of those "tough-minded" professors such as McGeorge Bundy, Walt Rostow, John Roche and Henry Kissinger, which has become indistinguishable from the kill-ratio logic of the Defense Department computers that predicted the last Viet Cong guerrilla would die 20 months ago. The liberalism of respectable institutions such as *Commentary* magazine, Freedom House and New York's Liberal Party has become a barrier to social change, a dead hand on the present, preventing the liberation of new ideas, new programs, new movements, new myths. After zigzagging ambiguously through the Thirties and Forties, the American electoral left fell off the track entirely about 1950, and we are still paying the backbreaking price.

We are paying that price in a Vietnam war that began in Harvard Yard, where Bundy, Rostow, Kissinger, Pat

so many fine, formative hours. We are paying that price in a trade-union leadership that stands to the right of *The Wall Street Journal* and the Catholic Church on most public issues. (One cannot help but notice how much the C. I. O. deteriorated after it cleansed itself by purging Reds and radicals in the late Forties.) And we are paying that price in the unnatural isolation of the student, black and anti-war movements of the Sixties, which were forced to start from scratch, bereft of immediate historical fathers.

The crucial point is that during the Fifties, liberalism lost its will to fight and accepted the basic economic and foreign-policy assumptions of the right. And this pulled the center of gravity of American politics decisively away from the left. What has happened these past 20 years is not that the country has grown more conservative but that liberalism has grown more conservative. By failing to organize F. D. R.'s "one third of a nation ill-housed, ill-clad, ill-nourished," by remaining silent during Joe McCarthy's attack on the Bill of Rights and by getting us into Vietnam, liberalism did the work of the right while claiming to represent the left.

Now we must move beyond and transcend the Cold War liberalism of military intervention (Bay of Pigs, Dominican Republic, Vietnam) by becoming peaceful internationalists, once again. And as historians such as Howard Zinn, Christopher Lasch and Staughton Lynd have pointed out, we must go back and rediscover the deeper roots of the indigenous American left in fragments of the Populist, feminist, black, Socialist and Progressive movements of the late 19th and early 20th Centuries.

No insurgent movement has ever succeeded that was rooted in hatred of its own country—a fatal mistake of which parts of the New Left (Weathermen, Yippies) are guilty. By retrieving the banner of the left as it was before it was corrupted by the Cold War, we offer the post-linear kids something inside their own nation with which to identify, so they won't have to import exotic fantasy notions of revolution from North Korea or Bolivia. By restoring the old dignity to the Populist attack on monopolies and abusive corporations and banks, we can take liberalism out of the soft suburban living rooms and place it on the side of the workingman—the unskilled factory worker, the waitress, the gas-station attendant, the dishwasher, the taxi driver, the small farmer. And by reconnecting with the old Populist passion for participation and decentralization, we can begin to end

that all human problems can be solved in Washington if you hire enough experts and bureaucrats and pay for enough Rand Corporation studies.

If something lasting went out of liberalism during the Fifties, then there had to be a deeper reason than just the Cold War, or McCarthyism, or that the unions purged all their rebels. That reason was that the central intellectual formulations of liberal anti-communism were mistaken. I don't say that the liberal leaders of the Fifties were badly motivated or uncommonly corrupt, or that any large numbers were caught in the web of conspiracy woven by the CIA spider. All I argue is that their judgment was bad, and their mistakes have had grievous historical consequences.

They were wrong, first, in their total, fanatical anti-communism, which permitted no possibility for change in the Soviet bloc and blinded them to terrible injustices within their own society and within the so-called Free World. Philosopher Sidney

Hook, the archetypal liberal anti-Communist, was able to write in the *Partisan Review* in 1952: "I cannot understand why American intellectuals should be apologetic about the fact they are limited in their effective historical choice between endorsing a system of total error and critically supporting our own imperfect democratic culture. . . ." That was never the stark either/or choice intellectuals faced. There were always the independent alternatives of democratic radicalism, or neutralism in the Cold War, or support for the great movements against colonialism then being spawned in the womb of the Third World from Cuba to Algeria to Vietnam—movements almost all the NATO intellectuals ignored in their elitist preoccupation with white Western Europe. And one does not make this case now with the cheap wisdom of hindsight. In fact, there were American intellectuals at the time—men such as C. Wright Mills, Dwight MacDonald, Paul Goodman and Norman Mailer—who did resist the tide of fashion and held onto a saving remnant of independent radicalism.

The second conceptual mistake the Fifties' liberals made was "the end of ideology" mischief, popularized by Daniel Bell's book bearing that unfortunate axiom. Bell's theory expressed the remarkable idea that all the great structural problems of America had been solved, and all that was required now were small adjustments, some minor technological tinkering with the soft machine at the top.

The foolishness of this notion has been proved many times by the mass

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Kent's 5th Victim

The Girl in the Picture Finds Only Hate Back Home

By Haynes Johnson
Washington Post Staff Writer

OPA LOCKA, Fla.—When Mary Vecchio came home from Kent State last spring in her flowered miniskirt and sandals held together by tape, she broke down and cried. "I'm so glad to be home," she said, as she embraced her father. It was "the most wonderful thing."

The scene of that tearful airport reunion—Mary, the gangling big-eyed girl with the long dark hair, angular face, and high cheek bones, surrounded by her emotional family, brothers, sisters, mother, father—was recorded by an army of newspaper photographers and television cameramen. The happy ending to an American tragedy.

Mary Vecchio, the "mystery coed" whose look of horror as she knelt over a slain student had been captured by a photographer to become a symbol of national protest, was home.

She wasn't even a coed, it turned out. Just a 14-year-old who had run away from home and turned up, by chance, on the campus the day the Guardsmen fired into the crowd of students, killing four of them. Her parents had seen that picture and identified her. Now, at the airport, it was over.

A week ago last Thursday, Mary Vecchio, now 15, was committed for a six-month period to a juvenile home south of Miami. She had run away again. The Kent State aftermath, her lawyer says, "has ruined her. You can't put that kind of load on a 14-year-old girl and expect her to take it. And if you want to be sociological about it, the family unit for all practical purposes has been destroyed."

He was referring to the climate at home to which Mary returned: the parents who refused to let their children see Mary; the insults in the community; the attitude of the high-school principal who initially suspended her ("The youngsters didn't want to have anything to do with her—and I was proud of them," he says); the policeman who, her parents and lawyer contend, harassed Mary, picking her up four times on charges ranging from loitering to sniffing transmission fluid (none of the charges stood up in court; Mary has never been convicted of a crime);

the restrictions imposed by the youth curfew ordinance of Opa Locka coupled with the restrictions of her own parents; the exploiters who manufactured and sold T-shirts and 6-foot posters showing Mary kneeling over the dead student's body, all without the Vecchios' permission; the monthly proceedings before the juvenile judge because Mary had been placed on probation after she ran away; the transfer to a new school, where she encountered new problems because of her notoriety; the testimony she had to give before the Kent State grand jury—and the FBI—and the state's attorney; the charges by the governor of Florida, Claude Kirk, made over state-wide

television, implying that Mary was part of a Communist plot; and the torrent of mail—obscene, abusive, vicious hate mail—that poured into the Vecchio household from throughout America.

Perhaps above all, it was the attitude of people that made Mary Vecchio a symbol of "American problems of wayward youth, student protests, violence, 'anti-Americanism.'"

In a sense, she has become the fifth victim of Kent State.

The letters alone were enough to leave lasting scars. Mary's mother, Claire, a heavy-set woman with coal-black hair, keeps them in a box in her bedroom.

"I still get shocked," she said, opening the box and taking out the letters, "because I don't believe in bad language myself."

"Look at that," she said, pulling out a newspaper clipping.

It showed pictures of the four slain students, along with one of Mary. Her face had been X-ed out in red ink. Across the top was written: "It's too bad you weren't shot." Mrs. Vecchio shook her head and said: "Can you imagine her looking at that?"

Others, opened at random, read:

"We are wondering why you still worry about your daughter, being she slept with all those hippies that are all diseased. We have no doubt she'll wind up being one of the biggest whores and prostitutes."

"The pictures in all the magazines in this country and abroad of you receiving with welcome arms your daughter is really a farce. If you wanted to find her, you could have. There are ways."

"We believe she should be placed in a juvenile home where she would not cause any trouble on campuses across the country..."

It was signed: "A taxpayer of Ohio."

"Some young people here know what she is—a dirty, foul, syphilitic whore."

"If she is ever seen in Ohio again she will be shot."

"Keep your hoodlum daughter in Florida where she belongs. What you need is a good beating with a strap, beating until you bleed good red blood. Your parents should have left you where you were. You don't deserve to be associated with decent people."

"I am a veteran, I done my hitch... the soldiers hang your picture up and spit on it. See how you stand with the Army??? You should do me world a favor and kill yourself"

One from Pleasantville, N.Y., began "Dear Mary Ann" the way she was identified in the press, although her parents call her "Mary," and said:

"You hippie Communist bitch!

"Did you enjoy sleeping with all those Dope Fiends in Ohio? The dealers of the Kent State four are on the

conscience of yourself and other rabble rousers like you.

"Congratulations."

The Vecchios themselves received threatening letters. "Even I got letters saying they were going to get me for raising such a radical into the world," Mrs. Vecchio says. "There was one letter that said they were going to come here and abolish the whole family, like the Sharon Tate thing. The FBI still has that one."

Mary, she says, has now changed completely.

"She was the happiest child; the friendliest person you ever saw," her mother said. "When she smiled she made you happy. They said in her school it was like the sunshine coming in. And that laugh! When you heard that laugh, you had to laugh."

"But Mary is so different now. She is so nervous. She can't even talk about it. And they're still calling her a Communist. Even her relatives say they're ashamed of her."

Others who know Mary well see different aspects of change. Her father, Frank, a 49-year-old maintenance man for the Dade County Port Authority, says: "Mary don't care for nothing in the world. Nothing. Years ago, she had love for life, love for her family, love for the baby, but now she doesn't have anything to live for. She's not the same girl. No-where the same."

"More Withdrawn"

Phillip Vitello, a Coral Gables lawyer who represents Mary, describes Mary in different terms. "The story's even worse than it seems," he says. "It's affected her mind to a tremendous degree. She's become more withdrawn. She refuses to relate to anybody. Now, she won't even talk to me or to her parents or to the judge."

None of this is to suggest that Mary Vecchio was a problem-free child, a care-free Shirley Temple of the 1970s who merely liked to wander. Like many others youths, Mary was confused and rebelling. She thought her parents too strict, school too confining, the community unappealing. The Vecchios had moved here from Worcester, Mass., nearly 25 years ago. Mary, of Italian extraction who proceeded to have six children

STATINTL

Continued

WASHINGTON POST PARADE
14 March 1971

STATINTL

WALTER SCOTT'S Personality Parade

Q. Why do historians blame the Cuban Bay of Pigs fiasco on President Jack Kennedy? Wasn't it really President Eisenhower's fault?—David Leeds, Cambridge, Mass.

A. It was President Eisenhower who gave Allen Dulles, then in charge of the Central Intelligence Agency, the go-ahead on the agency's plan to train and equip Cuban exiles in the United States to invade Cuba and overthrow Castro.

When President Kennedy took office, he foolishly followed the advice of his military and permitted what was obviously an ill-prepared invasion of Cuba. This resulted in the Bay of Pigs fiasco for which he generously assumed the blame. Similarly, when Lyndon Johnson succeeded to the Presidency, he, too, followed the advice of the military and continued the fiasco Kennedy had begun in Vietnam. The reluctance of incumbent Presidents to alter the foreign policy of their predecessors is one of the great weaknesses of the American Presidency.

M - 192,279
S - 209,887

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Like gets blame for Cuba-U.S. split

By LOY HOLMAN

Rocky Mountain News Writer

COLORADO SPRINGS — The late President Eisenhower's insistence that there be instant payment for American land holdings by Cuban revolutionaries who confiscated this property was the pivotal reason for the initial break in relations between the U.S. and Cuba.

That charge was made Thursday by one of two speakers who appeared on the opening program of a three-day symposium of Cuban Affairs, being held in Armstrong Auditorium on the Colorado College campus.

Lee Lockwood, a noted photo-journalist who has made many trips to Cuba and has interviewed Fidel Castro in person, claimed that the confiscation of the American land holdings during the Castro takeover should not have been surprising.

Bay of Pigs

He maintained, however, that the Cubans offered "deferred payment" for the lands, but that Eisenhower, being swayed by big businessmen within the U.S. and himself influenced by free

enterprise, "was a firm believer in cash on the barrelhead."

The Cubans' inability to make immediate payment eventually led to a closer relationship with Russia and finally the official breaking of diplomatic ties with the U.S. in early 1961.

Lockwood, who was on the scene at the time, said that this set the stage for the infamous Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba by exiles and sympathizers on April 19 of that year.

This event, termed a "complete fiasco" which came about from a Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) funded training camp in nearby Guatemala, is now celebrated in Cuba as "the first defeat of Yankee Imperialism," he said.

Lockwood charged that Eisenhower authorized the train-

ing of this brigade of mercenaries in March 1960 and that President Kennedy supported the action when he was elected.

The bearded journalist, who in 1967 won the Overseas Press Club award for best foreign reporting of that year, pointed out that the ill-fated Bay of Pigs invasion attempt merely solidified the support of the Cuban people behind Castro and pinpointed the U.S. as their enemy.

He said it also forced a close relationship with Russia, but he insisted that Cuba never became a "Russian military base" despite the admission of missiles during that crisis.

Also speaking during Thursday's opening session of the symposium was Prof. Richard R. Fagen of the political science department at Stanford University.

Three themes

Fagen attempted to point out the "order" of the Cuban revolution, with the following three themes:

• The guerrilla attitude that when their cause was right and the time was ripe, no obstacles would be too large. They all shared the hardships involved, but there was no doubt about who (Castro) was in charge.

And because of the ruralism of the revolution in Cuba, there was a great deal of effort which went into the betterment of the rural area, even when economical.

• Castro was given to enthusiasm, dash and sometimes genius, but he realized the need for some planning to make the revolutionary war successful.

• The new regime was to have been set up on the theory of a people's democracy, but there was never a high level of national democracy in Cuba. The closest they have come to their ideal is the local popular tribunals where a neighborhood scalded court settled area conflicts "without the great majesty of the state being involved."

MIAMI, FLA.
NEWS

E - 93,538

FEB 24 1971

He takes issue with McLemore

To The Editor:

Morris McLemore is a fine sports writer, and it would be a good idea if he stuck to sports and didn't get involved in writing about political matters. In any event he would do well to read Albert C. Persons book, Bay of Pigs. Persons, an American pilot hired by the CIA to fly and train Cuban pilots says it was not the CIA who changed the invasion plans at the last minute. It was not the CIA who canceled air attacks vital to the success of the invasion. It was not the CIA who sent the Cuban freedom fighters ashore on a Monday morning without air cover. It was not the CIA who deceived the American people.

The President was honest, and accepted the blame for the failure of the invasion. It is interesting to note that an investigation was ordered, but results were never told to the American or Cuban people.

JAMES MOIST, Miami

The Washington Merry-Go-Round

Castro Stalker Worked for the CIA

By Jack Anderson

The mystery man whom the Central Intelligence Agency recruited to assassinate Cuba's Fidel Castro has been laid up in the sick ward of the Los Angeles County jail.

He is handsome, hawk-faced John Roselli, once a dashing figure around Hollywood and Las Vegas, now a gray, 66-year-old inmate with a respiratory ailment.

Confidential FBI files identify him as "a top Mafia figure" who watched over "the concealed interests in Las Vegas casinos of the Chicago underworld."

Roselli has admitted to friends that he was a rum runner during the Roaring Twenties. Operating along the East Coast, he learned how to evade Coast Guard cutters and police patrols.

His name later became linked with the biggest names in the Chicago and Los Angeles underworlds. He also developed contacts in the Cuban underworld before Castro took over the Havana gambling casinos.

He had the right background for a hush-hush mission that the CIA was planning in 1961. As part of the Bay of Pigs invasion, the CIA hoped to knock off Castro and leave Cuba leaderless.

Risks Neck

Roselli was recruited for the

job by Robert Maheu, a former FBI agent, who admitted to us that he had handled undercover assignments for the CIA. He refused, however, to discuss the details. This is the same Maheu, incidentally, who is now involved in a legal battle over phantom billionaire Howard Hughes' Nevada operations.

Roselli was so flattered over being asked to perform a secret mission for the U.S. government that he paid all his expenses out of his own pocket and risked his neck to land the assassination teams on the Cuban coast.

In James Bond fashion, he held whispered meetings in Miami Beach hotels with Cubans willing to make an attempt on Castro's life. Once, he called on Chicago racket boss Sam Giancana to line up a contact. The confidential files report that Giancana had "gambling interest and an interest in the shrimp business in Cuba." However, the Chicago gangster took no direct part in the assassination plot.

Roselli made midnight dashes to Cuba with his hired assassins in twin powerboats. Once a Cuban patrol ship turned its guns on his darkened boat, tore a hole in the bottom and sank the boat. Roselli was fished out of the water by the other boat, which escaped into the shadows.

In earlier columns, we reported how the CIA furnished

Roselli with deadly poison capsules which he tried through a relative of Castro's chef to plant in the dictator's food. Later, marksmen armed with high-powered Belgian rifles attempted to infiltrate close enough to gun Castro down.

All told, six assassination attempts were made, the last in the spring of 1963. Throughout this period, Roselli worked under the direct supervision of two secret CIA agents, William Harvey and James (Big Jim) O'Connell.

Roselli's Reward

The FBI which got wind of the assassination plot, has tried to pump Roselli for information. But he was sworn to silence by the CIA, and up to this moment, he hasn't broken it.

Meanwhile, the Justice Department, as part of its crack-down on organized crime, tried to nail Roselli. The FBI discovered that his Chicago birth records had been forged, that his name was really Filippo Sacco and that he had come to this country from Italy as a child. He was convicted for failing to register as an alien.

He was also convicted for conspiracy to rig card games at Los Angeles' exclusive Friar's Club.

Of Roselli's two CIA associates, Harvey has now retired to Indianapolis and O'Connell

is still on the CIA payroll. Both admitted to us a friendship with Roselli but refused to discuss their CIA activities. Harvey said he had a "high regard" for Roselli and called the Friar's Club case a "bum rap." Said Harvey: "The Friar's Club indictment is phony. Roselli had no more to do with that than I had."

Roselli's lawyers are now trying to get clemency for their client, citing our stories about his secret CIA service.

STATINTL

KINGSPOINT, TENN.

TIMES

E - 24,246

TIMES-NEWS

S - 30,349

FEB 17 1971

Body Of Pigs Invader: 'America Got Cold Feet'

"The main problem I see in America is you don't know how much you are," Dr. Eduardo Zayas-Bazan told Kingsport Chronicle on Monday at the Kingsport airport. "I'm not a pig."

Dr. Zayas-Bazan, President of the Cuban Revolution, said he was in Kingsport, Tenn., on a mission to help the Cuban people. He said he was in Kingsport, Tenn., on a mission to help the Cuban people.

before he left today for Cuba and the U.S.

Zayas-Bazan was a member of a U.S. Revolutionary team of Cuban exiles who organized the abortive Bay of Pigs invasion and spent a year in Cuba as a prisoner before being released by the U.S.

He attacked the failure of the invasion to American "big boys" who said

the 1500-man Cuban force depended on CIA-promised aid and was stranded without the expected U.S. air-support.

"It took Kennedy too long to decide to back us up," Zayas-Bazan said. He said his unit landed in Cuba and awaited a needed second air-strike that was to have destroyed Castro's eight-plane airforce.

"We waved when we first

saw the planes and then realized they were Castro's," he said. Later he learned that the second air-strike had been cancelled due to "world public opinion."

Zayas-Bazan's unit watched as the Cuban airforce sank two of their boats and drove the others away. They fought for three days until they ran out of ammunition, were captured, and "on the third day Kennedy decided to send

air-support."

Zayas-Bazan said he presently sees no hope for change in Cuban life. He said although there has been some improvement under Castro in education and life for the very poor, "now everyone is hungry in Cuba."

He said, however, the lack of freedom in Castro's Cuba is a more serious problem than economic deterioration. He mentioned that his own

father is now serving a 10-year sentence as a political prisoner.

Zayas-Bazan, who has become a U.S. citizen after eight years in this country, said Americans tend to undervalue their freedom. "Americans have gone way overboard for material things and you have not impressed your children with the value of freedom," he said.

The Place To Begin

In his State of the Union message, heralded by Attorney General Mitchell as "the most important document since they wrote the Constitution," President Nixon has trotted out that fine old perennial, the need to reform the federal bureaucracy in the name of efficiency and better management. The need is obvious but Mr. Nixon is unrealistic in his proposal to pare down the twelve present Cabinet Departments to eight. Such Departments as Labor, Transportation and Agriculture have powerful lobbies and vested interests behind them which are by no means all-Democratic or all-Republican in composition. One may applaud what Mr. Nixon says about the need for reorganization but question that he seriously believes his scheme is realistic from a practical political point of view.

But there is a special reason for doubting his *bona fides* about the reorganization proposal. The four Departments he proposes to leave untouched are Defense, State, Treasury and Justice. Forget Treasury and Justice for the moment. State is probably in greater need of reorganization than any Cabinet department, with the possible exception of the Department of Defense. State at least does little harm; it is simply otiose, but the Defense Department's recklessness, waste and duplicity are clear and present dangers. Closely related to State and Defense is that vast, sprawling conglomerate known as the Intelligence Establishment. It costs \$5 billion annually or more—no one can even approximate the amount, such is the jumble of obfuscation and duplication which it has achieved. The Bay of Pigs was merely an egregious instance of the blunders of which it is capable. The prisoners-of-war raid furnishes a recent example. It was conducted without effective liaison with the Central Intelligence Agency for reasons best known to military intelli-

gence. If the CIA had been closely consulted the operation might not have turned out any better, but the fact remains that its only role was that of a bystander. The latest offense of Army Intelligence—spying on civilians—is merely a prize illustration of the need for close supervision and control of the entire intelligence establishment. No one seems to be able to ride herd on this vast scattered and uncoordinated bureaucracy. For example, no one seems to know quite how military intelligence got into the business of spying on civilians. If anyone has a chance of coping with the intelligence establishment it is the President. Executive orders, not new legislation, would be all that was needed to achieve a greater measure of efficiency and economy.

Here is one specific illustration. Sen. Clifford P. Case (R., N.J.) reveals that the CIA has spent several hundred million dollars to keep those two cold-war monstrosities, Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty, broadcasting from Munich, ostensibly bringing vital information to the Soviet Union and other Communist countries. Both organizations masquerade as private bodies and appeal for public donations. The Advertising Council lends a hand by securing free media time valued at between \$12 million and \$20 million in order to bring in a paltry \$100,000 in public contributions. At the same time the myth is sedulously cultivated that both organizations are sustained by large corporate donations. The fact is, of course, that the CIA comes across with \$30 million a year. The President could, if he would, put a stop to this expensive deception.

Even the intelligence bureaucrats are, somewhat appalled by the present situation. "Trying to draw up an organization chart is a nightmare," one senior aide is quoted as saying. "No one person seems to be in charge. . . . Whoever winds up running this thing is clearly going to have to be someone with the President's confidence." Here, clearly, is the place for the President to apply his zeal for bureaucratic reform and managerial reorganization.

STATINT

ST. LOUIS, MO.
POST-DISPATCH

E - 333,224
S - 558,018

FEB 5 1971

Recalling Jacobo Arbenz

The recent death of Jacobo Arbenz Guzman in Mexico recalls some unpleasant history of American intervention. Mr. Arbenz was elected president of Guatemala in 1950 and immediately embarked on one of the broadest programs for giving land to the peasantry. Among other lands he seized United Fruit Co. holdings. The company challenged the compensation and the Government backed the firm.

While the Arbenz government made no secret of its left-wing nationalism, Mr. Arbenz himself denied he was under Communist influence. However, in May 1954 the State Department announced that a shipload of arms from Communist Poland had been landed in Guatemala. In mid-June Col. Carlos Castillo Armas led an invasion force from Honduras and overthrew the Arbenz government. The invaders were backed by the Central Intelligence Agency.

The timing was interesting. Only about two months elapsed from Washington's discovery of Communist arms shipments to the overthrow of Arbenz. The immediate protestation that the United States had nothing to do with the ouster was more than hard to swallow. Afterward, the CIA seemed both proud and secretive about its victory. Secretary of State Dulles openly boasted about it. But the results were nothing to boast about, for the announced dream of making Guatemala a showcase for democracy in the Caribbean was lost in a nightmare of political reaction.

The Arbenz case is only a chapter in a long story. Yankee intervention in Latin America was old hat when he was ousted. There followed eight years later the CIA's disaster at the Bay of Pigs in Cuba. By that time Washington might have concluded that Guatemala was not Cuba, and that intervention was not worth the political and moral risks even where it succeeded militarily. Yet Marines landed in the Dominican Republic three years after the Bay of Pigs. As the story goes on, the lessons only echo.

CHARLOTTE, N.C.
NEWS

E - 65,014

JAN 27 1971

The
Editorial Research Reports

ARMIES OF SPIES

The United States is still trying to find an acceptable formula for mixing undercover operations with democracy. The latest disclosures that the army has been spying on thousands of civilians again raises questions about the seemingly uncontrolled growth of intelligence operations in this country.

Most of the Army's civilian-watching began in 1967 when it was called in to deal with racial and anti-war disturbances. Ranking officers discovered they had no information on potential troublemakers. An organization called Continental United States Intelligence was set up to get it. Before the unit was disbanded in 1969, it had fed the names of some 18,000 civilians into its computers, dossiers and files.

In the wake of charges that this was the entering wedge of the police state, Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird on Dec. 23, 1970, ordered a shakeup of military intelligence operations to place their operations under stricter civilian control. Laird said he wanted to

make sure these activities were "completely consistent with Constitutional rights, all other legal provisions and national security needs."

Protecting civilian rights may not be all that is on Laird's mind. He is also said to be concerned about increasing the efficiency of military intelligence and reducing the high cost. For the most part, the budgets of the various agencies are classified. The fiscal 1971 Defense Department budget requested a total of \$5.2 billion for intelligence and communications. Thomas Ross and David Wise estimated in The Espionage Establishment (1967) that the CIA spends about \$1.5 billion annually.

Most of the past criticism of intelligence operations has been directed at the Central Intelligence Agency. It was blamed for the failure of the 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion, where it not only had charge of planning the operation but carrying it out. The "company"—as it is sometimes known — was also strongly criticized for its handling of the U-2 incident in 1960.

NEWARK, N.J.
NEWS

E - 267,289
S - 423,331

JAN 28 1971

U.S. Seeking to Reconcile Spying With Democracy

By NATHAN MILLER
Editorial Research Reports

Washington

The United States still is trying to find an acceptable formula for mixing undercover operations with democracy. The latest disclosure that the Army has been spying on thousands of civilians again raises questions about the seemingly uncontrolled growth of intelligence operations in this country.

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Meanwhile, it was reported yesterday that the Army has ordered a "purge" of the files at its counter-intelligence headquarters at Ft. Holabird, Md. However, the directive permits continued spying on some civilians, such as those engaged in attempts to subvert military morale or in un-

authorized activities near Army facilities.

Prime Target

Most of the past criticism of intelligence operations has been directed at the CIA. It was blamed for the failure of the 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion, where it had charge of planning the operation and carrying it out. The "company"—as it is sometimes known—also was strongly criticized for its handling of the U2 incident in 1960.

More recent was the outcry in 1967 when it was disclosed that the CIA was using dummy foundations to fund the National Students Association, cultural organizations and the international operations of some unions. Plans were announced to study the possibility of creating a quasi-public agency to handle such transactions, but no report was made.

Spying on civilians goes much further than Army snooping on politicians and potential troublemakers, according to Sen. Sam J. Ervin, D-N.C. His Senate Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights has scheduled hearings for Feb. 23 in an attempt to end what he has called "this warfare on the American people."

Ervin has charged that the Civil Service Commission keeps a total of 15 million names in a security file. Thousands of other names are being fed into the computer of the Justice Department's Civil Disturbance Group. The Secret Service has a computerized list of activities. The Department of Transportation has an electronic dossier of 2.6 million Americans who ever had a driver's license suspended or revoked. America is well on the way to becoming a dossier society.

26 JAN 1971

All For Intelligence

President Nixon is said to have difficulty ascertaining what all the federal intelligence agencies do, and with how much money and manpower. And if the President cannot figure out what all the espionage is about, how can Congress, or the public?

Thus Mr. Nixon should have thorough support if he undertakes any real reorganization of the various intelligence arms—the Central Intelligence Agency, along with agencies of the Defense, Justice and State Departments and, at times, the FBI. Mr. Nixon has asked his staff to survey this abundance of intelligence effort and to report back with ideas about cutting spy expenses.

Mr. Nixon is the first President really to attempt to make fiscal or any other kind of sense out of the intelligence apparatus, though had he lived John Kennedy might have tried, considering the CIA blunder in the Bay of Pigs fiasco. One of the worst features of so-called intelligence is that it is not entirely that; it has too often been involved in paramilitary ventures far beyond data gathering.

Most citizens probably thought the CIA was supposed to bring all this together, and then President Eisenhower no doubt thought he was co-ordinating something when he set up the U.S. Intelligence Board, but the various agencies still go their own ways with an estimated 200,000 personnel and a similarly estimated expenditure of 3.5 billion dollars a year.

Aside from saving money, reorganization could result in more competent intelligence. But in this mysterious field governmental reorganization may be more difficult than anywhere else.

U.S. Foreign Policy: A Firm Nixon Style

Despite Nation's Mood of Withdrawal, President Strives for Strength Abroad

Following is the seventh and last in a series of articles exploring the Nixon Administration's style in foreign policy:

By MAX FRANKEL

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Jan. 23 — The men and minds at work on foreign policy have changed. The techniques and tactics of American diplomacy have changed. The troops are coming out of Indochina almost as fast as they once went in. The cast of leading characters on the world stage has changed and the rhetoric with which Washington addresses them has changed even more. Most strikingly, the people of the United States have changed their view of the world overseas.

Yet halfway through President Nixon's term the principal goals and ambitions of American foreign policy have hardly changed at all.

Mr. Nixon's Administration looks outward in the defense of American interests though the country is looking inward now for a period of rest and reconstruction.

Even in withdrawing troops from Vietnam, the President seeks to achieve the objectives that prompted massive intervention in the first place.

Even in the face of weariness with obligations abroad, he intends to conduct a forward diplomacy and to keep troops and navies across the seas to assure influence in distant places.

Even amid economic stress and demands for new priorities, he intends to remain pre-eminent in weaponry and to retain the capacity to contest any expansionist impulses in the Soviet union and Communist China.

In sum, President Nixon has labored to protect and to perfect the foreign-affairs concepts of the last two decades against the widespread disenchantment with Vietnam and the allure of insular doctrines.

To cope with those tensions

—and for other reasons as well—the President has further enhanced the power of his office in the conduct of foreign affairs, though he has had to yield some tactical ground to a more assertive Congress and an impatient public. By concentrating decision making in the White House, he has been able to devise his own mix of strategic and political calculations and to shield the process from challengers in Congress and among the public.

Signs of Declining Influence

As the series of articles about the foreign-policy process in The New York Times reported last week, most strategic and geopolitical concepts in the Nixon years have been developed by the President and his energetic adviser on national security, Henry A. Kissinger.

The series found a further decline in the influence of the State Department, continuing a trend that developed throughout the nuclear age. It also found a decline in the Pentagon's influence over foreign policy—also for a combination of reasons—although military leaders have regained some voice in planning policy and play a major role in its execution.

The articles reported a lack of cohesion in the conduct of foreign economic policy and intelligence operations—flaws that the White House has recognized and moved to remedy.

Yesterday's report focused on the still-ill-defined stirring in Congress to capitalize on public sentiment, to check the trend toward Presidential power and to retain a measure of at least restraining influence over foreign and military policies.

Such studies of concealed bureaucratic bargaining and continuing political maneuver cannot be definitive. Within every trend there can be a countertrend. Even minor episodes produce irreconcilable testimony and endless controversy.

For example, an account of irritation in the State Department

because the President had pre-empted its plan to publish last year a major definition of foreign policies evoked new and conclusive evidence that the department knew all along of Mr. Nixon's intention to produce his own report. The White House staff had several times solicited the department's help and did not sense a possible

even tougher than subordinates thought wise.

Reaction to Challenge

Like Presidents John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson, Mr. Nixon has often reacted to challenge as if it were a deliberate test of his willingness and freedom to act.

It was largely to demonstrate that American commitments would not be eroded even by strife at home that he decided from the start to brave the political storms and to withdraw only gradually from Vietnam, without a deadline. Similarly, it was largely to forestall miscalculation in Moscow that he has given more explicit pledges of support to Israel and kept more troops in West Germany than some of his advisers deemed necessary.

Moreover, by concentrating both the definition and the articulation of foreign policy at the White House, the President has been able to adjust his objectives abroad to the often-contrary political pressures at home. He has been eager to reach decisions from a central perspective in order to protect his brand of globalism from what he deems to be the domestic threat of isolationism.

He has proclaimed an ambiguous "doctrine" that essentially preserves commitments overseas while trying to soothe anxiety about them in the United States. It put forward guidelines for future military aid and involvements that neither altered nor criticized past practice in any significant way, but the proposals were shrewdly calculated to reaffirm the self-evident reluctance of the country to repeat the Vietnam experience.

Some Operations Expanded

In much the same way, Mr. Nixon has actually expanded some American operations in Indochina with the stated purpose of facilitating an earlier disengagement.

He moved to the brink of threatening military intervention in the Middle East in the hope of making it unnecessary.

He has withdrawn some troops from South Korea and other inactive theaters to win time and public consent for maintaining large forces in Europe and elsewhere.

He has twice reduced the military budget to preserve support for still-huge defense outlays and for the renovation or expansion of costly weapons systems.

He has abandoned talk of international crusade and ideals and replaced it with an emphasis on pragmatism, thus trying to scale down inflated expectations of American lead-

Articles on Policy Available as Pamphlet

The series of seven articles on foreign policy published by the New York Times in the last week is available in a pamphlet, which can be obtained from the Public Relations Department, The New York Times, New York, N.Y. 10036.

The price is \$1 and bulk rates are available.

conflict until close to publication day. At the department, however, officials continue to insist that they were deliberately crowded out of the picture.

Feelings of mistrust and rivalry are probably more intense than The Times was able to document. They inflame the talk of a gossipy town; beyond that they bear on the extent to which the White House will admit departmental officials to its policy councils and on the zeal and imagination those officials will bring to Presidential directives.

In every branch of government the line between effective and tidy control from the top, as sought by Mr. Nixon, and constructive use of the expertise of the huge Federal establishment is most delicate and difficult to locate. Yet even a lengthy study of how Mr. Nixon has organized the management of international affairs leaves the question of what difference it all makes to the substance of his policies.

The most conspicuous consequence is that he has imposed on all major policy decisions his personal sense of the rivalry with the Soviet Union. He has shown himself cautiously ready to negotiate for accommodation in regions of conflict and for some moderation in the arms race. But he has insisted on proceeding from a posture of strength, both personal and national.

The President has taken or threatened tough action—from Cambodia to Cuba to the Middle East—to prove that he would not hesitate to use his strength and to demonstrate that he was not to be confused with weakness. On several occasions he has wanted to show himself

THE PEOPLE'S RIGHT TO KNOW: HOW MUCH OR HOW LITTLE?

A CONFLICT almost as old as democratic government itself is raging anew in Washington these days. The issue is the accessibility of information about Government operations. This conflict often pits the President and the Executive Branch against Congress, regulatory agencies against consumer interests, bureaucrats against environmentalists, Congress against the voter, the courts against the bar and, at times, the news media against all of them. At its highest levels, the pitch of the argument is tuned by public disquietude over the war in Southeast Asia, and by public concern lest new foreign undertakings, veiled in secrecy, lead to new military commitments, if not to new wars.

A current cliché from the political lexicon—"the people's right to know"—marks the battlefield but does not exactly illuminate it. This lofty phrase was first used a quarter of a century ago by the late Kent Cooper, then executive director of the Associated Press. "It means," he explained, "that the Government may not, and the newspapers and broadcasters should not, by any method whatever, curb delivery of any information essential to the public welfare and enlightenment." The Constitution, as it happens, does not provide for any such right. The courts, moreover, have never interpreted the First Amendment—which prohibits Congress from abridging freedom of speech or the press—as requiring the Government to make unlimited disclosures about its activities.

Delicate Activities. Indeed, an uncurbed "right to know" collides dramatically with what might be called "the right not to know." Ever since governments were first conceived by man, public officials have argued that certain delicate activities of the state were best conducted in secrecy—intelligence operations, for instance, or diplomatic dealings. In the U.S., specific provisions for secrecy have quite often been enacted by Congress, as in the acts establishing the Central Intelligence Agency and the Atomic Energy Commission. Congress has also allowed business enterprises the right to hold inviolate their trade secrets, processes and many other internal operations.

In addition, the courts have upheld the validity of legal strictures concerning the substantial privacy of federal income tax returns, the raw investigatory files of the FBI, testimony given to federal grand juries, the confidential nature of the doctor-patient relationship, and a host of other matters. More often than not, Presidents have been able to shield their personal subordinates and the internal papers of their Administrations from investigation by either Congress or the press on the grounds of "executive privilege."

Many historians, philosophers and journalists agree that there have to be certain checks on the unlimited right of the public to knowledge about its government. Clinton Rossiter, a leading historian of the presidency, counted executive secrecy in diplomacy an essential prerogative of a President. Columnist Walter Lippmann, in his classic *The Public Philosophy*, observed that only within an ideal society, where laws of rational order prevail, is there "sure and sufficient ground for the freedom to speak and to publish." Even James Russell Wiggins, former editor of the *Washington Post* and an articulate spokesman for press freedom, takes no unlimited view of "the right to know." While decrying the proliferation of governmental secrecy, he writes: "We can give up a little freedom without surrendering all of it. We can have a little secrecy without having a Government that is altogether secret. Each added measure of secrecy, however, measurably diminishes our freedom."

Secret Details. The question arises whether or not too many measures of secrecy have been imposed upon the conduct of public affairs in America. A case in point is the extraordinary number of military and diplomatic agreements the U.S. has made in recent years with an assortment of allies and satellites. Many of these treaties in disguise involve a vast expenditure of resources in aid of other countries if war broke out. More often than not, details of the commitments were kept secret from the American public until disclosed by inquisitive news-

men or equally inquisitive congressional investigators.

Consider Laos. It is no secret any longer that the U.S. is today deeply involved in an undeclared war there, allied with the supposedly neutralist government of Prince Souvanna Phouma against the North Vietnamese and the Pathet Lao. Yet only after Senator Stuart Symington's Foreign Relations Subcommittee looked into the matter, against the wishes of the State Department, did the American public learn in detail how U.S. aircraft based in Thailand were bombing northern Laos, the CIA was guiding the operations of Meo tribesmen, and the U.S. was providing millions in military assistance to Souvanna Phouma—all clear violations of the 1962 Geneva accords on Laotian neutrality.

Among the reasons for secrecy about Laos advanced by Deputy Assistant Secretary of State William Sullivan was that the U.S. wanted to avoid forcing the Russians into taking "official" cognizance of activities about which they knew only unofficially. Plaintively, Senator Symington suggested that the U.S. public had a valid interest in knowing what was going on in Laos, since "we could run into the same kind of escalation as we did in Viet Nam."

Symington's subcommittee also uncovered, for the first time, details of secret agreements with Ethiopia dating back to 1960, under which the U.S. has armed a 40,000-man army at a cost to the American taxpayer of \$159 million. Although the extent of U.S. arms assistance to Emperor Haile Selassie is still cloaked by security, State Department officials admit that U.S. bombs and ammunition have been used against insurgent rebels and that U.S. military advisers supervise the training of Ethiopian troops. In defense of this agreement, Assistant Secretary of State David Newsom told the subcommittee that disclosures about Ethiopia had not been made because of "the great sensitivity" of the Emperor. Presumably, in State Department thinking, the "sensitivity" of the American public and Congress to this major diplomatic undertaking was of lesser importance.

Too Much "Exdis." Occasionally, the Government's concern for secrecy affects not only the public's right to know but its own efficiency of operation. When officials of the Water Pollution Control Administration flew to New Orleans recently to investigate a fire on an offshore oil drilling platform in the Gulf of Mexico, they discovered that the relevant papers had been locked up by the Interior Department's Geological Survey, which was responsible for supervising the drilling. A recent study of the State Department's operations found that too many reports from the field were being marked "exclusive" or "no distribution" ("Exdis" and "Nodis" in State lingo). As a result, so much current information is restricted to senior officials that the judgment of their subordinates is often irrelevant or out of date.

Information gathered at the taxpayers' expense is often kept secret for no better reason than apathy or red tape. When Dr. J.B. Rhine of Duke University, the noted expert on parapsychology, was asked recently to undertake some research for the Department of Defense, he agreed—but at the same time inquired why an 18-year-old study of his on the training of dogs to detect land mines had never been made public. Apparently, no one had bothered to declassify the material. A more pressing case of bureaucratic ineptitude involves the Atomic Energy Commission, which holds literally thousands of research papers and reports in classified storage. The material cannot be released because the commission cannot hire the personnel needed to declassify it—even though the reports would be of significance for the peaceful development of atomic energy.

The Government's predilection to do as much as possible in secrecy also affects domestic issues of fairly direct concern to the taxpayer. Environmentalists opposed to development of the SST, for example, have had difficulty gaining access to the report, which is critical of the supersonic transport, the Justice Department claims that the report is a "presidential document" and thus not subject to forced release. Preparation of a national inventory

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NO INTELLIGENCE

A Worried Look At The C.I.A.

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THE Central Intelligence Agency was established in 1947 after its wartime predecessor, the Office of Strategic Services (O.S.S.), was exposed as thoroughly infiltrated by the Communists. Let us examine some of that O.S.S. personnel.

In 1948, former Communist spy Elizabeth Bentley appeared as a witness before the House Committee on Un-American Activities. On Page 529 of the formal report of those Hearings is the record of Miss Bentley's testimony about intelligence she received from Comrades inside O.S.S. while she was operating as a Soviet courier:

All types of information were given, highly secret information on what the OSS was doing, such as, for example, that they were trying to make secret negotiations with governments in the Balkan bloc in case the war ended, that they were parachuting people into Hungary, that they were sending OSS people into Turkey to operate in the Balkans, and so on. The fact that General Donovan [head of O.S.S.] was interested in having an exchange between the NKVD [the Soviet secret police] and the OSS.

That's right, O.S.S. and the N.K.V.D. were working very close indeed.

When asked what kind of information Communist O.S.S. operative Maurice Halperin gave her to be forwarded to the Soviet Union, Miss Bentley testified:

"Well, in addition to all the information which OSS was getting on Latin America, he had access to the cables which the OSS was getting in from its agents abroad, worldwide information of various sorts, and also the OSS had an agreement with the State Department whereby he also could see State Department cables on vital issues." Halperin was Chief of the O.S.S. Latin American Division at the time when, as Miss Bentley has sworn, he was one of her contacts in a Soviet espionage ring.

Carl Aldo Marzani was Chief of the Editorial Section of the O.S.S. Marzani has been several times identified under oath as a member of the Communist Party. Using the most highly classified information, he supervised the making of charts on technical reports for higher echelons of the Army, the Navy, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the O.S.S. Comrade Marzani made policy decisions and was liaison officer between the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Army and the Office of the Undersecretary of War.

When questioned before a Congressional Committee, Irving Fajans of O.S.S. took the Fifth Amendment rather than admit to his Communist Party membership and long history of activities on behalf of the Soviets. Comrade Fajans was a key O.S.S. operative despite the fact that he was known to have been member of the Communist Party and have served in the Communists' Abraham Lincoln Brigade in Spain during the years 1937-1938.

Robert Talbott Miller III was another contact of Soviet courier Elizabeth Bentley. An O.S.S. employee assigned to the State Department, he was Assistant Chief in the Division of Research. On a trip to Moscow, Comrade Miller married a member of the staff of the *Moscow News*.

Leonard E. Mins, a writer who had worked for the International Union of Revolutionary Writers in Moscow and written for *New Masses*, was also on the staff of the top secret O.S.S. Comrade Mins took the Fifth Amendment rather than deny his past and present membership in the Communist Party. He refused to deny that he was a Soviet agent ever

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